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ABSTRACT
In the last two decades, the Atlantic bluefin tuna has been increasingly targeted by
fishermen throughout the world, primarily for sale in Japan. Commercial fishermen,
attempting to survive in a world of declining commercial catches, increased controls on
fishing effort, and increasing competition, view the U.S. $.50.00 or more per kilogram that
might be obtained from bluefin as a financial bonanza. Yet, the population of breeding
adult bluefin in the western Atlantic (the focus of bluefin fishing, since the largest bluefin
consistently occur there) has declined by an estimated Tl% to 90% since the 1970's. In
addition, the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean stocks have declined by an estimated .50%.
The international body which manages this resource is the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (lCCAT). ICCAT, fonned in 1966, is
charged to "investigate and study tuna resources and to adopt recommendations in order to
maintain the populations of tuna and simHar fish in the Atlantic Ocean at levels permitting
the maximum sustainable catch for food and other purposes." Although harvest restrictions
were implemented for this species in 1982, there have been no strong signs of
improvement in stock conditions over the twelve years since the restrictions were
implemented.
One way to improve the condition of the stock is to slow down international trade
of the bluefin species under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES). A CITES listing, as a supplement to ICCAT's management plan, would monitor
the worldwide trade in bluefin tuna, while allowing for fishery organizations to work
towards a comprehensive global management regime for the future.
Today, the Atlantic bluefin tuna has become a flagship fishery species illustrating
the wide array of viewpoints regarding current fishery practices and management. The
debate over the benefits and failures of international management of this particular fishery
has come to the forefront of global fisheries issues.
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PREFACE
In the last two decades, the abundance of bluefin tuna has been drastically reduced
by commercial fishing for human consumption. Unfortunately, the management of this
highly migratory species by international fishery organizations, such as the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), has failed to halt this serious
decline.
One way to improve the condition of the stock is to slow down international trade
of the bluefin species under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES). A CITFS listing, as a supplement to ICCAT's management plan, would monitor
the worldwide trade in bluefin tuna, while allowing for fishery organizations to work
towards a comprehensive global management regime for the future.
Today, the Atlantic bluefin tuna has become a flagship fishery species illustrating
the wide array of viewpoints regarding current fishery practices and management. The
debate over the benefits and failures of international management of this particular fishery
has come to the forefront of global fisheries issues.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, the bluefin tuna in the western Atlantic Ocean have
increasingly been targeted by fishermen from throughout the world, primarily for sale in
Japan. The western Atlantic is the primary area for bluefin fishing, since the largest bluefin
consistently inhabit this region. Although the world catch of bluefin is small in comparison
to world fishery volumes, fishing fleets from many countries have entered the competition.
From 1970 to 1991, an estimated 59 countries have exported bluefin tuna to the Japanese
market, the primary and most valuable market for this species.! Commercial fishermen, in
an attempt to survive in a world of declining commercial catches, increased controls on
fishing effort, and increased competition, view the bluefin as a financial bonanza, because
of the $50.00 or more per kilogram that can be obtained from its sale.2 Without proper
controls, overfishing of the bluefin continues to occur on an enormous scale. This
extensive fishing pressure has caused bluefin populations in all the world's oceans to
drastically decline.
The decline in the western Atlantic bluefin stock exemplifies what is happening to
other commercial species of fish. Of the seventeen major fisheries in the world, nine are in
severe decline, and four are commercially depleted.3 This decline is especially seen in the
western Atlantic Ocean. A report by the American Fisheries Society states "[The] majority,
if not virtually all of the important fin fish stocks...off the [Atlantic] and Gulf of Mexico
coasts of the U.S. are overfished or are clearly on the way to that condition."4 Haddock,
cod, redfish, hake, and pollack have decreased about 90 percent since the 1970's.5
Swordfish, salmon and shark stocks are also severely depleted. The collapse of the cod
! (Gaski, 1993), p. 32-34.
2 Ibid.
3 (Seabrook, 1994), p. 52.
4 (American Fisheries Society, 1992)
5 (Seabrook, 1994), p. SO.
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fishery on the Grand Banks, which is mostly in Canadian waters, has put more than
30,000 fishery employees out of work.6 More fishermen, increased demand for seafood,
and better technology for catching and transporting fish are the main reasons for these
declines.
The old assumption that the number of fish in the sea is limitless is another
fundamental reason that marine fishery management is faiUng. Some natural resources,
such as timber, bison, land, and wild horses, used to be managed i?e same way; each time
the resource came near to extinction the philosophy came under severe scrutiny and the
management resultingly evolved. Now these resources are privately owned and controlled.
Traditionally, most countries including the United States, have operated on an "open
access"7 approach where anyone who wanted to go out and fish could do so without
paying the government for using the resource - hence no rent nor taxes. Ocean
management has slowly begun to adapt from the open access philosophy. This gradual
change is evidenced in attempts at regulations for fisheries, such as the bluefin tuna, yet
such restrictions have general!ly been met with a lack of compliance by those benefiting
from the fishery. The result is that fishing effort on the bluefin stocks continues to be
greater than what the stocks can sustain.
Scientific data shows that the population of breeding adult bluefin (eight years and
older) in the western Atlantic has declined by n percent to 90 percent since the 1970's.8
The eastern Atlantic population, including the Mediterranean, has declined by about 50
percent9 The decline of bluefin species (northern and southern) is evident in other parts
of the world as well. Southern bluefin tuna, taken in all oceans south of 30 degrees South,
6 Ibid, p 52.
7 "Open access is dermed generally as an incomplete set of private property rights. and more specifically as
where the rights to use the fishery resource. and to exclude others from using the resource. are not vested in
an individual or group of individuals" (Sutinen, 1993. p. 1). citing (Cheung. 1970, & Ciriacy-Wantrup and
Bishop. 1975).
8 (lCCAT, 1993). p. 153-162.
9 Ibid.
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are considered to be over-exploited10, and the catches of northern bluefin in the eastern
Pacific are also showing similar patterns of decline in recent years. The over-exploitation
of bluefin tuna has led to severe~y reduced stock sizes, and controversy as to how and to
what extent the fishery should be managed. The international status of this highly
migratory species continues to pose a challenge as to its management as an international
common property resource over which no one country has jurisdiction.
There are several international fisheries arrangements which deal with the scientific
study and management of tuna, all of which evidence similar problems when attempting to
manage these highly migratory species. Of primary concern to this research is the Atlantic
bluefin tuna under the jurisdiction of the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
ICCAT, formed in 1966, is charged to "investigate and study tuna resources and to
adopt recommendations in order to maintain the populations of tuna and similar fish in the
Atlantic Ocean at levels permining the maximum sustainable catch for food and other
purposes." 11 Although harvest restrictions were implemented for this species in 1982,
there have been no strong signs of improvement in stock conditions over the 12 years since
the restrictions were implemented. 12
The decline in tuna populations, in particular the Atlantic bluefin tuna provides
evidence that ICCAT and other fisheries institutions such as the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission (lATIC) and the Convention of the Conservation of Southern Bluefin
Tuna (CCSBT), are not effective in restoring over-exploited ttma populations, nor in
managing tuna resources on a maximum sustainable basis. Therefore, hypothesis one of
this research states that there is clear evidence of over-exploitation of many bluefin tuna
lOAn appraisal of exploitation is given for a stock of a species using the tetms unknown. protected, not
exploited, under-exploited. moderately exploited, fully exploited, and over-exploited. These terms describe
the effect of current fishing effort on each stock. and represent the assessment scientists' educated opinion
based on CUlTent data and the knowledge of the stocks over time. (NOAA. 1992), p. 8.
11 (lCCAT, 1993), MissioniPurpose Statement
12 (Scott, 1992), passim.
3
stocks and hypothesis two states that ICCAT, as well as other existing international
mechanisms, have been virtually ineffective in providing for management of a sustainable
harvest of this species. There are fundamental problems which inhibit these fishery
organizations from adequately managing tuna The major problem areas include scientific
data collection and analysis, science versus politics, conflict between member and non-
member nations, flags of convenience and enforcement. These problems have not been
properly addressed by ICCAT, which further demonstrates a need for an effective
regulatory plan over the Atlantic bluefin species. The increasing exploitation of tuna stocks
makes development and implementation of sound conservation programs imperative.
Much still remains to be done to overcome political and social obstacles and refine the
management techniques necessary to obtain optimum results.
To strengthen tuna management, a solution may need to come from outside the
present systems. Since international trade of the bluefin species in the Atlantic is a primary
factor affecting the population, a reasonable solution would be for a global management
system, such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), to
strengthen the existing management regimes, by monitoring the worldwide trade in bluefin
tuna In fact, a single management organization for these species, operating on a global
basis, would be the most effective arrangement of all in terms of monitoring trade,
gathering statistical information, and coordinating and enforcing regional management
decision making. Hypothesis three of this research addresses the fact that although there
are identifiable problems inherent in organizations such as ICCAT and CITES, the listing
of bluefin tuna by CITES affords new opportunities to advance the protection of the species
by overcoming the limitations in existing regulatory mechanisms.
Today, the Atlantic bluefin tuna has become a flagship fishery species illustrating
the wide array of viewpoints regarding current fishery practices and management The
debate over the benefits and failures of international management of this particular species
has come to the forefront of global fisheries issues.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND ON THE WESTERN ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TUNA
Bluefin tuna possess unique qualities that necessitate special consideration if the
species is to be managed properly. In order to appreciate the complexities of managing
bluefin tuna, it is first necessary to understand the tuna resource and its unique properties
by examining the relevant biological, economical and historical aspects surrounding the
species.
A. THE WORLD TUNA RESOURCE
1. Biological Factors of the Tuna and Tuna-like Species - The tuna ("tuna" is Greek
meaning "to rush") and tuna-like fish include a large number of diverse species that for
management purposes are most often grouped into three categories. The first category, the
principal market species, includes six major tuna types which make up about 70 percent of
the world catch of tuna and tuna-like fishes. 13 These six types, in order of largest to
smallest in world catch are: skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis), yellowfin (Thunnus
albaca.res), bigeye (T. obesus), albacore (T. alalunga), northern bluefin (T. thynnus), and
southern bluefin (T. maccoyii).
The second category, commonly referred to as secondary market species, make up
about 22 percent of the world catch. These smaller and less heavily exploited species
primarily include seerfishes, bullet tunas, black skipjack, longtail, bonito, and others. 14
The third category includes billfish and swordfish, accounting for about three percent of the
world catch of tuna and bJna-like species. 1S
13 (!ATIe, 1991), p. 99-102.
14 Ibid.
is Ibid.
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World-wide catches of the principal market species of tunas in the Atlantic, Pacific
and Indian Oceans are shown in Figure 1, page 7. World catches of the three categories of
tuna and tuna-like species are shown in Figure 2, page 8.
The tuna and tuna-like fishes, including the billfishes, are nearly aU characterized by
rapid growth and most species attain a large size. They spawn large numbers of eggs over
certain areas of the oceans. The eggs hatch quickly and the small fish grow fairly rapidly.
Tunas and billfishes are among the fastest swimming species in the ocean and, in
fact, cannot stop swimming - their high density would make them sink if they did. They
would also suffocate if they stopped swimming because they must move large volumes of
water over their gills to meet their high oxygen demands. Their minimum swimming speed
moves them through the ocean at more than one body length a second16
Most tuna and tuna-like fish are known as highly migratory species because they
undertake extensive migrations. This migratory mode of existence sets them apart from
most other fish. They may be in the coastal waters of one nation today and in those of
another nation or on the high seas tomorrow. In short, they recognize no human-made
boundaries.
In the Pacific Ocean, northern bluefin and albacore migrate between the eastern
Pacific, off Canada. Mexico, and the United States coastal waters, and the western Pacific,
off Japan, Australia and New Zealand's coastal waters. 17 Skipjack are known to travel
between the central Pacific and the coastal waters of both the eastern Pacific and Japan.
Southern bluefin migrate circumpolarly from spawning areas around Australia to the
Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Yellowfin and bigeye, found in all three Oceans,
migrate long distances but do not appear to make as extensive migrations as the other
principal market species. 18 In the Atlantic Ocean, northern bluefin tuna are known to
16 (Joseph, 1983), p. 124-125.
17 (Joseph & Greenough. 1979), p. 5-12.
18 Ibid.
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Figure I
Catches of the principal market species of tunas in 1992, in thousands of
short tons.
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Figure 2
World catches of tunas and tuna-like species in 1992, in thousands of short
tons.
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range from Labrador to Uruguay in the western Atlantic, and from the Mediterranean to
Sierra Leone, Africa, in the eastern Atlantic. l9 Albacore and skipjack are believed to
migrate just as extensively.
In contrast, many of the secondary market species, although available information
is limited, appear to be less migratory than the principal market species. Billfish and
swordfish are known to be highly migratory, with some species making migrations of
several thousand miles.
It is their unique characteristics which set tunas and billfish apart from other fishes,
such as snapper, herrings, anchovies, and flatfishes, and which requires that they be given
special treatment to insure proper conservation and management Because of the tuna and
twla-like fishes unique characteristics - high fecundity, rapid growth, age at maturity, and
worldwide distribution, it is possible to fish these species to such a low population level
that production is reduced substantially, resulting in economic chaos in world fisheries for
tuna.20
Tuna Industries - Fishermen from a growing number of states using many gear
types participate in tuna fishing (from an estimated 40 nations in 1974 to 59 nations in
1991). Yet, even as early as 1974, approximately 75 percent of the principal market
species were taken by only six states: Japan, USA, Republic of Korea, Spain, Republic of
China, and France.21 In 1988, about 80 percent of the principal market species were
taken by Japan, USA, Spain, Republic of Korea, Philippines, France, Indonesia, Mexico,
19 The eastern and western Atlantic bluefm populations are considered distinct for fishery management
purposes. ICCAT conducts assessments of Atlantic bluefm under the hypothesis of the existence of two
separate stocks with a limited rate of exchange: one stock in the east Adantic, including the Mediterranean.
and one in the west Atlantic. divided at 45 degrees W in the northern hemisphere and 25 degrees W in the
southern hemisphere. (ICCAT Report 1993, p. 154). There is approximately a three percent west-to-east
exchange of adult bluefm across the Adantic Ocean.(Hoover 1983). p. 14. See Chapter V.B.l for a further
description of one stock/two stock theory.
20 (Joseph, 1983). p. 124-125.
21 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979). p. 5-12.
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and Republic of China.22 Historically, the two dominant states in tenns of both
production and consumption are Japan and the U.S.~ this has remained true to the present.
Pacific Ocean Tuna Fisheries - While yellowfin and skipjack comprise the most
significant portion of the catch made in the Pacific Ocean, bluefin, bigeye, albacore, black
skipjack, bonito, and billfishes also contribute to the overall harvest in this area. The
estimated catch of all tuna and tuna-like species in the eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO) in 1993
was about 350.8 thousand tons, and landings of this total fish caught, by country, were as
follows: 29 percent were landed in Mexico; 28 percent in Ecuador; and 14 percent in
Venezuela23 Other countries with significant landings of tunas caught in the EPO
included Colombia, Costa Rica, and the United States, each of which accounted for·
approximately nine percent of the landings.24
Atlantic Ocean Tuna Fisheries - Important commercial and recreational species in
the Atlantic include bluefin tuna, swordfish, yellowfin tuna, bigeye tuna, albacore, skipjack
tuna, blue and white marlin, sailfish, longbill spearfish, and other minor fishes.25 Many
anglers catch billfish, blue and white marlin, and sailfish in U.S waters and occasionally
longbill spearfish. Commercial fishing for these fish in U.S. waters is now banned, but
they may be accidentally caught on tuna and swordfish longlines. Both the bluefin tuna
and the swordfish species in the Atlantic are far over-utilized, and recent harvests have
heightened the risk of a population collapse.26 In addition, the catches of albacore,
skipjack, bigeye, blue and white marlin and sailfish are in excess of maximum sustainable
levels, and these species are believed to be fully, if not over-uti.lized.27 For the other
species, the status of utilization is unknown due to poor catch and effort statistics.28
22 (NOAA, 1992), passim.
23 (lATIC, 1993), p. 15-21.
24 Ibid.
25 (NOAA, 1992), p. 36-38.
26 Ibid.
27 (lCCAT, 1992)~ and (NOAA, 1992), p. 36-38.
"8 0.. (N AA, 1992), p. 36-38.
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From the early 1960's through 1977, U.S. fishermen averaged about 5,000 tons
per year of oceanic pelagics.29 Since 1978, U.S. fishermen have caught 8,000 tons or
more per year, and during 1987-90 they averaged 18,130 tons per year.30 However, the
estimated current potential yield of oceanic pelagics is 13,335 tons per year, indicating
over-harvesting of these populations.3 1 The U.S. dockside value of these fishes soared
from about $20 million in the early 1980's to over $100 million in 1989, and has increased
annually since then.32
The exploitation rate of Atlantic tuna and tuna-like fisheries exemplify a trend seen
in all the world's oceans. All the major stocks of the principal market species except
possibly for skipjack, appear to be close to fully, fully, or over-exploited on a worldwide
basis. All species of billfish are considered to be at least fully exploited and most are
moderately to severely over-exploited as well.33
2. The Bluefin Tuna Fishery- The bluefin tuna is a creature of superlatives. It can grow to
12 feet long, weigh up to 1.500 pounds and move at speeds of up to 50 miles per hour.34
It is one of the largest and fastest of fish, which travels in schools and is capable of living
in waters of greatly varying temperatures. 35 Built for speed and endurance, like most
tunas, its fins retract into slots during high speed acceleration. The bluefin is one of the
most highly developed of the tuna species and through its thermal exchange system, is able
to maintain a body temperature of 24 degrees C to 35 degrees C (though they inhabit waters
ranging as low as 6 degrees C)}6 Bluefin tuna exhibit some of the longest migrations as
compared to all other tuna species, and they have more restricted spawning grounds than
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 (ICCAT. 1993a), p. 162-168.
34 (Sarma. 1993), p. 229.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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most of the tropical tunas.37 Their mobility coupled with their high economic value make
their conservation and management difficult, but also a priority for most countries
involved.
LongJine and purse seine are the most popular gear types for bJuefin fishing
worldwide.38 Purse seining is a surface fishing method and is the more effective method
in terms of catch per unit of effort expended.39
The total volume caught of both bluefin tuna species (northern and southern) does
not represent an important proportion of the world's overall catch of fish. For example, the
world bluefin tuna catch in 1986 was only about 96,0Cl0 tons (about 0.12% of the world
catch for that year).40 Neither is bluefin tuna a significant part of the staple protein diet of
world populations. Nevertheless, the demand for bluefin tuna is firmly established - about
two-fifths of the catch is taken or consumed by just one nation, Japan. Over the past 20
years, the Japanese culture has increasingly required bluefin tuna for a luxury food item.41
3. Biuefin Species. by Area
a. Northern Bluefin in the Pacific Ocean - The catches of bluefin in the Pacific Ocean are
much less than those of skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye or albacore, but the fishery is still of
considerable economic value.42 Bluefin landings in the EPO consist mostly of age 1 and
age 2 fish,43 whereas age 0 and age 1 fish represent 90 percent of the western Pacific
Ocean (WPO) catch.44 The Japanese catch approximately 90 percent of the western
37 (lAITC, 1991), p. 91-127.
38 (lCCAT, 1993), p. 153.
39 (Joseph & Greenough., 1979), p. 9.
40 (Gaski, 1993), p. 1.
41 Ibid.
42 (lAITC, 1993), p. 82-89.
43 A year class (or cohort), such as age 1 fISh, are those fish in a stock born in the same year. For
example, the 1990 year class of Atlantic bluefm includes all those bluefm born in 1990, which would be
age 1 in 1991. (In 1990, they would be age 0.)
44 (lAITC, 1991), p. 6-7.
12
Pacific stock, mainly by trolling and by purse seining.45 In the eastern Pacific bluefin are
caught almost exclusively by purse seines.
Catches of bluefin reveal that the fish migrate fairly extensively between the WPO
and the EPO. General distribution and migration routes for the Pacific bluefin are shown in
Figure 3, page 14. It is believed that the northern b~uefin species in the Pacific spawns at
about age 5 plus. Spawning occurs in the area between Japan and the Philippines and in
the Sea of Japan.46 Fish from 15 to more than 200 ern in length are harvested in the
western Pacific by a variety of gears. The greatest numbers of fish are taken by trolling
and the greatest weights by purse seining. In the eastern Pacific they are caught almost
exclusively by purse seines. Most of these fish are about 65 to 100 cm in length, although
a few more than 200 cm long are caught47
Annual catches of bluefin for the entire Pacific Ocean ranged from 19,086 thousand
tons in 1951, to a peak of 34,544 thousand tons in 1981, and gradually decreased to
14,910 thousand tons in 1992.48 Catches in the eastern Pacific have been low for the past
10 years (except 198~1986), yet, present evidence, according to scientists is insufficient to
provide an explanation as to the causes (i.e. overfishing, reduced effort, population
dynamics, etc.) of the low catch rates.49
The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATIC), which has jurisdiction
over northern bluefin tuna in the eastern Pacific, has carned out research on the species
since 1973 but has never established regulations.50
45 Ibid.
46 (Bayliff, 1990), p. 57.
47 (lATTC, 1991), p. 3.
48 (lATTC, 1993), p. 188.
49 (lATTC, 1991), p. ~27.
50 Ibid.
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Figure 3
A model for northern bluefin migration in the Pacific Ocean.
Source: Bayliff, 1990
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b. Southern Bluefin in All Oceans - This species is distributed in all oceans south
of30 degrees south of the equator. The worldwide distribution of southern bluefin tuna is
shown in Figure 4, page 16.
It is believed to be a single stock which spawns in the eastern Indian Ocean, south of Java
from September to March. Southern bluefin grow at a slow rate, maturing in about 8 years
at 140 cm in length. They can live to be over 20 years.51
Australia, Japan, and New Zealand are the main countries fishing for this species.
In addition, Indonesia, Korea, and Taiwan are increasingly targeting the southern bluefin,
but adequate data as to the amounts caught by these countries is limited.52 Historically,
the stock has been exploited by Australian and Japanese fishermen for more than 35 years,
with New Zealand joining the fishery in the late 1970's.53 The Japanese longline fishery,
taking older aged fish, recorded its peak catch of 77,927 tons in 1961, and the Australian
surface catch of young fish peaked at 21,500 tons in 1982.54 (Data on peak catch for New
Zealand is unavailable.) In 1991, catches by these three countries, Australia, Japan, and
New Zealand, were 4,162 tons, 7,360 tons 55 and 2,828 tons, respectively.56
Catches by Australia, Japan, and New Zealand have been limited by quotas through
national legislation since 1986, and through the Convention of the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) since 1994. However, member countries only
implemented the quotas in the year 1989. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA)57 is concerned with tuna stocks in a specific Pacific Ocean region and the Indian
Ocean Fishery Commission (IOFC) and Indo-Pacific Fisheries Commission (IPFC)58 are
concerned with tuna stocks in the Indian Ocean.
51 Ibid, p. 5-6.
52 -(lAITC, 1991) p. 5.
53 Ibid.
54 (lCCAT, 1993), p. 182-183.
55 Ibid.
56 (Wanyama, 1994), table 4.
57 Detailed descriptions of CCSBT and FFA are given in chapter four.
58 Detailed descriptions of lAITC, IOFC and IPFC are given in chapter four.
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The IOFC and IPFC have broad responsibilities for fishery research and development in
this region, but do not set management regulations over tuna Stocks of southern bluefin
have fallen to an over-exploited level and it is estimated that the current parental stock is at
the lowest levels ever.59
c. Northern Bluefin of the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea - The Atlantic
northern bluefin species is primarily taken along the east and west coasts of the Atlantic
Ocean and in the Mediterranean Sea by both commercial and sports fishermen. This
species is primarily caught with three gear types - bait fishing, longlining and purse
seining. Most bluefin tuna in the west Atlantic are caught by longlining. Conversely, in
the east large catches are made by purse seine, baitboat and even trap fisheries.60 In the
east Atlantic, which supports a large fishery, over 90 percent of the bluefin catch is
composed of fish of age 1 or less.61 The size of fish caught varies in accordance with the
gear used, the time of year and the area fished.
The western Atlantic stock, which spawns in the Gulf of Mexico, migrates
northward along the U.S. coast to the Canadian coast When they leave the spawning
ground, they have a low lipid content and thus are of relatively low value to commercial
fisheries; with an increase in lipid content the price of tuna increases markedly.62
The western stock has been considered to be in a serious state of depletion for
almost 20 years. Management regulations of the western stock have been passed by the
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT),63 and take the
form of catch restrictions, minimum size limits, and closed areas. Catches have been
restricted to 2,660 mt (metric tons) annually since 1983, about half the average during the
59 (Wanyama, 1994)
60 (lCCAT. 1993). p. 153-162.
61 -(lATIC, 1991). p. 91-127.
62 (National Academy of Science. 1994), p. 39-4l.
63 A detailed description oflCCAT is given in chapter four.
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period 1973-1981.64 Although the western stock has been protected by various
management measures, it does not appear to be recovering.65 The only exception is the
recent apparent stability on the numbers of younger fish.
The eastern stock. which spawns in the Mediterranean Sea, is also in a depleted state.
The status is bleak for the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean breeding populations, which are
currently estimated to be half of what they were in 1970.66 The management regulation over
the eastern bluefin stock has only a 6.4 kg. minimum size restriction, passed by ICCAT in
1975, yet this appears to be effectively ignored by many nations, particularly in the
Mediterranean.67
Status of the Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna - A most serious situation and thus the focus
of this research, is the status of the western Atlantic bluefin stock. According to ICCAT's
Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), the western Atlantic breeding
population, believed to be at age 8 plus, has plummeted 90% since 1970 from an estimated
quarter million to a mere 22,000 fish in 199168 (see figure 5 page 19, and figure 6 page 20.).
ICCAT reported that as of January 1991, in addition to the decrease of the breeding population
to 10 percent of its 1970 level, the populations of ages 1 to 5 were at approximately 20 percent of their
1970 level (see figure 7, page 21), and ages 6 and 7 were at approximately 50 percent of their 1970
level (see figure 8, page 22).69 Because the sexual maturity in the western Atlantic bluefin does not
occur until about age 8, heavy fishing mortality of ages 1 to 8 adversely affects the spawning stock.70
64 (lATIC, 1991), p. 91-127.
65 (lATIC, 1991), p. 91-127.
66 (lCCAT, 1992),p. 115-122.
67 Ibid.
68 (sarma, 1993), p. 229.
69 Ibid.
70 (lCCAT, 1993), p. 153-162.
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Figure 5
The Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Population
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Figure 6
The Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Population
Older Breeders (Aged 10+)
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Figure 7
The Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Population
1,000 Young Fish (Ages 1-5)
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Figure 8
The Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Population
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Total Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna catch - The total Atlantic and
Mediterranean bluefin catch for 1991 was 24,400 mt71 Although provisional, this
amount is 310 mt lower than the 1990 total and reflects an overall decrease which began in
the 1980's. This decrease is partially attributed to east Atlantic catches, which have gone
from 6,700 mt in 1988 to 5,300 mt in 1991.72
Although the amounts reported for the west Atlantic are updated regularly,
collecting catch data for the east Atlantic, and even more so for the Mediterranean, is
hindered by the great number of nations and types of fishing gears harvesting this
resource.73 The Mediterranean, and to some extent the east Atlantic, is characterized by a
large nwnber of countries fishing for bluefin tuna using a great diversity of both ancient
and modem gear typeS.74 Because of this, it is difficult to obtain complete catch data, and
as a result, much of the data is either made of estimates or values assigned based on reports
from the preceding year.75
The Mediterranean Sea, the area providing the greatest landings, has many non-
ICCAT member nations that are active participants in the bluefin fishery. The
Mediterranean is also considered to have a significant amount of non-reporting of catch and
has poor, often unrepresentative sampling. A particular problem exists with the age 0 and
1 year old fish. In the past five years the 0 and 1 age fish have comprised approximately
75 percent of the fishing mortality of the eastern stock of Atlantic bluefin.76 Under-
reported and unreported volume was estimated by comparing catch statistics, by country,
with the Japanese import statistics, since Japan imports significant quantities of this species
from different countries.77 Market data indicates significant differences between the
71 (ICCAT, 1993), p. 153-154.
72 Ibid.
73 (ICCAT, 1993), p. 153-154.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 (lAITC, 1991), p. 91-127.
77 (ICCAT, 1993), p. 153-154.
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reported import figures and the reported catches, suggesting under-reporting of the Atlantic
bluefin tuna However, the estimates of under~ and unreported catches form the west
Atlantic were small compared to those estimated for the eastern Atlantic and
Mediterranean.78
Through the above discussions, it is clear that the western Atlantic bluefin tuna,
which presently demands the highest market value of all the tuna species, proves to be one
of the most valuable and most over-exploited of creatures.79 The bluefin tuna fishery80 in
the Atlantic epitomizes the current problems besetting many fishery managers, in short:
how to balance the biological, economic, social and political priorities of a fishery.
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS
It is broadly recognized that common property resources need special management
arrangements not appropriate for other resources.81 Tuna species, as are most fish stocks,
are known as common property, whereas other resources such as a farm or forest are
privately owned or controlled. These common property resources can lead to a "Tragedy
of the Comrnons"82 result. This occurs when a fisherman who has no private stake in a
common resource fishery has no incentive to maintain its productivity by limiting his
harvest or investing in the stock's enhancement, because he cannot reap the benefits.83
Other fishermen with the same access to the enhanced stock would simply increase their
catches and thus benefit at the expense of their fellow fishermen, who may be forced out of
business as a result Unfortunately, the Tragedy of the Commons has happened in the
bluefin tuna fishery. The bluefin populations are exploited by harvesters competing for
78 Ibid.
79 (Williams, 1992), p. 15
80 The term "fishery" is generally defmed to include a specific biological unit of fish, referred to as a stock,
categorized both by the type d fishing gear used to harvest that unit and by the purposes of the activity.
(Hoover, 1981), p. 15.
81 (Doulman, 1987b), p. 5.
82 (Hardin, 1968), p. 1243-1248.
83 Ibid.
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catches without regard for the impact on stock regeneration. As the bluefin tuna stock has
diminished, the value of each fish has risen dramatically. Catch per unit of effort84 may be
at an all-time low, but the return on each fish caught is at an all-time high. As a result,
those currently profiting from the remnants of the bluefin population have little incentive to
stop overfishing, much less rebuild the population to a higher, more productive level.85
The price paid for a high quality giant bluefin tuna can be $30,000 at the auction in
Tokyo, which is a small fraction of the cost to obtain the fish.86 If revenues continue to
rise at a rate which far exceeds the costs, fishermen will continue to fish despite declining
abundance. The prospect of landing such a valuable fish is attractive to many fishermen,
thus keeping fishing pressure high. In the long run this type of exploitation will further
depress the tuna stock and may lead to possible extinction.
In simple economic terms, if the problem of common property fisheries is over-
exploitation, the solution must be sought in limiting the number of fishing units and the
effort they put out.87 Such a limitation will cut the aggregate cost of fishing and reduce
fishing pressure to obtain a sustainable level-88 However, in reality, management
solutions for common property fisheries are not that simple - they must take into account
the complicated political and social factors, as well as the economic situation, particularly at
the international level. Although some countries have developed effective stock
conservation regimes for domestic fisheries, much remains to be done in refining
international bluefin management and overcoming the political and social obstacles to obtain
optimum results.
84 A commonly used indicator for the stabJs of fish stocks is catch per unit of effort (CPUE).
85 (Sutinen, 1993), p. 4.
86 (Scott. 1992)
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
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C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BLUERN TUNA
Prior to the 1970's, Atlantic bluefin tuna were not really thought of as a
commodity. Bluefin caught in major tournaments would be hoisted up by their tail, written
upon, photographed, then dumped off the dock. Hemingway, in his later years, was
known to get drunk and use them for punching bags.89 Giant bluefins, defined in the trade
as those over 310 pounds, sold for a few pennies per pound and were used mainly for pet
food. 90 While the Japanese have long relished giant bluefin, eaten raw as sushi (with rice)
and sashimi (without rice), the Atlantic stock had yet to be exploited for the Japanese
desires. This non-exploitation was due mainly to the logistic difficulties as to how to get
the tuna there fast. fresh and cost-efficiently.91
This under-exploited stage virtually changed overnight, due to a combination of
significant events. First, in the 1950's, the worldwide growth in the purse seining method
of fishing, using airplanes to locate schools of fish, led to the opening of a large
commercial fishery on bluefins, particularly in the Atlantic Ocean. Targeting juvenile fish
for this cannery fishery, the purse seiners harvested over 5,000 metric tons worth of fish
per season.92 The commercial expansion of fishing continued wi th the increasing ex-
vessel price (the price paid at the point of vessel offloading) paid directly to Atlantic bluefin
tuna fishermen, primarily by the expanding Japanese markets.93 In addition to the growth
in the commercial tuna fishery, recreational tuna fishing became quite profitable and
consequently, began to expand as wel1.94 In the United States, sushi bars proliferated,
pushing up consumer demand for bluefins. By the mid-1980's, bluefin was selling
wholesale off U.S. docks for $12 per pound.95 Concurrently, the Japanese began to
pursue the giants everywhere they could find them, including the Gulf of Mexico - the only
89 (Williams, 1992), p. 15.
90 (Hoover, 1983), p. 14.
91 (Griffln. 1992)
92 Ibid.
93 (Hoover, 1983), p. 14.
94 (Hoover, 1983), p. 15.
95 (Williams, 1992), p. 15.
26
known spawning area of the western Atlantic population.96 As the Japanese market for
Atlantic bluefin tuna expanded, so did the price for this fish. U.S. enterprising
fishmongers discovered that for the Japanese no price is too high to pay for something as
delicious as bluefin; thus, exports to Japan skyrocketed. With prices rising, the carrying
capacity of the world tuna fleet steadily increased. In the early 1960's total capacity was
about 350,000 metric tons.97 By the end of 1972 capacity had more than doubled.98
Presently, it is believed that fleet carrying capacity exceeds that needed to harvest the
present world catch of bluefin tuna species.
By the end of the 1980's, the above factors caused a growth in fishing intensity that
lead to a more than twentyfold escalation in bluefin catches since the same period in the
1970's.99 This excessive growth in Atlantic bluefin fishing has led to the species' over-
exploited state and continues to create major problems in the management of this tuna
resource.
Today, still highly prized as a delicacy in Japan's most exclusive sushi restaurants,
a single bluefin can bring fishermen up to U.S. $30,000, sell at auctions in Tokyo for more
than U.S. $60,000, then cost diners U.S. $350 per pound.I OO Now, more than ever,
fishing for bluefin tuna is driven by the Japanese market and the subsequent international
trade.
The above description of the tuna resource, and the biological, economic, and
historical factors involved, combine to identify the background and complex issues
surrounding the bluefin tuna. This resource is of great importance to the continued
economic development of many countries, not the least of which are Japan and the United
States, the two dominant tuna fishing nations in terms of both production and
96 Ibid.
97 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 11.
98 Ibid.
99 (Sarma. 1993), p. 229.
100 (Komori, 1993), p. 12.
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consumption. lOl Therefore, the following chapter will give a historical description of these
two countries' involvement in the tuna industries. The United States has proven to be a
major contributor to the development of the western Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery and,
subsequently, the over-exploited status of this species. Japan is the world's most
developed fishing nation and the Japanese market is the primary and most valuable market
for the bluefin tuna species. 102
101 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 11.
102 (Gaski, 1993), p. 1.
28
CHAPTER III
OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE JAPANESE TUNA
FISHERIES
A. THE UNITED STATES TUNA ASHERlES
Base~on 1991 Japanese import data for bluefin tuna, the U.S. is ranked as the
second largest bluefin exporting country worldwide (Australia is ranked first).103 It is
likely that an average of 80 percent of domestic exports of fresh bluefin tuna from the U.S.
were caught from the Atlantic Ocean, according to U.S. Customs export data. 104 Thus,
the United States' involvement in bluefm tuna fishing has contributed to the calamitous
exploitation of this species, especially in the western Atlantic Ocean.
In order to present an accurate account of the United States' Atlantic bluefin
fisheries, it is necessary to gain an historic overview of the U.S.'s involvement in all tuna
fishing practices, specifically the commercial tuna cannery fishery, in which the U.S. was
once an industry leader.
Historic Fishing Practices - After World War II foreign tuna fleets expanded
rapidly, while the U.S. maintained leadership in the processing of canned tuna, for which
there was a growing market. 105 In the late 1950's, technical innovations allowed the U.S.
high-seas tuna fleet to gain prominence in tuna harvesting. The combination of the
improved harvesting abilities of the U.S. high-seas fleet and the canning and distribution
capabilities of the U.S. food processing companies put the U.S. in a leadership position in
the world tuna fishery by the early 1970's.106 During this period, most of the U.S. high-
seas fleet fished for tuna and were centered in the eastern tropical Pacific.
103 (Gaski, 1993), p. 20-21.
104 (Gaski, 1993), p. 11-21.
105 (Orbach & Maiolo, 1988), p. 4-8.
106 Ibid.
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The fishery for tunas in the Atlantic began, for the most part. much later than in the
eastern Pacific. lO? In the 1950's, the addition of bait boats and purse seiners to the
predominant longline fishery caused a rapid expansion of tuna fisheries in the Atlantic.
This rate of expansion caused concern and as a result, in 1966, ICCAT was established to
manage Atlantic tuna and tuna-like species. In 1975, the u.s. implemented ICCAT
recommendations for western Atlantic bluefin tuna, and established a 6.4 kg. minimum size
limit, licensing and reporting requirements, and a quota of approximately 2000 metric tons,
detennined to be the historical level of fishing off the eastern and Gulf coasts of the
U .S.l 08 Quotas are designed to directly control the problems of overtishing;109 but in this
case, overfishing continued due to the extensive foreign catches (particularly by the
Japanese) off the United States coast. 110
Foreign fishing fleets were not subject to the United State's quotas because, "as is
generally the case with international agreements that are not self-executing, implementation
and enforcement of the approved recommendations remain the responsibility of each
individual member nation." 111 The Japanese, along with other nations fishing for tuna off
the U.S. coast, were only subject to the recommendation as implemented by their "horne"
government, and violations by foreign fleets could only be prosecuted by their respective
foreign government.112 However, the Japanese government relied only upon voluntary
guidelines and programs to reduce their catch of Atlantic bluefin tuna, and never restricted
its fishing fleets to a quota system similar to those established by the u.S. system.l 13 As
a resu.l!t, intense and unrestricted fishing by foreign longliners on the Atlantic bluefin tuna
resource continued.
to? (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 18.
108 (ICCAT, 1992), p. 54.
109 (Sutinen, 1993)
110 (Hoover, 1983), p. 19.
III Ibid, p. 20.
l12lbid.
113 Ibid.
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In the 1970's, the world tuna picture began to change due to several factors. First,
virtually all of the coastal nations extended their policy and management jurisdiction over
fisheries, including tuna, out to 200 miles, creating Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).114
Since the vast majority of the world tuna harvest is taken in areas far distant frQffi the home
country of the harvesting vesse'ls, (Japan and the U.S. catch most of their tuna off other
countries' coasts) this event significantly affected the ability of distant water fishing fleets
to use their traditional fishing gro~nds. Japan and the U.S., the two major distant water
tuna fishing nations, addressed this situation quite differently. Japan claimed, but did not
enforce tuna jurisdiction, and at the same time aggressively negotiated access agreements
with those countries off whose shores it had traditionally fished. 115 The U.S. Congress
passed the Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson Act) 116 in 1976,
establishing a U.S. 200 mile Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ). (A detailed account of the
Magnuson Act is given below.) However, the Magnuson Act also exempted tuna from the
FCZ, and the U.S. refused to recognize other nations' control over tuna resources beyond
their 12 mile territorial seas. 117 The U.S. took the position that management over tuna
was to be performed solely by ICCAT. Other distant-water fishing nations agreed with the
U.S. position at first By the late I970's however, the United States was the only nation
(except the Bahamas) stiU arguing that coastal nations did not have exclusive rights over
highly migratory species while they were within their FCZ's.l18
The second factor to change the tuna picture was the environmental movement that
had begun in the 1960's. This movement greatly affected the U.S. high-seas tuna fleet.
For example, the Marine Mammal Protection Actl19 focused negative attention on the
114Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 (Shepards Acts, 1992 - Title 16, U.S. Code sec. 1801 (1988), Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act; Public Law 96-561, 94 Stal 3300 (1980». Hereinafter referred to as Title 16, U.S. Code
sec. 1801 (1988).
117 Ibid.
118 (Doulman, 1987b), p. 105-1OS.
119 (Shepards Acts, 1992 - Title 16 U.S. Code sec. 1361 (1972); sec. 9-11-390 (1975); Title 22 U.S. Code
sec. 1978 (1988), Marine Mammal Protection Act; Public Law 100-711, 102 Stal 4755.)
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operations of the U.S. high-seas tuna seine fleet, in whose nets porpoises were killed when
fishing for certain tuna species. The impact of this attention ranged from attempts to
boyco,tt tuna products on the U.S. market to an increasing tendency towards the reflagging
of u.s. tunaboats under foreign "flags of convenience" .120
Thirdly, due to the availability of cheaper labor, tax and other advantages, the U.S.
tuna processing firms began to relocate more of their canning operations overseas, causing
both the closing of tuna canneries on the U.S.' Atlantic and Pacific coasts and the.
displacement of fleets which provided tuna to this market 121 The displaced high-seas
fishermen then shifted to a prosperous, mpidly developing market for fresh tuna in the
U.S., and an extremely lucrative market for high grade sashimi tuna in Japan122 (see
figure 9, page 33). This shift in fishery practices is easily understood when comparing the
historic price of 30 to 90 cents per pound for tuna sold to canneries, to the fresh tuna
market price of $10 to $20 per pound for sashimi grade tuna 123 In addition, fishermen
from other fisheries, such as shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico and swordfish in the Atlantic
and Gulf of Mexico, were attracted to the lucrative, newly developed fresh tuna fishery.
This resulted in a tremendous increase in the catch of tunas by U.S. fishermen in the U.S.
FCZ. For example, in the Southeast U.S. waters alone, the tuna catch increased seven-
fold from 1980 to 1988,124
All of the above factors: more efficient tuna fishing practices, foreign fishing ships
intensely targeting bluefin, the creation of EEZs, the environmental movement, and the
mpid increase in commercial tuna fisheries within the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone,
have combined to reduce the Atlantic bluefin stocks at an alarming mte.
120 The arrangement to register a vessel in a country which is foreign to the vessel's owner(s), in order to
operate under the protective operational umbrella of that cotmtry of registry, is termed "flags of
convenience". (Glahn, 1992), p. 435. See chapter V, section D, and (Glahn, 1992), ch. 15, for further
explanation.
121 (Doulman, 1987b), p. 105-10S.
122 Ibid.
123 (Orbach & Maiolo, 1988), p. 4-8.
124 Ibid.
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FIGURE 9
U.S. ex-vessel price indices* for bluefin tuna and all edible finfISh, 1983-
1990.
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1. The Magnuson FisheD' Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson Act) - Prior to
the passage of the Magnuson Act in 1976, the principal tuna fisheries in which u.s. high-
seas fishermen participated were those that occurred off other nations' coasts. 125 Tuna
fisheries in the u.s. 200 mile region during this period were not well developed.
Albacore, yellowfin, bigeye, bluefin and skipjack tunas were taken in modest amounts
from various locations in the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico and Pacific in both commercial and
recreational fisheries. 126 The Japanese longliners fished fairly significantly for tuna off
Hawaii's' coast and in the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico regions.l 27
As previously stated, the passage of the Magnuson Act created an FCZ, which
extended U.S. jurisdiction over fishing out to a 200 mile limit. 128 Congress presented as
rationale for the passage of this bill the convictions that foreign overfishing in U.S. coastal
waters was a serious problem and that a national conservation and management program of
fishery resources was necessary to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks, and
to insure conservation. 129 Therefore, the provisions of the Act authorized foreign fishing
only under certain conditions, provided that a stringent agreement between the U.S. and the
foreign government could be reached. In addition, Congress stated that "international
fishery agreements have not been effective in preventing or terminating the overfishing of
valuable fishery resources." 130
The Act set up eight regional fishery management councils, composed of fishery
experts from the federal and state governments, and the fishing industry.131 These
Councils were designed to bring together national, state, and local interests in each region
for preparation of fishery management plans for certain species deemed in need of
management within the Councils' jurisdiction. Once a plan is developed, it is submitted to
125 (Doulman, 1987b), p. 105-H)8.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Title 16, U.S. Code sec. 1801 (1988)
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
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the Department of Commerce for approval, then implemented as a federaJ ruling. The
primary enforcement authority for any regulation is assigned to the Coast Guard. The
primary responsibility for international fishery agreements is assigned to the Secretary of
State. 132
Magnuson Act Exempts Tuna - The Magnuson Act created a special exception for
"highly migratory species," 133 namely tuna, due to pressure from the American Tuna Boat
Association and the U.S. Tuna Foundation, organizations associated with U.S. Pacific
west coast distant-water tuna fleets. who contended that to include highly migratory species
within the U.S. Fez would trigger reciprocal action by other coastal nations, thereby
closing productive fishing grounds to them. 134 The Act states that the reason for the
exemption "is in recognition of the wide-ranging migratory behavior of tuna and the need
for unification of control pursuant to an international agreement" 135 To better clarify the
situation, Senator Weicker stated in a hearing before the National Ocean Policy Study,
"This exclusion allows our distant water tuna fleet to disregard judicial claims by other
nations on tuna within their own waters. Present U.S. policy therefore allows our tuna
boats to enter foreign waters against the will of the claimant nation. A Federal fund
[established by an amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1954], jointly shared
with industry is then used to pay the fines of the vessels if seized by a foreign
government." 136
132 (Royce. 1984), sec. 13.5.2.
133 The 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty defmes highly migratory species as including marlin.
swordfish. and sharks. in addition to tuna. (U.N. Document AlConf. 62/121). Oct 1.1982. Annex I. p.
1329. See also (I.L.M.• vol. 21 p. 1261). However. in order to placate the tuna industry and exempt just
tuna species. the U.S. Magnuson Act narrowed this definition. choosing to defme "highly migratory
species" as "species of tuna which, in the course of their life cycle. spawn and migrate over great distances
in water of the ocean" (fille 16. U.S. Code sec. 1801 (1988). sec. 1802(14». 'rrhis [U.S.] defInition
equating highly migratory species with tuna is inconsistent with scientific defInitions." (Doulman. 1987b).
p. 107.
134 (Council. 1988). p. 9.
135 (Tide 16. U.S. Code. sec. 1802(14) (1988)).
136 (Council. 1988). p. 9.
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The Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affai~ described the
U.S. State Department position as follows:
"The rationale behind the United States' approach is straight forward. Tuna are not
a resident resource of the EEZ. They are only found within any EEZ temporarily
and may migrate far out into the ocean waters beyond. Therefore, the coastal state
does not have the ability to manage and conserve tuna, nor does it have a
paramount interest in their development.... Only through international
agreements have States actually managed effectively the highly migratory tuna
species.... Accordingly customary international law precludes the coastal state
from establishing sovereign rights over tuna In the U.S. view this is evidenced by
Article 64 of the Law of the Sea Convention, which requires cooperation between
coastal states and distant-water fishing nations to manage tuna, both within and
outside the EEZ, on a regional basis, through an international organization." 137
The passage of the Magnuson Act helped spur the development of the U.S.
domestic tuna fisheries and allowed the United States to continue participation in
international fishery agreements such as ICCAT. However, the tuna exception also
allowed any nation to fish for tuna within the U.S. FCZ, since the U.S. declined to
exercise exclusive authority over tuna 138 Thus, the significant Japanese longline fishing
for the Atlantic bluefin tuna continued. In an attempt to control fishing on this highly
migratory species, Congress, in 1990, amended the Magnuson Act to include tunas under
U.S. authority starting in 1992.139 However, at the same time, Congress decreed that
U.S. regulations be no stricter than international ones (i.e. by ICCAT). In addition,
pressure from the commercial fishing industry promoted Congress to transfer authority for
other large pelagics - swordfish, sharks, billfish and tunas - from the regional councils to
the U.S. National Marine Fishery Service (NMFS).140
137 Ibid, p. 115.
138 (Doulman. 1987b), p. 107-1OS.
139 (Shepard's Acts 1992, Title 16. U.S. Code sec. 1978 (1990»
140 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990). sec. 2(b)(1).
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Almost 20 years later, the U.S. marine fisheries have experienced detrimental
declines - sixty-seven fish stocks are over-harvested; New England groundfish have been
reduced to about 10 percent of their known capacity; and large coastal sharks, swordfish
and giant bluefin tuna are categorized as critically depleted. 141 It seems clear that U.S.
policy, as well as international management, has failed to manage these fisheries on a
sustainable basis.
B. THE JAPANESE MARKET
The Japanese tuna market is mainly based on consumption of tuna in raw form -
sashimi. The sashimi market demands large tuna species - primarily bluefin, and to a lesser
extent, bigeye and yellowfin. 142 Most of the fresh bluefin traded travels by air, since the
Japanese market has stringent requirements for freshness, color, and temperature. The
most valuable, the fatty giant bluefins, travel individually packed in ice and are rushed by
airplane to the Tokyo market to fetch the highest prices.l 43 The fattiest part of a giant tuna
is the meat running in a diagonal stripe across its belly, which the Japanese call Toro and
for which they pay the highest price. "In Japan we are concerned with status in all things,
including food. It is necessary to have a food with a higher status than any other, and that
is the toro of the giant bluefin." 144
1. Development Prior to the 1970's - Prior to World War II the Japanese economy
depended mainly on primary industry (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries), with farm and
fish products being the staple foods for the population.145 Most of the national intake of
animal protein came from fish products because the people rejected meat and dairy products
for religious reasons. With government support, Japan's fisheries production increased
141 (Williams, 1993), p. 11.
142 (Doulman, 1987a), p. 107-134.
143 (Gaski. 1993), p. 2.
144 (Seabrook. 1994), p. 48.
145 (Doulman, 1987b), p. 57-68.
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sharply, from 440,000 tons in 1900 to 4.1 million tons in 1940. 146 Tuna production
doubled from onIy about 100,000 tons to 200,000 tons because tuna fishing was confined
to Japan's coastal and offshore waters. 147 In 1960, to meet Japan's increasing demand for
tuna and to decrease fishing in fully exploited coastal and offshore waters, the government
initiated a policy of switching licenses from other fisheries to tuna fisheries. 148 This
successful initiative led to a sharp increase in tuna demand, and the expansion of the tuna
fleets to meet this demand. Despite improvements in the tuna fleet in the early 1960's,
vessels could not meet the demand for sashimi because of problems in maintaining the
quality of the fish on long fishing trips. Therefore, Japan's longline fleet concentrated on
supplying foreign canning plants. In the late 1960's, various economic factors enabled
Japan's distant-water tuna fleets to switch to the production of sashimi-grnde tuna rnther
than tuna for canning. With the introduction of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's), Japan
proclaimed its extended jurisdiction in Ign, and began establishing relations with coastal
states to harvest their tuna resources. 149
2. Post 1970 and present prnctices - The Japanese market for bluefin tuna continued to
escalate, and in the 1970's, this lucrntive market was "discovered" by enterprising
fishermen who promoted an international trnde in this species.I 50 Since the 1970's, the
international trnde in bluefin tuna has increased and continues to do so today. Presently,
Japan is undoubtedly the primary consumer of bluefin tuna in the world 151 Japan
imported an avernge of almost 2,8(X) tons of bluefin tuna annually between 1970 and 1990
and exported an avernge of almost 160 tons annually between 1970 and 1985.152 During
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 (Gaski, 1993), p. 11.
151 Ibid "-1,p. vn .
152 Ibid, p. 11-21.
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this same time period, 1970-1985, Japan also caught an additional 51,000 tons of bluefin
annually.153 "Based upon the sum of these imports, exports, and catches of bluefin tuna,
Japan consumed an annual average of at least 53,000 tons during each of the 16 years from
1970-1985 This represents an equivalent of about 40 percent of the world catch of bluefin
tuna, or about 440 grams of bluefin per citizen of Japan in 1985."154 In 1992, Japan was
ranked as the fourth major haIVester of this tuna155
The majority of Japanese imports and catches are brought to the Tokyo Central
Wholesale Market, established in 1923.156 Bluefin and other fish are transported to the
market and are examined and marked before a dawn auction for purchase and distribution.
The market categorizes and prices bluefin as fresh domestic, fresh imports, fresh meiji
(small domestically caught bluefin under 7.5 kg), and frozen. 157 Fresh domestic fish
draws the highest price (exceeding $50 per kg in 1991) in the winter months when it is
least available, while meiji and frozen bluefin prices are fairly steady throughout the year,
due to their constant availability at all times of the year158 (see figure 10, page 40).
Distinctions can be made between sashimi tuna species by the type of end use. The highest
quality northern'bluefin (fresh domestic) is consumed exclusively in high-class restaurants,
and the lower quality product is marketed as household sashimi. 159 Southern bluefin is
also used exclusively by restaurants. Bigeye tuna is used equally in restaurants and in
households, while most yellowfin sashimi is consumed in households)60
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid "-1, p. V11 •
155 (ICCAT, 1993a), table I, p. 203-206.
156 (Gaski, 1993), p. 11-21.
157 Ibid
158 Ibid.
159 (Doulman,l987a), p. 115-117.
160 Ibid
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Figure 10
1990 monthly Tokyo Central Wholesale Macket prices of four categories of
fresh and frozen bluefut. tuna.
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As a result of the high prices for the bluefin sashimi, many fish exporting countries
have tried to take a share of this market, particularly as most traditional commercial
fisheries are declining and the prices and demands of world fisheries markets fluctuate.
The number of countries exporting bluefin tuna to Japan has increased over the two-decade
period of 1970 to 1991.161 In 1991,36 countries exported either fresh, frozen, or other
bluefin meat to Japan.l 62 From 1970-1990, a total of 59 nations exported bluefin to
Japan. 163 (see Figure 11, page 42). Based on Japanese import data, the top five bluefin
tuna exporting countries are, in descending order: Australia, United States, Taiwan, Spain,
and Canada 164 (see Table 1, page 43). These five nations dominate the trade to Japan,
exporting 78 percent of all reported Japanese imports. 165 Many of the countries involved
in the export of bluefin tuna are those which occur within, or near, either the natural
temperate water range, or the spawning areas of either species of bluefin tuna. Although
statistical data is lacking, it is believed that one third of the bluefin caught is consumed
outside Japan, notably in the Republic of Korea, and presumably in Spain and in
Portugal.166
Because of the limited statistics available, it is difficult to identify and describe trade
data 167 However, it is observed that the only mode of export to Japan for the most
valuable bluefin (the fatty, giant bluetins) is by airplane. An estimated 87 percent of
bluefin,83 percent of Albacore, 90 percent of Yellowfin, and 88 percent of "other mna" are
161 (Gaski, 1993), p. 11-21.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
167 Only three countries report the international trade of bluefin tuna specifically in their national Customs
statistics - Japan, New Zealand and the U.S.. Thus, it is difficult to assess the full scope and nature of the
international trade. However, the data provided by these three countries allows a good insight into the
international trade in bluefm tuna. since Japan and the U.S., in particular, have major shares in the world
trade of bluefin, and use the same Customs code for bluefm tuna in their statistics, making it easy to
correlate data. (Gaski 1993), p. 11-21.
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Figure 11
Bluefin tuna countries of export and total import volume, reported in
Japanese import data, 1970-1990.
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exported byair. 168 It is also interesting to note that the three major exporters of bluefin to
Japan - Australia, Taiwan and the U.S. - have more than 50 flights each transporting fish
each week to Tokyo. 169
The extraordinary effort required by fishermen to catch even a very small number of
bluefin is economically justified by the exorbitant price paid by the Japanese market - a
factor contributing to the continuing overexploitation of the species. As will be shown in
the next chapter, Japan, the United States, and other countries have fonned various
organizations which attempt to manage the bluefin tuna and other tuna species; however, it
does not appear that existing management controls are adequately resolving the bluefin's
over-exploitation problem. If the world is to maintain tuna resources at a maximum
sustainable population level, it is clear that controls on exploitation win be required.
Without an adequate system for determining and implementing the necessary controls, it is
likely that the major stocks of tuna will continue to be decimated and retwns to society
diminished. However, implementation of effective global management controls will
require some resolution of the fundamental differences between those nations involved in
the tuna industry.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
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CHAPTER IV
OVERVIEW OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
MANAGING TUNA SPECIES (with emphasis on ICCAT)
Several international fishery management organizations deal with the scientific
study and management of tuna Some have been fairly successful in addressing research
and management problems; others have accomplished little of significance. None,
however, have yet instituted an international management program establishing a common
set of rules binding all relevant nations, which is capable of maintaining the ilan'est of
tunas at maximwn sustainable levels and protecting stocks from over-exploitation. 170 In
order to understand the complexities of tuna management, this next section will consider a
number of management systems and institutional arrangements. An overview will be given
of the organizations' functions; the predominant factors in each jurisdictional region; a
description of the fisheries; and the status and regulations over tuna species. Strengths and
weaknesses of each organization, as well as comparisons to other organizations will be
pointed out when appropriate.
Because Atlantic bluefin tuna is primarily managed by ICCAT, and a relatively
extensive data-base exists, the discussion will primarily concentrate on this organization.
A. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
ATLANTIC TUNAS CICCAT)
The fishery for tunas in the Atlantic was originally dominated by longliners, but in
the late 1950's bait boats and purse seiners became major participants. 171 As these
170 (Joseph & Greenough. 1979). p. 3-4.
171 Ibid. p. 18-20.
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fisheries developed, the total catch of tuna and tuna-like species increased rapidly, causing
concern by the mid-1960's over the rate of exploi tation.
1. Functions - In response to this concern, on May 14, 1966, the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations sponsored a conference in Rio de Janeiro which
resulted in the establishment of the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas - ICCAT. There were 16 original member countries, and as of 1993, there
are 22 contracting parties. 172 However, a number of important fishing nations, such as
Italy and Taiwan. have not signed the treaty. 173
The Commission area includes "all the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. including the
adjacent Seas." 174 The Commission is charged to investigate and study tuna and tuna-like
(i.e. swordfish and billfish) resources and make recommendations which will maintain the
species populations at maximum sustainable levels. A recommendation adopted by the
Commission has no regulatory authority on its member countries. 175 Only after each
individual member nation implements the recommendation into its own national law does
that recommendation actually take effect Further. if a member country objects to a
recommendation. then that member has no obligation to follow that recommendation and
simply goes on conducting its own fishing practices. 176 From its inception, ICCAT has
approved omy a few recommendations. mainly because the Commission must go through a
complicated political process of objections by the member nations, whose divergent
interests lead to little. if any, agreement Enforcement of these approved recommendations
is the responsibility of each individual government with respect to its own citizens and
vessels; however. enforcement has been minimal. 177
172 ICCAT member nations are Angola. Benin, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory
Coast, Japan, Morocco, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Republic of
Guinea, Russia. South Africa. Spain, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. (freaties in Force, 1994
p. 339. See ICCAT 673 UNTS 63). Hereinafter referred to as (ICCAT 673 UNTS 63)
173 (ICCAT, 1993), p. 5-8.
174 (ICCAT 673 UNTS 63)
175 (ICCAT, 1993), p. 5-8.
176 Ibid.
177 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 18-20.
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As a clearing house for statistical data and coordinator of international scientific
research, ICCAT serves a very valuable function. However, ICCAT is not provided with
sufficient funding and staff to conduct its own research, which has inhibited data
acquisition and the timely formulation of management advice. 178 Although efforts have
been made to strengthen the budget, the collecting of basic catch and effort data and the
conducting of biological studies remain the responsibility of member governments. Since
ICCAT is required to use the technical and scientific services of its member nations, it
created a Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS).179 This Committee,
composed primarily of biologists, is responsible for recommending courses of action to
take in conserving and managing Atlantic tuna and tuna-like species. The SCRS currently
conducts its investigations on Atlantic bluefin tuna using the two-stock hypothesis
(separate eastern and western Atlantic stocks) with limited intermixing. (For distribution of
bluefin tuna and east/west management areas, see figure 12, page 48.) Because of the
complexity and magnitude of the fisheries, SCRS scientists examine the eastern and
western bluefin stocks in differing years. The SCRS has been true to its mandate, but
ICCAT has a history of disregarding its own scientists, as will be elaborated on in
Chapter V. 180
2. United States Involvement - In 1974, ICCAT adopted two recommendations which
were to be implemented by the individual member nations. The U.S. however, lacked the
necessary enabling legislation and therefore was unable to transform the recommendation
into law to regulate the fishing activities of U.S. tuna fishermen.l 81 Congress finally
responded to this need by passing the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975 (ATCA).182
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 (Weld. 1991), p. 5.
181 (Hoover, 1983). p. 19.
182 (Shepards Acts. 1992 - Title 16, U.S. Code sec. 971 (1988). Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975;
Public Law No. 94-70.89 Stat 385 (1975»
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Figure 12
General distribution of bluefin tuna in the Atlantic Ocean (dartened areas
indicate .known spawning areas). The solid line separates the ICCAT
eastern and western management units.
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Now, the structure is set up so that tunas are internationally managed through regulations
recommended by ICCAT. Regulations are then implemented in the United States by the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) as authorized under ATCA.
The ATCA provides for three Commissioners who comprise the official U.S.
section to ICCAT. The Commissioners are appointed by the President of the U.S. for
three-year tenns and they may not serve more than two consecutive tenns. The ATCA also
provides for an Advisory Committee of five to twenty public members in addition to
representatives of the five eastern regional fishery management councils. In accordance
with a NMFS charter, the Commissioners appoint public members representing diverse
interests so that the Advisory Committee "fairly represents" the various groups concerned
with the fisheries "including fishennen, vessel owners, processors, and others concerned
with the fisheries covered by the Convention...."183
3. Regulatory Actions Over Tuna and Tuna-like Species - ICCAT has taken regulatory
actions with regard to three species of Atlantic tunas: yellowfin, bigeye. and bluefin. It
has also established measures for Atlantic swordfish. In 1972 ICCAT made its first
recommendation on the taking of yellowfin tuna weighing less than 3.2 kilograms in
amounts greater than an incidental catch allowance per trip of 15 percent of all yellowfin
tuna on board a vessel.l84 These regulations were extended to bigeye tuna in 1980. No
significant ICCAT recommendation for yellowfin or bigeye has been made since. Declines
in Atlantic swordfish landings inspired ICCAT to promote studies in 1989 and in 1990; to
implement a 15 percent reduction in fishing effort; a 25 kg. minimum size requirement; and
to cap effort in the South Atlantic.l85 No further significant ICCAT recommendations
were presented for swordfish until 1994.
183 (Weld 1991), p. 9-11.
184 (ICCAT, 1992), p. 102-135.
185 (ICCAT, 1993a), 169-176.
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In 1974, regulatory measures were first recommended for Atlantic bluefin tuna.
These regulations included a 6.4 kg. minimum size regulation, a limit on fishing mortality
to 1974 levels, and an exemption allowing incidental catches of 15 percenl186 A
regulation limiting catches in the western Atlantic to 1,160 mt was introduced for 1981 and
increased to 2,660 mt for each year from 1983 to 1991. 187 Due to the low level of small
bluefin tuna, ICCAT also limited the catch of bluefin smaller than 120 centimeters in length
to no more than 15 percent in weight of the catch limit in the western Atlantic. 188 Further,
no directed fishery was pennitted in spawning areas such as the Gulf of Mexico. 189
At each of its meetings since 1983, ICCAT extended the existing management
regime for bluefin tuna for an additional year. At the 1991 annual meeting, new
management measures were recommended that reduced the quota for western Atlantic
bluefin tuna by 10 percent in 1992 and 1993 with possible additional reductions up to 25
percent based on future SCRS analysis.190 ICCAT also adopted its "bluefin statistical
documentation program II , which requires the use of an ICCAT accepted reporting system to
monitor trade in frozen bluefin tuna The declaration is supposed to eventually be
broadened to include fresh fish as well. The program is to be phased in over time and is
expected to address the problem of harvests in excess of ICCAT rules, especially by non-
member countries, by requiring exporters of bluefin tuna to include documents identifying
the location and flag of the vessel catching the fish. 191
In 1993, ICCAT members agreed to reduce the 1994 bluefin tuna catch levels in the
western Atlantic by 15 percent. to a total of 1,995 ml For the three main countries fishing
for this species, this quota breaks down to a decrease in Japan's allocation from 26 percent
in 1993 to 12.5 percent in 1994 (2.50 mt); an increase for the u.s. from 52 percent to
186 Ibid, p. 151-162.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
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61.25 percent (1,235.2 mt)~ and Canada's share increasing from 21.5 percent to 26.25
percent (509.8 mt).I92 No quota was set for the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin
tuna Based on the advice from the SCRS, ICCAT also enacted a two year, 50 percent
reduction in the catch quota for bluefin tuna in the western Atlantic, which would call for a
1,200 mt total quota in 1995.193
The SCRS's 1993 north Atlantic swordfish stock assessment showed the stock at
only 68 percent of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and still declining, noting that
catches were from 5,000-7,000 mt above the replacement yield (i.e. the catch level at which
the stock size is neither increasing nor decreasing). 194 SCRS recommended substantial
and immediate reductions. ICCAT agreed to reduce catches of swordfish in the north
Atlantic by about 20 percent over the next two years, and to cap catches in the south
Atlantic to prevent the further transfer of fishing effort there. 195 Specific country quotas
were established for Spain, Portugal and Canada, where none had existed before.
At the annual 1994 ICCAT meeting, the nations fishing the western Atlantic bluefin
stock agreed to increase the total quota to 2,200 mt of bluefin for each of the years 1995
and 1996. This amount is to be divided as follows: an increase in Japan's allocation to
353 mt~ an increase for the U.S. to 1311.4 mt~ and an increase in Canada's share to 535.6
mt This is a 10 percent increase over the 1994 catch.1 96
Also at the 1994 meeting, the countries fishing for eastern Atlantic bluefin agreed to
a 25 percent reduction in catch levels from the 1993 or 1994 levels, whichever is greater,
by 1998.197 For the first time ever, then, ICCAT established measurable catch levels by
192 (Rathbun, 1993), p. 1-6. Note: It appears that tremendous political pressure, along with the threat of
a CTIES listing, convinced the Japanese to agree to a significant decrease in its Atlantic bluefm tuna quota.
Ibid. p. 5. CITES is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora. Its purpose is to regulate international trade in wild animals, plants and their products. See chapter
7 for further detail.
193 (Chu, 1993)
194 Ibid, p. 5-6.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
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which to hold nations accountable fishing the eastern stock accountable. A potential
noteworthy achievement at the 1994 meeting, was ICCAT's approval of a resolution
allowing members to impose trade sanctions on non-member countries which do not
cooperate with ICCAT conservation efforts, in an attempt to help control increasing catches
outside the convention. 198
4. Status of the Stocks - ICCAT's conservation efforts still fall short of what is needed.
For instance, "allowable catches will continue at unsustainable levels in the eastern Atlantic
bluefin fishery and the north Atlantic swordfish fishery. The western Atlantic bluefin
juvenile and parental stock are still severely depleted, yet the first signs of rebuilding [in the
1994 re-assessment] were treated by member countries as an excuse to increase
catches. "t 99 "Most stocks of tunas and tuna-like fishes in the Atlantic are classified as
fully exploited or severely depleted. "200 Bluefin tuna populations have declined steadily
since 1970, and the swordfish fishery, which collapsed in 1989, is still decreasing.
Yellowfin tuna stocks caught in the Gulf of Mexico are falling, and all billfish are
considered to be at least fully exploited.201 In addition, the lack of catch and effort data,
especially for the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean is considered to be a serious problem,
further hindering management efforts by ICCAT.
This downward trend of tuna and tuna-like stocks indicates that the ICCAT
management measures of quotas, minimum size limits, and closures have not permitted the
over-fished stocks to recover, nor have they allowed for sustainable harvests for other
species. A thorough examination of the issues behind ICCAT's attempts at management
will be discussed in chapter five. In addition, the types of management regulations
employed by ICCAT, will be looked at in chapter VI.
198 It is unknown whether this measure will be consistent under GAIT. the General Agreement for Tariffs
and Trade.. Ibid, p. 6.
199 Ibid. p. 2.
200 (American Fisheries Society. 1992)
201 Ibid.
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OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
B. THE INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION (lATIC)
Prior to 1960, fishing for tunas in the Eastern Pacific Ocean was dominated by
baitboats.202 A shift from bait boats to purse seiners in the early 1960's, resulted in a
tremendous increase in fleet carrying capacity from 46.3 thousand tons in 1966 to 184.6
thousand tons in 1976.203 The profits from tuna landings increased, consequently, so did
the demand for tuna, causing intense competition among countries for the catch.204 The
fleet capacity gradually dropped to a 136.6 thousand ton level in 1989. This decline was
primarily caused by vessels leaving the fishery due to declining catch rates and to EI
Nino.205
1. Functions - During the 1950's and 1960's, the increasing demand for tuna in the Pacific
Ocean caused growing concern over these tuna resources. Thus, the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission - IATTC,206 was established in 1950 by a convention between
Costa Rica and the United States. IATIC is principally concerned with the eastern Pacific
Ocean (EPO), defined as the area between the mainland of North, Central, and South
America and 150 degrees W. IATIC is open to adherence by nations that fish for tunas
and tuna-like species in the eastern Pacific. As of 1994 there were eight members: Costa
Rica, the United States, France, Japan, Nicaragua, Panama, Vanuatu, and Venezuela
Ecuador, Mexico, and Canada were once members, but withdrew from the Convention for
political reasons.207
202 (Joseph & Greenough. 1979), p. 13-18.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 From mid-I982 till late 1983, there was a major El Nino event. The catch rates in the EPO were low
during the El Nino, which caused a shift of fishing effort from the eastern to the western Pacific, and the
fishing effort remained relatively low during 1984-1986. (IATIC, 1993), p. 15-21.
206 (See IATIC, 80 lJNTS 3)
207 (IATIC, 1993), p. 5.
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IATIC is charged with studying tuna and other fish caught by tuna fishing vessels
within its geographical area of responsibility, and recommending management measures
designed to maintain stocks at levels that will produce maximum sustainable yields.208
IATIC fulfills its responsibilities with two programs, the Tuna-Billfish Program and the
Tuna-Dolphin Program. The principal responsibilities of the Tuna-Billfish Program are
"(1) to study the biology of the tunas and tuna-like species of the eastern Pacific Ocean with
a view to determining the effects that fishing and natural factors have on their abundance,
and (2) to recommend appropriate conservation measures so that the stocks of fish can be
maintained at levels which will afford maximum sustainable catches. "209 The principal
responsibilities of the Tuna-Dolphin Program are "(1) to monitor the abundance of dolphins
and their mortality incidental to fishing through the collection of data aboard tuna purse
seiners fishing in the eastern Pacific, (2) to analyze these data and make appropriate
recommendations for the conservation of dolphins, and (3) to study the causes of mortality
of dolphins during fishing operations and encourage fishermen to adopt fishing techniques
which minimize the moralities of dolphins. "21 0
IATIC is structured differently from ICCAT in that it has been provided with
sufficient funding and staff 'to conduct its own research.211 The IATIC staff consists of
50 plus scientists, technicians, and support personnel, headquartered in La Jolla,
California, and at laboratories and field stations in Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Puerto Rico,
and Venezuela
As is the same with ICCAT, success of IATIC's management system requires that
each nation participating in the fishery assume responsibility for enforcing any IATIC
recommendations that are adopted.212 However, not all nations fishing tuna in the EPO
are both physically able and politically willing to enforce IATIC recommendations.
208 Ibid.
209 (lATTC, 1993), p. 5.
210 Ibid.
211 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 13-18.
212 Ibid.
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2. Regulations Over Tuna and Tuna-like Species - Since its inception, IATIC has adopted
quota regulations over yellowfin tuna, and established decreasing limits on total dolphin
mortalities from commercial fishing in 1993. The majority of IATIC's fishery
management work is in research.
In the 1960's, IATIC staff first directed efforts towan:ls assessing yellowfin tuna in
the eastern Pacific Ocean. An overall annual catch quota for the eastern Pacific was
adopted and implemented for yellowfin to be taken by vessels of all nations within a
specified regulatory area (see figure 13, page 56). The quota has been modified through
the years and, up until the late 1970's, the management program for the conservation of
yellowfin was considered to be effective in terms of maintaining populations at desirable
levels.213 In 1979, the management agreement among the major participating nations
broke down. Since then, yellowfin stock components have :been overfished.
The breadown of the IATIC regime illustrates the difficulty of achieving and
sustaining a management agreement when many nations are involved.
U.S. Policy - In the spring of 1990, due to public pressure in the U.S. over
dolphin bycatch from tuna fishing. the U.S.' canning industry adopted a policy of not
purchasing tunas caught on trips during which sets on tunas associated with dolphins were
made.214 This caused many of the U.S. flag vessels fishing in the EPO to leave that
fishery and enter the fisheries of the Atlantic or western Pacific. It also resulted in the re-
flagging of U.S. vessels to operate under other countries' flags (to avoid U.S. policy).
mainly the Mexican and Venezuelan registry. The "dolphin-safe" policy continued,
resulting in further decreases in the number of U.S. flag vessels fishing in the EPO.215
213 (Joseph & Greenough. 1979), p. 13-18.
214 (lAITe, 1993), p. 17-20.
215 Ibid.
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Figure 13
IATTC's Yellowfin Regulatocy Area (CYRA)
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There were no restrictions on fishing for tunas in the EPO during the 1979-1993
period, although in 1979, the IATIC staff agreed to a quota of 165,000 tons. Yet the
quota was not implemented by member countries.216 From 1981 to 1993, various quota
amounts were again adopted annually by IATIC staff, who emphasized these quotas were
necessary. However, once again, they were never implemented by member countries.
Much of the contention between member countries attempting to implement the IATIC
adopted quotas has been an inability to agree on the distribution of the allowable catch
among themselves.217 As is a problem in the Atlantic, as seen by ICCAT, many
developing coastal states harvesting tuna are reluctant to agree to any conservation scheme
that involves catch quotas, unless special allocations are included recognizing what they
believe are their rights as developing states.218 In opposition to developing states,
developed nations, in particular the U.S., defend their historic fishing rights, stating that it
was their expertise and investment that developed the eastern Pacific fishery, which entitled
them to their fair share of the fisheries.219
3. Status of the Stocks - In the EPO, the primary area of concern for IATIC, the catches
of bluefin were below average during 1980-1984, about average during 1985 and 1986,
and below average during 1987-1993 (see Figure 14, page 58). In the WPO catches were
well above average during 1978-1983 and about average during 1984-1992, except for
1988 and 1990, where the catches were well below average.220 In the WPO, reliable data
is not available on catches and/or landings on the Japanese fishery for small bluefin (which
represents about 90 percent of the western Pacific catch).
216 (lAITC, 1993), p. 17-20.
217 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 13-18.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 (lATIC, 1993), p. 82.
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FIGURE 14
Catch, effort, and catch-per-unit of effort data for the sUlface fishery for northern bluefin tuna in the
eastern Pacific Ocean.
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There is concern in IATIC about the recent poor catches of bluefin in the EPG.
However, the available, limited information does not evidence a clear reason(s) for the
decline.221 Some data indicates that both reduced availability and reduced fishing effort
have contributed to the reduced catches of bluefin in the EPO during the 1980's and early
1990's.222 Although basic catch data for the purse seine fishery, obtained from a logbook
system, is available in the eastern Pacific, there are problems with identifying effort,
directed primarily at bluefin. This lack of standardized effort data may inhibit the overall
knowledge of this fishery, especially since effort on the bluefin has become more efficient
with the introduction of spotter planes. In the WPO, "no estimate of effort at all is available
for the catches of very small bluefin (which represents about 90 percent of the western
Pacific catch) taken in the inshore waters of Japan. "223
C. CONVENfION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA
(CCSBT)
1. Functions- In the late 1970's, international scientific concern over the status of the
southern bluefin stock became apparent to the fishing community. In 1982 and 1983,
international meetings were held by the three predominant fishing nations Australia. Japan,
and New Zealand, where it was agreed that there was a need for some type of coordinated
management policy. Catches were limited by quotas agreed to by the three countries, yet
these quotas have not been realized in any year except 1989,224 and catches have
continued to decline. This is a situation similar to that in regard to both ICCAT's minimum
size regulation for eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna. and IATIC's quota
management over yellowfin - both of which were virtually ignored and were never
implemented by the respective organizations' member countries.
221 (Bayliff, 1990), p. 77-81
222 Ibid, p. 85.
223 Ibid.
"24 -
- (IATIC, 1991), p. 5.
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In 1994, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand fonnalized its trilateral arrangement-
the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), which entered
into force on May 20, 1994.225 The objective of the CCSBT is "... to ensure, through
appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilization of southern bluefin
tuna" 226 The Convention broadens the potential scope of global management of southern
bluefin tuna by allowing for accession by any State who fishes, or is a range state for this
species.227
2. Regulations Over Southern Bluefin Tuna - As a result of the trilateral meetings in the
early 1980's, Australia first introduced quota management in 1984, establishing a 14,500
ton total allowable catch for 1984-5, and decreasing yearly thereafter.228 A seasonal-area
closure of its fishery off western Australia was also adopted. Quota measures of 23,150
and 1,000 tons were adopted by Japan and New Zealand, respectively, for the 1986 fishing
season and decreasing thereafter.229 From 1989 to present, the catch limits for all three
trilateral countries were reduced to 6,065 tons for Japan, 5,265 tons for Australia, and 420
tons for New Zealand230 Scientific evidence suggests that catches have declined as a
consequence of declining recruitment, rather than introduction of the quota plan.231
CCSBT members - Australian commercial fishing on southern bluefin juveniles
began in 1951-1952.232 Up until the late 1980's, southern bluefin caught in the Australian
fishery were mainly used to supply the domestic canning industry. Australia then
developed an export market to Japan to supply the more financially lucrative Japanese
225 (Australian Treaty Series. 1994. #16)
226 Ibid. art. 3
227 (Wanyama, 1994, p. 1-8.
228 (Caton, 1991), p. 247-250.
229 (lCCAT, 1993a). p. 182-183.
230 Ibid.
231 -(Caton. 1991), p. 247-250.
232 (Caton, 1991), p. 247-263.
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sashimi market. Today, approximately 90 percent of the Australian catch goes to the
Japanese sashimi market233
Adult southern bluefin have been caught by Japanese longliners since 1952 on the
high seas or in waters other than its own. Japan both imports this species from other
fishers and consumes tuna caught by its own fleet. Japan has been recording imports of
southern bluefin separately in its Customs statistics since 1993. Australia was the largest
exporter of southern bluefin tuna to Japan, followed by Taiwan and Indonesia, in 1993.234
Non-members of the CCSBT, fishing for the southern bluefin species, account for 38.8
percent of imports.235
Adult southern bluefin have been caught by the New Zealand handline-troll fishery
since the late 1970's. In 1989 initiation of a joint venture with Japanese longline fishing
interests increased total New Zealand catches. AU of the New Zealand catch is exported to
Japan.236 New Zealand statistics show a total of 2,828 tons exported to Japan in 1991,
which was well above the agreed quota level of 420 tons.237
Non-CCSBT members - Southern bluefin tuna catches by countries other than
Australia, Japan and New Zealand have in the past been considered trivial. Although data
from other reported countries (Taiwan, Korea, and Indonesia) suggest that fishing for
southern bluefin is poor, there is evidence indicating that catches now represent a
substantial component of the global catch, especially given reductions in Australian and
Japanese catches.238 Data indicates that only 7.2 percent of the southern bluefin landed in
Indonesia comes from Indonesian boats, the remainder being landed by Taiwanese vessels.
Large fish (100 kg. plus) comprise the majority of this catch. It is estimated that total
Indonesian landings of southern bluefin (Indonesian plus Taiwanese vessels) for 1992,
233 (lATIe, 1991), p. 8-10.
234 (Wanyama, 1994), p. 1-8.
235 Ibid
236 (Wanyama, 1994), p. ~5.
237 Ibid.
238 (Caton, 1991), p. 262.
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were approximately 900 tons, with three-fourths of this amount being exported, and the
remainder being utilized locally (either boiled or canned tuna).239 The estimated
Taiwanese catch for 1992 was 7,300 tons, and Korea's 1992 catch was 1,100 tons.240 An
additional concern with the non-CCSBT catch is that part of it is occurring in the spawning
grounds, which will seriously affect the already depleted adult stock.241
The management arrangements over southern bluefin have failed to address the
problem of the increasing catches of non-CCSBT countries, which operate outside of the
trilateral agreements242 - a problem mirrored in ICCAT's inability to control non-member
countries fishing for Atlantic bluefin tuna, and, to a lesser extent, a situation also seen
under IATIC's purview. Catches of southern bluefin by non-member countries are at
quite significant levels as compared to catches taken by the trilateral nations.243 The
CCSBT offers the potential for these countries, as well as others, to join in an international
management regime, but to date, none of them have joined the treaty.244
3. Status of the Southern Bluefin Tuna - Stocks of southern bluefin tuna have been heavily
overfished for the past 30 years. It is estimated that the current parental stock is 10-20
percent of the parental biomass of 1965, which scientists consider to be the lowest level
ever.245 Abundance of the 4-7 year old stock has increased slightly since 1986, however,
recruitment (number of stock at age 1) has declined from the early 1980's, and continues to
do so today.246 Though catch figures have been reliably reported, "it has been extremely
difficult to derive a consistent measure of effort for surface fisheries for southern
239 (Wanyama. 1994), table 4.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid, p. 8.
242 (lATIC, 1991), p. 8-10.
243 A comparison of calChes by non-trilateral countries, compared to the trilateral countries. since 1989,
indicates a 879 percent increase in catches compared with those over the previous four years. (Wanyama.
1994), p. 4.
244 (Wanyama. 1994), p. 7.
245 (Wanyama, 1994), p. 1.
246 (ICCAT, 1993a), p. 182-183.
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bluefin."247 It is also noted that reported catches from Indonesia, Korea, and Taiwan
seriously under-represent total catches of southern bluefin tuna248
Although the following organizations, the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA) and the Indian Ocean Fishery CommissionlIndo-Pacific Fishery Commission
(IOFC/IPFC), do not directly manage or engage in significant scientific research over
bluefin tuna, their jurisdictional areas are known to have bluefin species migrating through
them. Thus, it is important to briefly consider these organizations and their tuna
management schemes, as they may provide useful information for global fisheries
management in the future.
D. SOUTH PACIAC FORUM ASHERIES AGENCY (FFAl
1. Background - The idea of a specialized organization to address regional fisheries
management concerns was first discussed in 1en6 at the 7th annual South Pacific Forum
meeting.249 The area of concern, the southwestern central Pacific Ocean, is a tuna rich area
which has long been exploited by the fishermen of distant water fishing States (DWFS). In
1988, this area produced at least 30 percent of the total world tuna catch and greater than
one half of the world catch of skipjack tuna250 (Skipjack tuna makes up the majority of
tuna caught in the Pacific and is normally canned for export to the U.S.251) Catch of all
tuna and billfish has been rising steadily since lenO, and in 1990 totaled 1,622,160 metric
tons.252
247 (lATIC, 1991), p. 8-10.
248 Ibid.
249 The South Pacific Forum is a political body formed in 1971 by Heads of Government in the region.
The FFA, as well as other special purpose autonomous bodies have been created under its umbrella.
Members in the SPF are the same as those of the FFA. (Doulman, 1987a), p. 245-256.
250 (FAO, 1993)
251 (lATIC, 1993), p. 77-81-
252 (FAO, 1993)
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Purse seining accounts for approximately 62 percent of the tuna catch in this area,
while the balance is taken by longlining and pole and line technique. Approximately 80
percent of the tuna in the region is taken by the fishing vessels of distant water fishing
States (DWFS).253 The largest distant water fishing fleets sail under the flags of Japan,
the United States, the Republic of Korea. and Taiwan.
FFA arrangements with distant water fishing nations - Prior to the advent of
expanded ocean jurisdiction, fleets fished virtually unhindered in the South Pacific. After
most of the South Pacific Island States declared exclusive economic zones in the late
1970's, DWFS were required to pay a fee for harvesting fish. Japan, the DWFS with the
greatest presence in the region since the early twentieth century, entered into bilateral
agreements with almost all the member States of the FFA.254 These agreements continue
today.
The Republic of Korea. Taiwan and China have a recent and growing tuna fishing
presence in the region. These DWFS have bilateral access agreements with some of the
South Pacific States. The United States, as was mentioned in Chapter three, did not
recognize coastal State jurisdiction over highly migratory species until relatively recently.
Finally, in 1988, the U.S. government and the South Pacific States signed a multilateral
access treaty, providing the U.S. vessels with access to approved areas of member country
EEZ's in exchange for up to 55licenses and $18 million annually in access fees.255
2. Functions- In 1979, the constitutive convention was signed, creating the South Pacific
Forum Fisheries Agency.256 This regional organization does not usurp member States
sovereign rights to regulate fishing, only assists them in their management rights. 257 The
253 (Doulman, 1987a), p. 161-169.
254 Ibid, p. 71-80.
255 (Bergin. 1993)
256 (freaties in Force, 1994. See FFA, fJ7 UNTS 227)
257 (Mann Borgese & Ginsberg, 1980)
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membership was limited to members258 of the south Pacific fishery and other States or
territories in the region on the approval of the Forum members. The specific objectives of
the FFA include: promoting regional cooperation and coordination of fisheries policies.
securing the maximum benefits from the living resources of the region for the peoples of
the region. and facilitating the collection. analysis and dissemination of scientific and
economic infonnation about the living marine resources. in particular the highly migratory
species.259 FFA's essential role is coordination; it is not vested with making management
decisions (i.e. setting catch quotas).260 Such decisions are the responsibility of individual
member countries. which are required to infonn the agency about their management
initiatives. This role makes the FFA unique from the other organizations. mentioned
above.
3. Regulations Over Tuna Fisheries - The southern bluefin tuna. which migrate through
the southwestern central Pacific area. are managed under CCSBT. Presently there are no
biologically based management measures for tuna or tuna-like species in this region. The
FFA does not have the data base nor the administrative apparatus needed to establish a
resource management regime.261 Once tuna stocks become more heavily exploited.
however. a management regime to restrain fishing effort to an optimum level for generating
benefits to all FFA members win be necessary.
Among its management efforts. the FFA has created a regional registry of fishing
vessels. instituted catch reporting requirements and licensing fees. facilitated bilateral and
multilateral access agreements between distant water fishing States and the South Pacific
States. and implemented a joint surveillance plan that provides for reciprocal enforcement
258 Currently FFA member States are Australia. The Cook Islands, Fiji, The Republic of Kiribati. The
Marsball Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia. Nauru. New Zealand, Niue, Palau. Papua New Guinea.
Solomon Islands. Tonga. Tuvalu. Vanuatu and Western Somoa. 8(Meltzer. 1994), p. 268.
259 (Meltzer, 1994), p. 267-m.
260 (Doulman. 1987b). p. 254.
261 Ibid. p. 13-22.
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authority for each island State in the exclusive economic zone or territorial sea of another
member State.262 The FFA's efforts are viewed as being very successful, which is
reflected in the benefits accrued to the island member States. However, since tuna stocks
are presently not exploited and FFA countries have limited physical and financial resources,
a problem may well ultimately arise in establishing effective regulations, enforcement and
surveillance. Since tuna and tuna-like stocks traverse in and out of FFA's jurisdictional
area, one suggestion to address this problem, which will be discussed further in chapter
seven, is to coordinate tuna management across the entire Pacific, Atlantic and Indian
Oceans.
4. Status of the Tuna Stocks - A difference between the main tuna fisheries managed under
ICCAT, IATIC, and CCSBT, and the primary tuna fisheries in the southwestern central
Pacific region, is that the latter is believed to be under-exploited. The skipjack tuna, the
primary species caught in the south Pacific region, has a fast reproductive cycle, which
presently makes this species in no danger of decline. Where ICCAT and CCSBT must be
primarily concerned with rebuilding the bluefm stocks to a sustainable level, and with
conserving other tuna-like species, FFA's main goal is to promote optimum utilization of
the resources in their waters.
E. INDIAN OCEAN ASHERY COMMISSION <IOFO ArID INDO-PACIAC
ASHERIES COMMISSION <IPFC)
In the Indian Ocean, principal market species other than skipjack are taken mostly
by three longline fishing nations, Japan, the Republic of China, and the Republic of
Korea.263 Additionally, moderate amounts of skipjack are taken by coastal fleets using
drift nets and hook and line gear. Historically, the major surface fisheries have been on the
262 S(Meltzer, 1994), p. 267-273.
263 (Joseph & Greenough. 1979), p. 20-21.
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eastern boundaries of the Indian Ocean - for southern bluefin off Australia, and for
yellowfin and other species around Indonesia
1. Functions - The IOFC 264 was established in 1967 by the Council of the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The Commission has broad
responsibility over fishery research and development in the Indian Ocean. The IPFC 265
was formed in 1948, also within the framework of FAO. Like the IOFC, the IPFC has
broad responsibility over the development and conservation of the living marine and
freshwater resources of the Indo-Pacific region.266
Neither group employs a permanent secretariat or staff, and financing for research
and development is undertaken by members267 of each Commission. Stock assessment
studies have been limited to general reviews made by a special ad hoc group of experts
serving both bodies.
As seen in other oceans, in the Indian Ocean there exist the problems of catch
distribution, fleet expansion, and lack of effective enforcement268 Unique to these FAO
organizations is the stipulation that non-United Nations members cannot belong. For
example, the Republic of China, an important rona fishing nation, cannot be a member of
either the IOFC or the IPFC.269
264 (See IOFC, FAO constitution) art. VI-I.
265 (See IPFC, 418 UNTS 348), and (FAO constitution), art. XIV.
266 (Anonymous, 1990/91), p.1151-2; 1324.
267 As of 1991, the 41lQB: members are: Africa - Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mmuitius,
Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanvmia. America - Cuba, USA, Asia - Bahrain. Bangladesh, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel. Japan, Jordan. Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Maldives. Oman, Pakistan, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Thailand. United Arab Emirates, Viet Nam. S. Pacific - Australia, Europe -
France, Greece, Netherlands. Norway, Portugal, Spain. Sweden, UK.
I£K 19 members are: America - USA, Asia - BangJadeili, India. Indonesia, Japan, Kampuchea Oem..
Korea, Malaysia. Myanmar (BU1Dla). Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines. Sri Lanka. Thailand. Viet Nam.. S.
Pacific - Australia. New Zealand, Europe - France, UK. (Anonymous. 1990/91), p.1151-2; 1324.
268 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 20-21.
269 Ibid.
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2. Regulations Over Tuna Species - Both the IOFC and the IPFC employ committees
concerned with tuna stocks primarily in the Indian Ocean, and to a lesser extent, in the
western Pacific Ocean. However, regulations over any tuna or tuna-like species have never
been established by either Commission.270 Southern bluefin tuna in the Indian Ocean are
regulated by CCSBT. Both the IOFC and the IPFC, have inter-organizational relations
with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, through links with FAO. The
IOFC/IPFC, over the years, have made the point that data on catch, effort, and size
composition of the catch, needed for proper assessment of western Pacific and Indian
Ocean tuna stocks, are lacking in terms of both covemge and timeliness.271
3. Status of the Tuna Stocks - The state of the stocks are fairly similar to those in the
Atlantic. The stocks of the principal species have been increasingly harvested over the last
two decades, reducing the catch per unit of effort for most species.272 The catches of tuna
in the Indian Ocean have risen sharply from 191,911 tons in 1982 to 743,829 tons in
1990.273 The increase was due in part to a general increase in the fishing effort and in
particular to the movement of the French and Spanish purse-seining fleets from the Atlantic
to the Indian 0cean.274 A review of the status of stocks in the region indicates that many if
not all of the stocks are now subject to medium to heavy exploitation, and in the case of
yellowfin tuna in the western Indian Ocean, are fully exploited.275
At present, research, catch and fishing effort data for tuna and tuna-like species are
collected by individual coastal and distant-water states involved in the Indian Ocean
fisheries. Coastal countries have very limited research capacity, especially in the area of
270 (Anonymous. 1990/91), p.1151-2; 1324.
271 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979). p. 20-21.
272 (FAO, 1992) Appendix D
273 (FAO, 1992) Appendix D.
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid.
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stock assessment, and consequently, the status of tuna and tuna-like stocks in the Indian
Ocean are highly uncertain.276
By reviewing the above organizations, we are able to glean some important points.
First, despite management efforts, (including catch quotas and area-closures for both
ICCAT and CCSBT, and minimum size regulations implemented by ICCAT) parental
stocks of the western Atlantic bluefin and the southern bluefin tuna have reached an over-
exploited state. Northern bluefin juvenile stocks in the western Pacific, Atlantic and
Meditemmean, and the southern bluefin juvenile stocks are believed to be either fully, or
over-exploited. In the eastern Pacific, bluefm catches have been declining since 1987. The
common theme in evidence is that many bluefin stocks worldwide are either over-exploited,
fully-exploited, or declining - despite national and international management efforts. For
both the bluefin species, the primary threat remains fishing to supply the Japanese tuna
market.
A second important trend is observed - catches by non-members of ICCAT,
CCSBT, and to a lesser extent, IATIC, inhibit the organizationIS ability to manage tuna
and tuna-like stocks. Further inhibiting the organizations purposes, is the fact that some of
the member nations ofICCAT, CCSBT, and rATTC, fail to comply with the organization's
recommended regulations.
A third problem appearing in all the organizations is the lack of adequate data,
which may limit the organizations' ability to provide fundamental stock status reports
regarding the respective fisheries. The quality of the scientific data presented at
organizational meetings often causes much political controversy over the need for, or the
extent of a regulation. These problem areas, as well as others identified as common themes
within the fishery organizations presented above, will be looked at in more detail in the
following chapter.
276 (Burke & Christy, 1990), p. 20-21.
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CHAPTER V
MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS
From the previous discussion, it is clear that similar problems are evidenced in all
of the major oceans of the world and that the international management of bluefin tuna has
been ineffective. This chapter takes an in-depth look at some of these major problem
areas, including scientific data collection and analysis, the problem of science versus
politics, the conflicts between member (and non-member) nations, flags of convenience,
and enforcement Examples of these problems will be taken mainly from ICCATIs
management system and compared to the other institutions, such as IATIC, and CCSBT as
appropriate.
A. _COLLECTING AND ANALYZING SCIENTIAC DATA
"The basic requirement for management-oriented research on tunas is to have
available catch statistics by species as well as data on the fishing effort that produced these
catches. Also of prime importance are samples showing the size composition of the catch
and various other kinds of data that provide information on life histories and relationships
between the fish and their physical and biological environment" 277 As a result, fishery
organizations, such as ICCAT, IATIC, and CCSBT, establish goals to assess stock
conditions and to determine maximum sustainable yields in order to establish effective
management regimes. Once a management system is in place, it is necessary to effectively
monitor fishing activities in order that management decisions, such as quota amounts and
when to close a fishery, can be made on a timely basis. As seen in chapter four, many
organizations have expressed concern about the limitations in such areas as data col1ection
and analysis of fishery statistics.
277 (Joseph & Greenough. 1979). p. 22-39.
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On many occasions, scientists have stressed the need for collecting adequate data
for management of the fisheries and have predicted the difficulties that would be
encountered if they were not collected.278 However, as mentioned earlier, in many
instances collection of basic fishery statistics such as catch and effort data have been
inadequate. For example, market data on all Japanese imports of Atlantic bluefin stocks
has indicated significant differences between the reported import figures and the reported
catches, suggesting under-reporting of some national statistics.279 Estimates of bluefin
tuna catches in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean are completely unreliable, "due in
part to incomplete reporting from the nations involved in fishing this stock and the general
lack of participation by scientists with knowledge of the fisheries. The small number of
scientists dedicated to the assessment of the eastern stock have difficulty acquiring timely
infonnation on the logistics of the diverse fisheries, especially of the Mediterranean."280
For the eastern Atlantic bluefin population, ICCAT has stated, "Many times the Committee
has expressed serious concern about the lack of basic infonnation on the catch and size
composition."281 Further, "the SCRS wishes to stress that the high catch of small bluefin
fish [in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean] indicates a lack of compliance with the
ICCAT minimum size regulation. This problem may become crucial for the future of this
stock."282 Of primary concern is ICCAT's lack of funding, time, and staff, which has
negatively affected the quality and quantity of scientific assessments completed in the
western Atlantic bluefin stocks.
In the Pacific Ocean, adequate estimates of fishing mortality, and the numbers of
spawners and recruits of northern bluefin tuna are not available.283 Effort data on the
bluefin tuna catch in the western and eastern Pacific are non-existent In the Indian Ocean,
278 Ibid.
279 (lCCAT 1992), p. 154.
280 (lCCAT, 1993b)
281 Ibid.
282 (lCCAT, 1990)
283 (IATIC, 1993), p. 35.
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estimates of catches of most principal types of tuna are widely unknown. For southern
bluefin in all oceans a measure of effort for surface fisheries has not been derived,284 and
total catches of this species may be seriously under-represented because of un-reported
catches from non-member CCSBT countries.285
In addition, factors which determine a bluefin stocks abundance, such as stock
structures, fecundity, natural mortality and the relationship between stock size and
spawning success are largely unknown. Scientists can only determine the size and
population trend of a stock of fish by using mathematical models incorporating many
assumptions about such unknowns. The models are improved by trial and error over time,
and the assumptions incorporated in the models are always subject to challenge.286
Mathematical models used to calculate stock abundance's are a contentious issue
when considering the management of northern and southern bluefin tuna, yet these
methods are regularly used to assess the status of an exploited population.287 The virtual
population analysis (VPA) methodology, based on catch rates as measured by CPUE, is
used in the SCRS assessments of Atlantic bluefin tuna.288 The VPA is also used by
IATIC and CCSBT in various stock analyses. The VPA is based essentially on a back-
calculation procedure that allows reconstruction of the abundance of each cohort in the
population on the basis of the catches and estimates of natural mortality.289 Because there
are many restrictions imposed by available data, scientists must incorporate important
assumptions into the VPA model such as, there are two definite stocks (eastern and
western), and there is no error in the age composition of the fish caught290 These
uncertainties limit confidence about the status of the population,291 and consequently limit
284 (IAITe, 1991), p. 8-10.
285 Ibid.
286 (Weld, 1991)
287(Natiooal Academy of Science, 19(4), p. 79-108.
288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
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the ability of fishery managers to confidently impose restrictions over a stock. In 1994.
this concern over stock assessments lead to the U.S. National Research Council to conduct
a peer review over ICCAT's science. The most notable results of the review found that
available biological evidence on stock structure (one stock or two) was sparse.292 and that
research on the Atlantic bluefin tuna is not continuing at an intensity necessary to answer
major biological questions pertaining to the management of the fisheries.293
ICCAT. as well as other fishery organizations. continue to grapple with data
gathering and analysis needs. especially from countries that are not ICCAT parties.
Beginning September 1. 1993. all frozen bluefin imported into any of ICCAT's member
countries are to be accompanied by an "ICCAT statistical document"294 The purpose for
this document is to gain a better idea of the numbers of fish being imported into ICCAT
member countries and track trade from non-ICCAT nations such as Panama. Honduras.
and Italy.295 The original proposal by the U.S.• Canada. and Japan was for a "certificate
of origin". but after intense negotiations. the countries agreed to replace the term "certificate
of origin" with. a "bluefin statistical document." allowing use of a Commission-accepted
document. instead of a certificate that would have required validation by a government
official.296 Initially. the statistical document program will apply only to imports of frozen
bluefin. but ICCAT plans eventually to extend the program to cover fresh bluefin. This
plan could help distinguish bluefin exports by non-ICCAT countries from those of member
nations. The arrangement could also give Japan. by far the major importer. the capacity to
prohibit imports of bluefin tuna from non-ICCAT countries.297 However. the program
292 The peer review conducted its assessments based on the one-stock theory. thus the results and
recommendations to this research paper is limit. since this research is based on the present two-stock
theory. Ibid, p. 1-4.
293 (National Academy of Science, 1994), p. 79-108.
294 (ICCAT, 1993), p. 67.
295 (Sutton, 1993)
296 (Sarma, 1993)
297 (ICCAT, 1993), p. 67.
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relies completely on the member nation's interpretation of this ICCAT recommendation,
and to date, has not yet been enforced.
ICCAT appears to be relying on the statistical document as an opportunity for an
ICCAT importing country to deny entry to non-member nations under the Genernl
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).298 GATT allows governments to restrict trade in
order to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and to conserve exhaustible natural
resources.299 The recently approved ICCAT resolution allowing members to impose trade
sanctions on non-member countries may assist the statistical document by providing the
backing it needs to stand up to GATT.300 For example, Japan could conceivably deny
entry of bluefin tuna from a non-member ICCAT nation, an action which may be in
compliance with GATT. It remains to be seen whether it will stand up to GATT until it is
tested. However, not until countries like Japan become accountable to the ICCAT
recommendation, and actually implement and enforce such a statistical document program,
will there be any real progress.
From the above experiences showing problems with fisheries data collection and
analysis in all the worlds oceans, it is clear that if international management of tuna
resources is to be successful, collection of basic statistical data must be carned out by a
management organization that is given a mandate to accomplish this job and is provided
with the support (fiscal, scientific staff, member nation compliance, etc.) necessary to carry
it out Since populations of tuna migrate over vast areas throughout many oceans, this
organization must monitor large geographical areas. Management cannot be applied
effectively over only a portion of a population's range, especially since many stocks of tuna
298 (Treaties in Force, 1994, p. 341; see GATT text. TIAS 17(0)
299 (Anonymous. 1992)
300 A 1992 ruling by GATT declared a U.S. law protecting dolphins to be in violation of its free trade
rules. The U.S. had established a trade embargo on tuna that were caught by killing dolphins. The ruling
was made on the following grounds: 1. The resource was international rather than domestic and by
instituting an embargo the U.S. was trying to foist its law on the rest of the world 2. The law violated
the GATT rules because the thing being protected (dolphins) was not the product being traded (tuna). Since
ICCAT instituted a internationally-agreed standard in 1994, an embargo by an ICCAT member enforcing
the statistical document. potentially could now meet both the GATT criteria's. (Anonymous. 1992)
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and tuna-like species frequently overlap and the fleets that fish for them are higWy mobile.
It is redundant and inefficient for a number of organizations to gather data independently,
as is the case today. Ideally, it would be far more efficient, both economically and
logistically, for the responsibility for collection and dissemination of such data to reside in a
single international body.30l
B. SCIENCE VERSUS POLITICS
Although data collection and analysis may be a primary factor inhibiting fishery
management organizations, once the scientific data has been collected and assessed, these
organizations must make timely management decisions based on the best scientific data
available, as limited as it may be. However, a problem too often encountered is the
reluctance of organizations to use the scientific data if it supports regulations which are
"stricter" than what many member countries are politically willing to accept Too often
what is eventually passed only amounts to "soft laws", or those laws which rarely become
more than a written document.
The debates associated with the various ICCAT meetings typifies the Commission's
failure to act consistently with its own scientific findings, and instead indicates that ICCAT
bows to political pressures. Ultimately, this failure has led to the Commission's inability to
establish recommendations which have "teeth" in them.
1. The Two-Stock Theory - In October 1981, at the yearly meeting of the United States
Advisory Committee to the United States ICCAT Commissioners, NMFS scientists noted
that the overall abundance of the western bluefin stock had declined.302 NMFS also
presented evidence based on limited tagging data, that Atlantic bluefin are actually two
separate stocks - eastern and western.303 Thus, based on this evidence, the U.S. created a
301 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 22-39.
302 (Hoover, 1983), p. 26.
303 (Ruais, 1993), p. 13.
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two-stock assessment, concluding again, that western tuna populations had decreased
significantly. Japanese and European scientists raised objections to the two-stock
hypothesis, but U.S. scientists lobbied their case well, and succeeded.
Acting on this infonnation, the U.S. Advisory Committee recommended that the
groundwork be established for the possible imposing of a moratorium on directed fisheries
in known spawning areas. However, ICCAT scientists believed stronger action was
needed.
2. The 1981 ICCAT Meeting - On November 11, 1981, SCRS classified western bluefins
as depleted and strongly recommended that catches be cut as close to zero as possible.3°4
Eventually, an ICCAT recommendation was passed for a two year moratorium in the
western Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery, with a small quota for purposes of continued
scientific assessment of the stoc.k.305 The proposed number of takes was 565 metric tons.
Canada, Japan and the U.S., the three countries determined to be actively fishing for
bluefin tuna in the western Atlantic, were to share the monitoring responsibility by taking
and studying just enough fish to enable scientists to estimate the abundance of the stock.
More specifically, the ICCAT recommendation authorized Canada, Japan and the U.S. to
establish the final quotas themselves, provided that the combined quota was no more than
565 mt.306
Instead of complying with ICCAT's directive, the following measures were taken.
Representatives of these three countries gathered to arrange a quota deal. At this meeting,
based on the two-stock theory, bluefin were divided on a political "equaJ.-distance" line,
where the Canadians were provided a share of the quota that was higher than their recent
catches, and the Japanese high-seas fleet would not have to count catches from anywhere
east of the line (where they are known to fish significantly). The three countries, taking
304 Ibid.
305 (lCCAT, 1992), p. 55.
306 Ibid.
76
further advantage of the ICCAT recommendation that they establish the final quota
themselves, also concluded that the quota would be increased to 1,160 metric tons,307
Exemplifying its weak stance, ICCAT did not dispute the three countries' political
maneuver, and instead, only passed a policy requiring all future stock assessments to be
conducted by its Standing Committee on Research and Statistics and not by scientists from
any single country,308
Nevertheless, the establishment of a quota regulation by ICCAT continued to cause
much political controversy. In the U.S., bluefin exporters formed a lobbying group called
the East Coast Tuna Association, and hired a consultant to vet ICCAT's data. Although the
consultants' final report found minor technical mistakes in the ICCAT science, they were
unable to disprove SCRS's scientific evidence showing the tuna population's decline.309
At the same time, Japan was also criticizing ICCAT scientists for the minor flaws in their
data. Succumbing to this intense political pressure, ICCAT gave in and raised the quota to
2,660 metric tons,310 As a result, the United States quota increased for the 1983 fishing
season from 605 mt to 1,387.3 mt; Japan received a quota of 699.4 mt; and Canada's quota
became 573.3 mt311 Throughout the 1980's this annual "scientific" quota remained
unchanged, though the SCRS's data continued to show the breeding population declining
and fishing mortality increasing each year,312 From 1982 to 1991, the bluefin tuna stocks
in the western Atlantic were reduced approximately 60% from its 19701eve1.313
3. The 1991 ICCAT Meeting - SCRS reported that even if the quota were cut in half, the
west Atlantic bluefin's breeding population would have only slightly better than a fifty-fifty
probability of increasing in numbers, and there was a strong likelihood that the population
307 Ibid.
308 (Ruais. 1993). p. 13.
309 (Williams. 1992), p. 18
310 Ibid.
311 (Hoover, 1983), p. 55.
312 (Sarma. 1993). p. 230.
313 (Safina, 1991), p. 5.
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would continue to decline.314 ICCAT, once again victimized by political pressure from
member countries, ignored their own scientists and recommended that the quota be cut by
only 10 percent. Further, while ICCAT never established a recovery program for the west
Atlantic, it did not set catch quotas for the east Atlantic either. Yet ICCAT's own data
showed that the population has declined by 50 percent since 1970,315
4. November 1992 Meeting - At this meeting, ICCAT missed yet another opportunity to
take further action to reduce the catch quota for the severely depleted bluefin tuna
population in the western Atlantic. In the words of ICCAT's official newsletter, "No
specific regulatory measures were recommended this year by the Commission."316 The
Commission did recommend that a management review committee be established to
consider a possible reduction of the fishing level to 50 percent of the 1991 scientific quota
to allow for rebuilding of the western Atlantic bluefin stoek.317 The U.S., according to
Chief U.S. Commissioner Cannen Blondin, was the only country that spoke in favor of
the 50 percent reduction.318 Canada continued to insist that no further reductions were
needed since, in their view, rebuilding of the population could occur under the present
management regime. Japan emphasized that uncontrolled fishing by non-ICCAT countries
must be dealt with first, but supported a 50 percent reduction in principle. Unfortunately,
the 50 percent target reduction failed to get anywhere. The recommendation which was
finally agreed upon, was a quota reduction of only 10 percent319
5. The 1993 ICCAT Meeting - In contrast to the prior meetings, the 1993 meeting did
initially prove to be somewhat worthwhile in the eyes of bluefin conservationists. ICCAT
314 (lCCAT, 1993)
315 (Safma. 1991), p. 5.
316 (Ruais, 1993)
317 (lCCAT, 1993), p. 102.
318 (Sutton, 1992)
319 (Federal Register, 1992), p. 32905.
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passed a recommendation to reduce the quota for western Atlantic bluefin tuna by 50
percent over the next two years, pending further investigations in 1994.320 The 1994-95
aggregate bluefin tuna quota for the western Atlantic was set at 1,995 mt, with the U.S.
having 62 percent, Canada - 26 percent, and Japan - 12 percent. At the meeting, Japan
agreed to cut back on its share of the western Atlantic tuna quota from its usual 22 percent
to 12 percent, in an effort to reach an agreement that would avoid a CITES321 listing of the
species (further discussed in chapter 7).322 This concession was made by Japan without
the support of the Japanese fishennen. Needless to say, the fishennen were outraged and
called for a boycott of U.S. and Canada fish.323 To this date, the boycott has not been
carried through.
Although Japan agreed to cut its share of western Atlantic bluefin tuna, its
fishennen actually catch a significant amount of their total harvest of bluefin in the eastern
Atlantic.324 Since there are no catch quotas in the eastern Atlantic, Japan may shift their
displaced western tuna fishing efforts to the eastern tuna population.325 Thus, this
concession by Japan may not amount to a conservation based measure for the tuna
6. The 1994 ICCAT Meeting - Prior to this meeting the SCRS perfonned a new
assessment, revising the 1993 assessment, which revealed little change in the overal'l trend
in bluefin abundance, but did show a slight increase in stock size.326 At the annual ICCAT
meeting, the SCRS, however, tempered its report, stating, "The relative merits of various
error structures in catch per unit of effort (CPUE) standardization, as well as the
320 (Rouleau, 1993), p. 12
321 CITES is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and ROJa Its
pwpose is to regulate international trade in wild animals. plants and their products. See chapter 7 for
further detail.
322 Ibid.
323 Ibid.
324 (Sutton, 1994)
325 Ibid.
326 "The primary reason the 1994 assessment differed from the previous one (i.e., was more optimistic in
its projections), was changes in model specification. in other words, the new method by which the
assessment was conducted." (Hinman. 1994), p. 3.
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implications of mixing, will be investigated further during 1995 and it would therefore be
advisable to be cautious while awaiting those results as well as those of next year's
assessment. In addition, despite positive signs estimated in the current assessment, the 8+
biomass remains close to the lowest levels observed while the estimated fishing mortality is
higher than previously stated in 1993."327
The nations fishing the western Atlantic bluefin stock, heeding SCRS's emphasis
on caution, agreed to increase the total quota to 2,200 mt of bluefin for each of the years
1995 and 1996. Obviously, the 50 percent reduction recommendation presented in 1993
was never carried out
As evidenced in its many meetings throughout the years, ICCAT has not managed
the bluefin tuna resource for the maximum sustainable yield, which its charter mandates.
As we have seen, ICCAT scientists, under the circumstances, have presented the best
available scientific data and recommended restrictions to conserve the species. However,
political pressure from member countries has negated attempts at serious conservation
based measures. The result of this cycle has been the continual decline of the bluefin
species.
Chapter four presented other examples of this problem, where scientific data is
presented showing a need for fishing restrictions on a tuna species, but the member
countries do not heed the recommendations. Examples are also seen in IATIC's
regulations over yellowfin tuna, and CCSBT's regulations over southern bluefin tuna
C. CONA.JCT BETWEFN ICCAT MEMBER NATIONS (and non-member nations)
In an attempt to Wlderstand why many fishery management bodies too often fail to
effectively manage tuna populations, an analysis of the member countries who make up
these organizations is necessary. From a broader perspective, the contracting parties to
ICCAT, IATIC, FFA, and IOFC/IPFC, are a combination of developing countries and
327 Ibid.
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developed countries, whose goals and justification for joining the respective fishery
agreements drastically differ. A study by the United Nations, titled The 1992 Human
Development Report compares and contrasts "life issues II between developing and
developed countries.
Environmental concerns differ at different stages of development. Industrial
countries' concerns are often projected long into the future, with attention to such
problems as renewable resources, global warming and the destruction of ozone
layer - resulting from overconsumption of natural resources. On the other hand,
developing countries are often concerned less about the quality of life than about life
itself. And their concerns are much more immediate: polluted water is a threat to
life, eroded land, a threat to livelihood.328
A known fact is that the capability of the worlds oceans to produce tuna is limited,
yet the fleets that harvest these species have increased rapidly over the years. It has been
pointed out that on a worldwide basis, fleet carrying capacity far exceeds what is needed to
harvest the available catch.329 Developed nations with large fleets fish for tuna for profit,
not for food. These countries fish for tuna because it provides an excellent return on
investments. At the same time, developing nations also see in tuna fishing an opportunity
for good returns on investments, and are working hard to enter the fishery. Since the tuna
are a limited resources, a problem exists as to who should get what share of the available
supply. In addition, unrestricted fleet growth creates serious political problems by
exacerbating the situation regarding distribution of the catch among users.330 The
questions of how to distribute the catch among nations and how to restrict fleet growth is
prevalent worldwide, making these some of the most important questions in international
tuna fisheries. A situation often seen in fishery organizations deliberating over the catch
distribution problem, is the non-agreement between member countries. As seen in ICCAT,
the only way to pass any recommendation to which the diverse interests of member
328 (Human Development Team. 1992), p. 14-15.24-25.
329 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 22-39.
330 Ibid.
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countries can agree, has resulted in dilute and weak recommendations. It seems obvious
that the incongruous philosophies of member countries will be extremely difficult to resolve
under the present international fishery organizations.
Another fact, as expressed in previous chapters, which has inhibited fishery
organizations such as CCSBT, ICCAT, IATIC, and IOFC/IPFC, is that non-members of
these organizations are a major obstacle to implementing an effective tuna management
plan. Although data is lacking, the significant non-member countries fishing for tuna are as
follows: In the Pacific, non-members to IATIC are Ecuador, Mexico, and Canada; in the
Atlantic, non-members to ICCAT are Panama. Honduras, and Italy; in the southern ocean
regions, non-members to CCSBT are Taiwan, Indonesia and Singapore; and in the Indian
Ocean, a non-member to IOFCIlPFC is the Republic of China When considering the
unofficial estimate that non-member countries catch 75 percent more bluefin tuna than the
current quota. it is obvious why the conservation benefits of regulations in this fishery have
never been achieved.
Some form of global cooperation. incorporating both member and non-member
nations. to pass effective regulations appears to be necessary. The cooperative agreement
must hold countries accountable and begin to resolve such problems as catch distribution
and fleet growth.
D. R.AGS OF CONVENIENCE
Operating ships under non-member country flags, or "flags of convenience" to
avoid management regulations.331 is another of the problems inhibiting effective
management of high seas fisheries. Using this method. tuna fishing countries have
circumvented ICCAT regulations as well as other fishery organizations. The reflagging of
fishing vessels to countries that are not parties to international fishery agreements has
become a common-place method of averting regulations. These flags of convenience
331 (Gowie, 1993), p. 39.
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vessels are not required to comply with certain legal regulations, creating a controversial
issue of many years standing.332 Many ships operate under non-member nations' flags -
an alarming fact when noting that non-member nations catch an estimated 75 percent more
bluefin tuna than the current quota333 Obviously this thwarts any type of fishery
management effort. Unfortunately, as described in chapter two, the fishermen who are
most negatively impacted are those who fish within the established quotas, which creates a
disincentive to abide by the quota
An attempt at resolving this issue has been made. In December 1993, an agreement
was approved by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) through the United
Nations, requiring that governments register and report all possible high-seas fishing boats
which are registered under their countries' flag.334 The intention of the convention is to
make flag States responsible for their vessels fishing on the high seas. The treaty is
presently open for signature and will enter into force upon ratification by 25 countries.335
Unfortunately, there is little inducement for flag States to commit themselves to the
agreement's responsibilities.336 This new agreement would be a positive step forward in
support of fishery organizations by providing a means of collecting data. However, its
success will depend on the participation of high seas fishing countries and the actual
exchange of fishing effort data.
E. ENFORCEMENT
If the problem areas previously discussed were somehow resolved, and effective
conservation regulations over tuna resources were adopted, the next area of concern is
enforcement of these regulations. In the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans, quotas, size limits
and closure regulations have been passed by the respective fishery organizations. Each
332 Ibid.
333 (Higginson. 1993)
334 (33 I.L.M. 968 (1994)+)
335 Ibid.
336 (Higginson. 1993)
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nation participating in the fisheries has been responsible for enforcing these regulations
with respect to its own vessels. Unfortunately, some nations have chosen either not to
enforce the regulations, or have been unable to do so effectively. Some technologically
advanced nations are able to enforce the regulations by surveillance of their vessels at sea
using advanced electronic equipment, while other less advantaged nations have no such
capability. This research has found that data on the quality and the extent of enforcement
by bluefin tuna fishing countries is limited.
An approach to solving this problem could be applied on a worldwide basis, in
which individual nations would delegate the responsibility for surveillance and catch
inspection to an international body representing all States}37 This body's main
responsibilities would be to determine positions of tuna vessels while they were at sea and
to inspect catches of unloading vessels. If violations were detected, they would be reported
to the nation whose flag the violating vessel was flying. Legal action would remain the
responsibility of the member nations. The cost of operating such an international body
would be rather nominal, since it would not be concerned with apprehension of violators _
and thus would not need to maintain an expensive fleet of patrol vessels. This international
surveillance and catch inspection body should be established as a branch of an overall
global agency which has the responsibility for conservation and management of tuna The
purpose of keeping the enforcement body separate from the research and management
agency is to prevent misuse of data between the various user groups - harvesters,
processors and scientists.338
Evaluation of Hypothesis One - Data analyzed in this study indicates that the adult
Atlantic bluefin tuna stocks, as well as many other bluefin tuna populations worldwide,
have declined to an over-exploited state. This fact renders hypothesis one, which states
that there is clear evidence of over-exploitation of bluefin tuna stocks, to be true.
337 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 22-39.
338 Ibid.
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Evaluation of Hypothesis Two - Through this analyses, it is reasonable to conclude
that the totality of difficulties that ICCAT faces have combined to render ICCAT virtually
ineffective in its ability to competently manage the Atlantic bluefin tuna, let alone rebuild the
stocks to a maximum sustainable level. This fact is continuously reflected in the reported
declines of the species. Thus, we are able to conclude that hypothesis two, which states
ICCAT has been virtually ineffective in providing for sustainable management of the
bluefin tuna, is indeed valid
The international controversy over how to resolve these major problem is complex.
The capability to solve the flags of convenience and enforcement problems does exist,
possibly through use of the Agreement to register flag-state vessels, and the creation of an
international enforcement body; the political will to do so remains in question. Prior to
solving these problems, however, some internationally acceptable solution must be found
to the following major issues: limitations in data collection and analysis; politics
superseding science; reconciling philosophical differences between member countries; and
the lack of compliance to fishery agreements by non-member countries. Until solutions to
these issues are found, the management of highly migratory species, specifically the
Atlantic bluefin tuna, will continue to be ineffective.
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CHAPTER VI
APPROACHES TO TUNA MANAGEMENT
There are two fundamental philosophies, which underlie and shape international
tuna management The first basic philosophy in international fisheries management is that
the nations of the world consider conservation of tuna stocks to be a desirable objective,
and that they are willing to cooperate in implementing some fonn of management to attain
this objective on a lasting basis.339 "In the case of tuna, the minimum level of
conservation, the most fundamental management requirement, is to maintain reproductively
viable stocks. Stocks must not be driven to levels where extinction is threatened or which
preclude recovery to fonner abundance in a reasonable period of time. "340 Consistent with
this philosophy, is the desire of most international fishery management organizations,
including ICCAT, IATIC, and CCSBT, to maintain tuna stocks at levels where maximum
biological yields can be taken on a sustainable basis - a tenn referred to as maximum
sustainable yield (MSY).341 However, in fisheries management there is controversy as to
what exactly is an appropriate basis for establishing management goals. More specifically,
the question is, should management be based on MSY, which primarily takes the biological
factors into consideration, or on an optimum yield342 concept, which encompasses
objectives beyond biological factors, such as economic, social and administrative. As is
339 Ibid, p.40-42.
340 Ibid.
341 For further information on MSY concept. see (NOAA, 1992), technical memo, and (Anderson. 1986),
p.25.
342 International acceptance of optimmn yield as a meaning of conservation came about at the Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas that was negotiated in 1958.
(Royce, 1984), sec. 13.3.
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presently the case, MSY is a stated objective in the international tuna regimes of ICCAT,343
IATIC,344 and CCSBT.345
The second, more traditional philosophy, is that fisheries in the worlds' oceans are
basically uncontrolled by government inteIVention; commonly referred to as open access.
Since the occurrence of public acceptance of the facts that fishery resources are exhaustible,
controlled fishing in nations jurisdictional zones has slowly begun to take the place of open
access.346 Yet, open access is still the predominant approach in the high seas. This greatly
affects a managers' ability to regulate highly migratory species, which inhabit both the high
seas and the EEZ's of many different nations. However, an unregulated fishery under
open access results in undesirable biological, economical, social and administrative
consequences.347 The biological concern is that of a stock collapse under open access.348
An example, such as the bluefin tuna fishery, is the case in which the profits from fishing a
species is high relative to the cost of fishing. This situation causes the size of the resource
stock to fall below the level which can sustain a maximum yield, thus placing the resource
at risk of collapse.349
The economic reality is that economic performance is inferior under open access.3 50
The reason being that individual producers fail to take into account their impact on the
resource stock. Since these producers may have minimal or no fishing restrictions on
catching fish, they are compelled to catch them before others do. All the fleets fishing for
their individual benefit creates a reduction in stock far below the level which would provide
the maximum economic returns for the fleet as a whole.351
343 (lCCAT, 1993a), Act text, A. Mission, p. 2.
344 (lATTC, 1993), Act text, p. 5.
345 The CCSBT text also references "optimum utilization" as an objective to management of southern
bluefm tuna. (Wanyama, 1994), p. 7.
346 (Royce, 1984), sec. 13.3.
347 (Sutinen, 1993), p. 1-3.
348 Ibid.
349 Ibid.
350 Ibid.
351 Ibid.
Open access may also have undesirable social and administrative consequences.352
Social problems encountered are effects on the distribution of income and wealth, the
amount and fonn of employment, cohesion in rural communities, class divisions, and
industry attitudes towards the regulation. Administrative consequences include
enforcement costs and problems, catch data quality, monitoring and research requirements,
and industry's support and cooperation.353
Open access fails to biologically sustain stocks and generate maximum economic,
social, and administrative net benefits - inevitably leading to a "Tragedy of the Commons"
result. This failure has been (and still is) the justification for governments to intervene, by
encompassing more and more of the oceans under its control (ex. EEZ's). and by
projecting management regulations over resources, namely fisheries, in order to maximize
benefits for the good of many.
Based mainly on these two philosophies, a variety of fisheries management
techniques have been put into practice over the years. These regulatory techniques fall into
two categories, conventional and rights-based instruments. Conventional instruments are
those regulations which have had a long history and are commonly used throughout the
world. In addition, conventional approaches to fishery management are categorized by
what they do not do - they do not resolve the fundamental problem created by open access,
which is the lack of the exclusive right by the fishennan to the use of the resource.354
Conventional regulatory types are total allowable catch (quotas), minimum mesh size and
other gear restrictions, minimum fish size, vessel. restrictions, trip limits, and area and
seasonal closures.355
In contrast, rights-based methods are distinguished from conventional, in that they
directly address the fundamental cause of over-exploitation in an open access fishery; the
352 (Anderson, 1990), p. 1-7.
353 Ibid.
354 (Sutinen, 1993). p. 1-3.
355 Ibid.
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lack of exclusive rights of use.356 Examples of rights-based regulatory types include
license limitations, individual transferable quotas (ITQ's)357, territorial use rights, and sole
ownership.358
Since the quality of management by the aforementioned international organizations
is of direct interest to this research, only those regulations recommended by ICCAT (with
supporting evidence from fATIC and CCSBT) will be thoroughly evaluated as to their past
and potential ability to sustain the bluefin tuna populations at a maximum yield. The
conventional management approaches employed by ICCAT, such as total quotas, minimum
size limits, and areaJtime closures will be discussed.
A. Total Allowable Catch. or Total9uotas - The most important mmification of the rapid
technological gear change that occurred in the 1960's in the tuna industry, was the increase
in landings and reduced fishing effort This has resulted in a substantial increase in the
catch of bluefin tuna worldwide.
In 1982, ICCAT, attempting to curtail western Atlantic bluefin catches, established
a total allowable catch (TAC) of 2,660 mt to be allocated to the ICCAT member nations
(U.S., Canada, Japan»)59 The management regulation was extended for bluefin tuna
each additional year until 1992. In 1992 and 1993, the quota was reduced by 10 percent
and 15 percent respectively, and in 1994, the quota was increased by 10 percent
The total allowable catch method sets a ceiling on total catch of the western Atlantic
bluefin species for a given annual period. In effect, the measure attempts to control directly
the extent of total fishing mortality to avoid depletion of the resource stock.360
356 Ibid.
357 Forfurtherinfonnation on ITQ's see (pearse, 1992. From Open Access to Private Property, Ocean
Development and International Law, Jan-March, p. 71-83).
358 Ibid.
359 (lCCAT, 1993a). Since 1982 when quota limitations were imposed. imports into Japan of the western
Atlantic bluefm species from non-ICCAT parties, have increased at least 20 fold, (lCCAT, 199380 p. 75)
This statistic may suggest ICCAT countries are skirting the quota by re-tlagging their fishing vessels to
non-member countries.
360 (Sutinen, 1993), p.4-5.
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The potential benefits of a TAe are: it provides good resource conservation by
directly controlling fishing mortality, and more employment
The drawbacks of a TAC are: it aggravates the race among fishermen to catch fish
before others find and land them, it induces more by-catch, discards and gear conflicts, it
allows for wasteful capital stuffing,361 and it volatile prices resulting in less economic
stability. In addition, allocation ofTAC's among national groups, and enforcing a TAC on
the high seas is very difficult362
Outcome - Although a total allowable catch was imposed over the western Atlantic
bluefin fishery in 1982, the population size has continued to decrease and fishing mortali ty
has skyrocketed to values as high or higher than before 1982, particularly for the age 8+
bluefin.363 (See Figure 15, page 91) The species, especially the adult tuna, remains at a
level far above its maximum sustainable yield - a fact which negates the effectiveness of the
quota regulation.
Overall, total quotas have not worked to effectively conserve or rebuild the Atlantic
bluefin stocks, and the economic performance ofTAC's have proven to be poor. The
tendency towards the race to fish among fishermen has led to wasteful capital stuffing, and
excessive capacity has developed in both the harvesting and processing sectors. Compared
to other types of regulations, the TAC has presented relatively few social and administrative
problems.364 However, a problem does remain regarding disagreement over allocation of
the quota amounts (between ICCAT countries and gear types), which has led to the
reluctance of nations and fishermen to comply with the regulation.
361 Capital stuffing is the excessive investment in larger and faster vessels and in more efflcient gear.
362 (Anderson, 1990), p. 1-7.
363 (lCCAT, 1992), p. 120.
364 (Sutinen, 1993), p. 4-5.
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Figure 15
Decline of western Atlantic bluefin tuna breeding adults (age 8+).
showing increase in. fishing mortality.
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B. Minimum Size Limit - In an attempt to control the increasing catch and effort on the
small bluefin stocks in 1974 ICCAT recommended a conventional approach that prohibited
the catching and landing of bluefin weighing less than 6.4 kg. (approximately 69 cm) over
the entire Atlantic bluefin fishery. ICCAT later imposed a minimum size limit of 120 cm
(the length associated with the earliest age at maturity) for the west Atlantic in 1983, due to
the continued concern over the low level of abundance of small bluefin. In the eastern
Atlantic and Mediterranean, about 90 percent of the catch is composed of juvenile fish, ages
0-4 years.365 Fish in this age category are not spawners and thus are being harvested
before contributing to the reproductive success of the stock.366
The potential benefits of implementing a minimum size limit for the bluefin
population consist of conserving the population if small fish caught are thrown back and
survive, which will help rebuild the spawning stock biomass and enhance yield per recruit
Potential losses is that after non-legal size fish are caught they cannot be sold and
thus profits and consumer surplus may be lost Also, data quality will likely deteriorate
since only legal landings, not actual catches, are reported, and an increase in monitoring
costs will be encountered.367
ICCAT viewed the potential benefits of a minimum size limitation (and time/area
closures, discussed in the next section) as outweighing the potential losses. Therefore,
some member countries heeded ICCAT's recommendation and implemented the regulations
for the following reasons:
• Due to the increased technology, some fishermen and scientists believe that they
could more effectively target fish by size.
•- Bluefin are migratory in nature, so they are located in different areas at certain times
of the year, and the cost of effort is sensitive to the place and length of the timing of the
365 (lCCAT, 1993a), p. 81.
366 Ibid.
367 (Sutinen, 1993), p.5-6.
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season. Thus, a restriction on small fish and spawning fish, will effect the total amount
of the catch.
• A minimum size limitation restricts the size of fish that can be landed and sold, thus,
will combat the problem of the increase in catch ofjuvenile bluefin tuna368
Outcome - Although a minimum size limit was imposed over the Atlantic bluefin,
since then, the numbers of tuna have continued to decline and remain far above the MSY
for the species. Further, catches of fish under the 6.4 kg limit stilI remains high, especially
in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.369 Due to enforcement problems the minimum
size limitation has failed to sustain these bluefin tuna populations at a mmtimum yield
In addition, maximum economic performance has been unattainable with minimum
size limits. Since small fish under the minimum size limit cannot be sold in the commercial
market, there have been lost profits and lost consumer surplus. Some of this loss may
have been mitigated if fishermen were motivated to plan their fishing to avoid catching non-
legal size fish,370 In the future, the only economic justification for regulating the size of
bluefin caught is the hope of insuring a larger future value of catch. This will be
determined if the present value of the expected future catch exceeds the value of the
possible immediate catch,371
Socially, introduction of a minimum size limit has most likely reduced short-run
catches, thus reducing fishermen's earnings. Not surprisingly, implementation of this
regulation has received industry resistance, due to the perceived increase in short-term
costs. However, the regulation has apparently not had any effects on the tendency towards
capital stuffing, or on perceived inequities and class divisions.372
In terms of administrative effects, the size limit has most likely reduced data quality,
since only legal landings, not actual catches are reported. This in tum, has added to the
368 (ICCAT. 1992)
369 (ICCAT. 1993a), p. 81.
370 (Sutinen, 1993), p.5-6.
371 (Anderson. 1990), p. 196-210.
372 (Sutinen, 1993), p.5-6.
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cost and difficulties of monitoring the bluefin populations}73 The fishing industries'
attitudes towards acceptance of a size limit has also had implications on the enforcement
needed and ultimate success or failure of the regulation.
Overall, a minimum size limit for the Atlantic bluefin stocks has posed few social
problems, has not improved the status of the species' populations to a maximum
sustainable level, has most likely reduced data quality and increased administrative and
monitoring costs, and has produced minor economic losses.
C. Time/Area Closures - The time/area closure conventional regulation is designed to
indirectly regulate the catch of bluefin, by closing blocks of time and large areas, restricting
when and where concentrations of these small fish are caught The effects of closed
seasons/areas and size limitations are very closely related. The objectives of both these
regulations are to protect smaller and younger fish allowing them time to grow to larger and
more valuable sizes and to mature and reproduce. These measures do nothing to haIt or
mitigate the race-to-fish inherent in open access fisheries.374
In 1974, in addition to a minimum size regulation, ICCAT also recommended that
bluefin spawning areas, notably the Gulf of Mexico and the Mediterranean, be closed to
fishing in order to protect the highly targeted juvenile fish. The reason for the closure at
this time was due to the fact that in the east Atlantic and Mediterranean the majority of the
catch was increasingly taken from the 0-5 year old fish. In the Gulf of Mexico, the
Japanese longline fishing for small bluefin was significant
Since 1974, area closures have been in effect from late May to late June in the
Mediterranean sea, and since 1982, the Gulf of Mexico area has been closed throughout the
373 Ibid.
374 Ibid. p. 7-8.
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year.375 ICCAT viewed the potential benefits of a time/area closure, along with a
minimum size limitation as outweighing the potential losses.
The potential advantages of time/area closures are: they delay the harvest of small
fish until they are larger when more pounds can be landed at a higher value and quality per
pound;376 they may modestly reduce fishing mortality, thus increasing landings and stock
conservation; and they call for low enforcement costs and problems.377
The potential disadvantages of time and area closures are: they delay the harvest of
some large fish as well as small fish; they increase the cost of fishing, since vessels are
restricted in being as efficient as possible; they may lead to less employment, since some
vessels will apply less effort; and those marginal vessels not covering costs may leave the
industry.378
Outcome - Although time/area closures were recommended and followed by some
ICCAT members, total Atlantic bluefin populations have continued to decrease and remain
far above the MSY for these stocks. The time/area closure regulations have failed to
sustain the Atlantic bluefin mna populations at a maximum yield Overall, no significant
social and administrative problems have apparently been created and modest economic net
benefits may have been aohieved as an indirect result of the time/area closures.379
Overall, the biological effect of all these regulations (quota, minimum size, and
closures), have proven to be detrimental to the western Atlantic stoeks.380 In particular,
there does not appear to be a significant beneficial correlation between the 1982 quota
375 (lCCAT, 1992). p.263.
376 (Anderson, 1990), p. 196-210.
377 (Sutinen, 1993), p. 7-8.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
380 In the east Atlantic and Meditenanean, it is believed that the quotas, minimum size limit, and time
closure, have been widely ignored by some ICCAT member countries, contributing to the failure of these
regulations. In the western Atlantic evidence suggests that the failure of the conventional type regulations
themselves. as opposed to the lack of compliance by member cmmtries. is the main contributor for the
regulations failing to benefit the bluefm populations.
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regulation and fishing mortality of the western adult stock, as seen in Figure 15, page 91.
Neither does there appear to be significant beneficial correlation's between the
implementation of the minimum size and closure regulations, and the young bluefin stocks,
as evidenced in the Figures 7 and 8, page 21 and 22 for the western Atlantic juvenile
stocks, and in Figure 16, page 97 for the eastern Atlantic juvenile stocks. In the face of
these restrictions, analyses indicate that fishing mortality rates on both small and large size
bluefin has increased to values as high or higher than before the inception of these
regulations.381 The most notable failure of the regulations is evidenced in the western
Atlantic breeding population, which have declined at the highest rate (compared to other
ages), since the adoption of these conventional regulations.382
Gulland, in his classic FAD manual on fish stock assessment methods, notes that
the strength of future recruitment" ...cannot be completely independent of the abundance of
the parent stock... " and "...the failure to take account of the possible effect of a decline in
adult stock on subsequent recruitment.. can lead to a collapse of the stock. The history of
several major pelagic fish stocks (California sardine, North Sea herring) illustrates the
importance of the stock-recruitment problem."383 In another classic example, the Atlantic
halibut fishery off New England in the 1800's was legendary for its abundance. Yet, by
1900, it was no longer worthwhile to target on halibut, and to this day the few halibut
landed are usually caught incidentally to fishing for haddock, flounders, and other species.
The American Fisheries Society sums up the present situation of ICCATs failure to
impose effective regulations, stating "The present management regime will not allow the
stock to recover, poses an unacceptable risk of there not being enough adult fish to spawn
new generations of tuna, and is counter to the long-term interest of both fishery producers
and consumers. "384
381 (lCCAT, 1992), p. 120
382 Ibid, p. 12l.
383 (Gulland., 1983), p. 223.
384 (American Fi$heries Society, 1992)
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Figure 16
Estimated stock size of east Atlantic bluefiJl tuna
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D. IATIC and CCSBT Regulations
IATIC - Although IATIC has never made recommendations [or Pacific bluefin
tuna, the case in which IATIC implemented regulations over yellowfin tuna reveals
valuable infonnation as to the degree of its success with regulation types. From 1966 to
1979 an annual total allowable catch for yellowfin in the defined conservation area was
agreed to by IATIC members, and the fishery was closed each year when estimated
catches approximated the TAC leve1.385 During this time, catches of yellowfin decreased,
while effort increased. In 1979, the management agreement broke down and quota
regulations, recommended by IATIC stafffrom 1979-1993, were never implemented.386
Since 1979, the CPUE of eastern Pacific yellowfin has significantly increased, causing the
stocks to reach an over-exploited state.387 Thus, from 1979 on, the quota regulation has
failed to sustain the species at a maximum yield.
CCSBT - Since 1984, (prior to CCSBT entering into force in 1994) Australia has
implemented a total quota and a seasonal area closure for the southern bluefin tuna New
Zealand and Japan introduced total quotas over the species in 1985.388 Despite these
management efforts, parental stocks have continued to ~ticallydecline since the
inception of the regulations.389 The abundance of age 4-7 year olds has slightly increased
since 1986, mainly as a result of the reduction in surface fishing, as opposed to the area
closure and quotas.390 These regulations were implemented to rebuild the breeding
populations and to sustain populations of the juvenile fish, yet the total population of
southern bluefin tuna has continued to decline at a high rate, since inception of the
regulations.391 As evidenced in other fisheries employing the same types of conventional
385 (Doulman, 1987b), p. 15.
386 (lATTC, 1993), p. 19.
387 (Doulman, 1987b), p. 15.
388 (ICCAT. 1992), p. 182.
389 Ibid.
390 Ibid.
391 (Wanyama. 1994), p. 2.
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methods, it is clear that the quotas and closure have failed to manage the species at
maximum sustainable levels.
Conventional methods used to manage tuna species which migrate through open
access areas and various nations' jurisdictional zones, appear to be a failure in achieving the
biological, economic, social and administrative goals as established by various fishery
management bodies. Conventional regulations show no ability to reverse the downward
spiral, let alone manage bluefin tuna species according to the goal of maximum sustainable
yields. Yet, conventional regulations cannot be separated out alone as the one reason for
the species decline. The major problem areas (such as data collection, science versus
politics, conflicts between member and non-member countries, flags of convenience, and
enforcement), along with these conventional regulatory methods, combine to inhibit
fisheries organizations from effectively managing highly migratory species.
With bluefin populations being severely overfished, of primary importance at this
time is that fact that additional measures, such as greater international efforts, are needed
which will effectively rebuild the western bluefin stock and sustain the total Atlantic
population, as well as target the problems inherent in international bluefin management. By
improving the effectiveness of international fishery agreements in the future, the effective
use of conventional methods may also in tum improve.
Since conventional methods have proven to be sub-optimal under the current
international regimes, a secondary question arises as to whether or not rights based
methods could be effective in reducing fishing effort. Rights based methods, such as
license limitations, ITQ's, territorial use rights, and sole ownership, seek to assign
exclusive catch rights to individuals or organized groups for an area and/or a species.392
In short, these types of regulations can impose significant economic, social and
administrative consequences on fishermen. Consequently, many fishermen prefer the
392 (Sutinen, 1993), p. 3. For further information on rights based methods, see (Sutinen. 1993) &
(Gulland, 1983)
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conventional, sub-optimal regulations because these regulations redistribute catch and
wealth in their favor.393 A management authority, such as ICCAT, is captured by its
member nations' fishing industries because a majority of nations must support a regulation
in order for the regulation to survive implementation. Therefore, "[conventional]
regulations that appear perverse are the results of rational agents exploiting the political
process for redistributive gains. "39: Karpoff predicts that current industries' strong
opposition will make such rights based regulations virtually impossible for ICCAT or other
international organizations to implement in the foreseen future.
For the immediate future, other measures, such as better enforcement over the
present regulations, as well as requiring (not recommending) the use of the statistical
document program to track both frozen and fresh imports into Japan is necessary. Yet, to
adequately deal with all the inherent problems in international bluefin management, a global
management body must be put into place to target these problems in a comprehensive and
binding manner. Additionally, this body must be endowed with the means to enforce
regulations, so as to allow their intent to take hold.
393 Ibid.
394 (Karpoff. 1987)
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CHAPTER VII
NEED FOR COORDINATED GLOBAL TUNA MANAGEMENT
ICCAT (as well as other fishery organizations such as IATIC and CCSBT) is
simply not effective in managing highly migratory tuna and tuna-like species, due to the
many problems areas, as evidenced in chapter five, and the lack of adequate regulations, as
seen in chapter six. Presentfy, a core issue exacerbating these problems is the fact that the
vast majority of all export-grade bluefin tuna supplies a single market - Japan.3 95 The
Japanese consume approximately three quarters of all of the bluefin caught in the western
Atlantic.396 The extremely high prices offered by Japan for the bluefin continue to bring
more effort into the fishery, which continues to drive the over-exploited stocks to possible
commercial extinction. With the increase in such driving factors as international trade,
consumer demand. and effort. tuna abundance will rest mainly upon the ability of agencies
to modify current trading practices, and combat the major problem areas and ineffective
regulations.
In order to strengthen tuna management. additional efforts to reverse the 20 year
decline in the tuna population may need to come from outside the present ICCAT system.
Since international trade of the bluefin species in the Atlantic is a primary factor affecting
the population. a reasonable solution to the over-exploitation of bluefin tuna would be for a
global management system. such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species - CITES, to strengthen the existing management regime, ICCAT, by monitoring
the worldwide trade in bluefin. By monitoring trade, gathering statistical information, and
coordinating and enforcing regional management decision making. CITES could be
effective in targeting some of the fundamental problems inherent in fisheries management
and allow bluefin populations to rebuild
395 (Gaski, 1993), p. i-iv.
396 Ibid.
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A. BACKGROUND of the CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
ENDANGERED SPECIES (CITES)
International trade in wildlife is a big business. For example, in 1981, the U.S.
imported and exported wildlife and wildlife products worth over U.S. $962 million.397
Currently, a fur coat made from South American ocelots fetches up to U.S. $40,000. It is
estimated that the international trade industry generates over five billion dollars annually.398
Trade dramatically increased in volume in the 1950's and 1960's, leading to an
increased awareness and concern by the public. In 1963, the International Union for
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), first responded to this public
concern about the effects of trade on wildlife species, and called for "an international
convention on regulations of export, transit and import of rare or threatened wildlife species
for their skins and trophies."399
l.Yunctions - The IUCN initiative led to the adoption of the Convention on the
International Trade in Endangered Species, CITES,400 which emerged during the
environmentally conscious era of the 1970's. Originally ratified by representatives of
thirty-two countries, the treaty entered into force in July 1975.401 With cwrently 120
nations as parties (see Table 2, page 103-104),402 the Convention is the most widely
accepted international conservation consensus ever developed, regulating more than 2,400
species of animaJs and 30,000 species of plants.403 CITES, hailed as "the most important
legal document to promote protection of wildlife to date and perhaps the only treaty which,
if properly enforced, could make a significant difference in the conservation of wild flora
397 (Lyster, 1985), p. 239-241.
398 The World Wildlife Fund has estimated the declared value of the international wildlife trade to be over
$5 billion. (Gaski, TRAFFIC WWF 1995), phone interview.
399 Ibid.
400 (Treaties in Force, 1994, See OTES, 993 UNfS 243). Hereinafter after referred to (993 UNfS 243).
401 Ibid.
402 Note that more than two-thirds of the Parties to CITES are developing C01Dltries. Ibid.
403 (Kosloff & Trexler, 1987), p. 10223.
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Table 2 CITES Parties
As of January 1994, the following 120 countries are parties to the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES).
8 August 1976
9 August 1978
15 May 1989
24 November 1977
7 January 1976
12 February 1976
6 January 1993
5 February i 980
20 December 1981
16 May 1990
25 August 1977
13 June 1985
EFFECTIVE DATEPARTY
Finland
o*France
*Gabon
Gambia
oGermany
*Ghana
oGreece
Guatemala
*Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Honduras
Hong Kong
(see United Kingdom)
Hungary 27 August 1985
India 18 October 1976
Indonesia 28 March 1979
Iran 1 November 1976
Israel 17 March 1980
oItaly 31 December 1979
o*Japan 4 November 1980
Jordan 14 March 1979
Kenya 13 March 1979
o*Korea 7 October 1993
Liberia 9 June 1981
Liechtestein 28 February 1980
Luxembourg 12 March 1984
Madagascar 18 November 1975
Malawi 6 May 1982
Malaysia 18 January 1978
oMalta 16 July 1989
Mauritius 27 July 1975
oMexico 30 October 1991
Monaco 18 July 1978
o*Morocco 14 January 1976
Mozambique 23 June 1981
Namibia 18 March 1991
Nepal 16 September 1975
oNetherlands 18 July 1984
PARTY EFFECTIVE DATE
Afghanistan 28 January 1986
oAlgeria 21 Febuary 1984
oArgentina 8 April 1981
Australia 27 October 1976
Austria 27 April 1982
Bahamas 18 September 1976
Bangladesh 18 February 1982
Barbados 9 March 1993
Belize 21 September 1981
Belgium I January 1984
*Benin 28 May 1984
Bolivia 4 October 1979
Botswana 12 February 1978
o*Brazil 4 November 1975
Brunei Darussalem 2 August 1990
Bulgaria 16 April 1991
Burkina Faso 15 January 1990
Burundi 6 November 1988
Cameroon 3 September 1981
o*Canada 9 July 1975
Cen African Rep 25 November 1980
Chad 3 May 1989
Chile I July 1975
China 8 April 1981
Colombia 29 November 1981
Congo 1 May 1983
Costa Rica 28 September 1975
o*Cuba 19 July 1990
Cyprus I July 1975
Czech Republic I January 1993
oDenmark 24 October 1977
Djibouti 7 May 1992
Dom Republic 17 March 1987
Ecuador 1 July 1975
Egypt 4 April 1978
EI Salvador 29 Juloy 1987
Eq. Guinea 8 June 1992
Estonia 20 October 1992
Ethiopia 4 July 1989
* Are also ICCAT members (Note: 18 out of 22 ICCAT members are also party to
CITES)
• Countries that fish for bluefin in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and are party to CITES.
(Note: 27 out of 34 countries that fish for bluefin in this area are party to CITES.)
Source: World Wildlife Fund: TRAFFIC
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PARTY
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
·Norway
Pakistan
·Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
·Poland
*Portugal
*Russian Fed.
Rwanda
·St. Lucia
St. Vincent &
Grenadines
Senegal
Seychelles
Singapore
Slovakia
Somalia
·*South Africa
·*Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
·Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad & Tobago
·Tunisia
Uganda
United Kingdom
(incl. Hong Kong)
·*United States
United Arab Emirates
·*Uruguay
Vanuatu
*Venezuela
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Table 2 continued
EFFECTIVE DATE
8 August 1989
4 November 1977
7 December 1975
25 October 1976
19 July 1976
15 November 1978
11 March 1976
13 February 1977
25 September 1975
16 November 1981
12 March 1990
11 March 1981
1 January 1992
18 January 1981
15 March 1983
28 February 1989
3 November 1977
9 May 1977
28 February 1987
1 January 1993
2 March 1986
18 October 1975
28 August 1986
2 August 1986
24 January 1983
15 February 1981
I July 1975
I July 1975
27 February 1980
21 April 1984
21 January 1979
18 April 1984
I July 1975
16 October 1991
31 October 1976
1 July 1975
12 May 1990
1 July 1975
15 October 1989
22 January 1978
18 October 1976
22 February 1981
17 August 1981
CITES Parties
Source: World Wildlife Fund: TRAFFIC
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and fauna," brought optimism to all proponents of wildlife trade.404 CITES' widespread
appeal demonstrated by its large membership is explained by its basic principles, which
most States have proved willing to accept. and by the way in which it operates, ensuring
that on the whole it is better enforced than many other treaties.405 Since its inception,
CITES has had mixed success in meeting its goal of protecting endangered species from
international trade.406 While CITES has effectively eliminated trade in some species such
as exotic cats, commercial hunting still threatens the survival of elephants, sea turtles, and
many other species.407
The basic principles of CITES are quite straightforward. It regulates international
trade in wild animals, plants and their products, which are listed on three Appendices to the
Convention.408 The three Appendices, to varying degrees, operate to limit commercial
trade in species which are endangered or threatened with extinction. The degree to which a
species is endangered determines which Appendix it is listed on. The Convention regulates
and controls the trade by issuing permits for the "specimens or species" listed on the
appendices.
a. Am>endices - A major feature of the Convention is the categorization of species
under three Appendices according to the perceived vulnerability of that species to
commercial exploitation.
Appendix I includes ali species "threatened with extinction which are or may be
affected by trade. "409 Trade in these species is authorized only in exceptional, or very rare
circwnstances so as not to further endanger their survival.410 When CITES first went into
404 (Chopra. 1987), p. 225.
405 (Lyster. 1985), p. 240-241.
406 (Heppes, 1987). p. 229-2246. There is no comprehensive review of CITES' effectiveness around the
world. (Gaski. 1995), phone interview by author, also see (Kosloff. 1987). p.l0233. Thus, the full scope
of CITES implemenlation cannot be fully evaluated through this research. Yet, certain trends are
discernible, and cautious assessments can be made.
407 (Hill, 1990). p. 231.
408 (Chopra, 1987), p. 225.
409 (993 UNTS 243). art. 11(1)
410 Ibid.
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effect, Appendix I contained approximately 450 species, including such well-known
endangered species as tigers, cheetahs, humpback whales, and peregrine falcons.411 Since
then, this list has grown to include over 700 animal species and several thousand plant
specIes.
Appendix II includes all species which "although not necessarily now threatened
with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of such SPeCies is subject to strict
regulation in order to avoid utilization incomparable with their survival."412 Appendix II
allows controlled trade in those species which are heavily traded but have relatively stable
populations.413 In 1990, Appendix II listed 40,000 species of plants and animals.414 The
Appendix also lists SPeCies which are not threatened, but are similar in appearance and look
very much like threatened SPeCies. This is to ensure ease of enforcement by officials at
country borders.
Appendix III includes "all SPecies which any party identifies as being subject to
regulation within its jurisdiction for the purposes of preventing or restricting
exportation."415 The purpose of this Appendix is primarily to help various parties to the
Convention, to protect and preserve the SPeCies which they consider to be "threatened with
extinction I! or "likely to be threatened with extinction" within their jurisdiction.416 Any
member country may add a species to Appendix III if the species is endangered in that
country, regardless of its status in the world at large.417
b. Listing a Species - ContIacting parties must determine which species are to be
listed for protection under CITES and under which category they belong. To determine if a
species belongs on one of the Appendices, Parties must first consider its vulnerability to
future extinction. However, the term "threatened with extinction" under Appendix I has
411 (Hill, 1990), p. 238.
412 (993 UNTS 243), art. II(2).
413 Ibid.
414 (Hill, 1990), p. 239.
415 (993 UNTS 243), art. II(3).
416 Ibid
417 (Hill, 1990), p. 240..
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been subject to interpretation by the Parties themselves.418 At the first Conference of the
Parties to CrTES in 1976,419 in an attempt to clarify this term, the parties determined what
would constitute 'preferred evidence l when considering a species to be threatened or
endangered. The Conference decided that the most preferred evidence is scientific
population surveys which illustrate a reduction in numbers over time.420 Other acceptable
evidence, although less preferred, is the non-scientific observance of the loss of a species'
habitat or heavy trade in the species.421 Without the support of pre-existing population
surveys, however, it is difficult to determine what the impacts of trade or habitat factors
have been or will be on a population. This problem has arisen particularly with proposals
to list marine species where only limited stock data exists.422 A third listing criterion is that
the species must be currently affected or potentially affected by trade.423 This criterion was
interpreted at the 1976 meeting:
The biological status and trade status of a species are obviously related. When
biological data show a species to be declining seriously, there need be only a
probability of trade. When trade is known to occur, information on the biological
status need not be complete. This principle especially applies to groups of related
species, where trade can readily shift from one species that is well-known to
another of which there is Iittie biological information.424 (emphasis added)
Based on the proceedings of the biennial CITES conferences, there appears to be a
willingness among the parties to list species under Appendix I and II, if some information
on either population or trade is available.425 The conference proceedings also show that
418 (Favre. 1987). p. 249-252.
419 At the f11"St Conference of the Parties to crrES. the Berne Criteria was adopted by the Parties. The
Berne Criteria specify the types of information required to justify inclusion in Appendix I or II based on the
provisions of Article II. (993 UNTS 243). art II.
420 (Favre, 1987). p. 249-252.
421 Ibid.
422 Ibid.
423 Ibid.
424 (FlISt Conference Proceedings. supra note 56. at 33 (conf. 1.1)).
425 (Favre, 1987),251-253.
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the parties occasionally act to protect species without thorough evidence of either trade or
declining population levels.426
Ultimately. a decision to list a species on Appendix I or II must be approved by a
two-thirds majority of the voting parties.427 Additions to the appendices are considered
either at the biennial meetings or by mail between the meetings. Plants or animals may be
removed from either list or transferred from one list to another by the same process.
However. there is a strong presumption against changes that lower the level of protection
for any given species.428
The formal listing of a species on one of the appendices. an important step in
providing protection for that species. can be hampered by the political agendas of those
parties involved. As seen later in this research with the case of the bluefin tuna proposal.
politics. as well as scientific evidence. plays a significant role in the final composition of
the appendices.
c. Permits System - The Convention operates by means of a pennit system.429 It
prohibits international trade of species included on any of the appendices without prior
grant of a CITES pennit These permits are essentially "passports for plants and animals".
An importer or exporter must present the proper pennits to a designated official before
endangered flora and fauna are allowed to cross the borders of any party state.430 On the
whole. the pennit system has proven to be "relatively effective"431 due mainly to the
administrative structure of the Convention.432
d. Administmtive Structure - Member Parties are required to meet on a regular
basis. every two years. in order to review implementation of CITES and make
426 Ibid
427 (Hill. 1990). p. 240.
428 Ibid
429 (U.S. Department of the Interior. 1978). Ch. 1. Sec. 22.23
430 For Appendix I species. both an export and an import permit are mandatory prerequisites prior to
shipneot. Appendix II and ill require only the acquisition of an export permit (Liwo. 1991). p. 130.
431 (Lyster. 1985). p. 239-241.
432 Ibid
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improvements.433 The scope of the activities at these biennial Conferences are wide. The
primary responsibilities include approving a budget, making recommendations to improve
the effectiveness of the Convention, and reviewing the list of species included in the
Appendices.434 In addition, the meetings provide a forum at which the Parties can take the
necessary measures to solve problems that may arise.
A Secretariat is employed to oversee the pennit system on an intemationallevel,
monitor the implementation of the Convention, and assist Parties in their efforts to
implement and enforce the provisions of CITES.435 The various ways in which the
Secretariat perfonns these functions include contacting the Parties about specific problems
regarding implementation and enforcement and recommending solutions; recommending
actions to be taken for the Parties evidencing major problems; reviewing permits and other
official documents to detennine their validity and detect infractions; distributing infonnation
on infractions; conducting training seminars; and providing on-site technical assistance.436
One important initiative of the Secretariat with regards to improving enforcement
efforts is the preparation of Alleged Infractions Reports, which provides infonnation on
cases where the provisions of the Convention are not being fully implemented.437 The
Infractions Report identifies enforcement actions that have resulted in prosecutions or
seizures of illegally traded CITES species, as well as identifying other enforcement
issues.438 This Report is an important tool that brings attention to enforcement
problems.439
In addition to the Secretariat, a Standing Committee was established in 1976, which
meets a minimum of once a year.440 This Committee considers recommendations by the
433 Ibid. p. 273-275.
434 Ibid.
435 (Nash. 1994). p. 8-10.
436 Ibid.
437 Ibid.
438 Ibid.
439 Ibid. p. 10.
440 (Wijnstekers. 1992). p.116.
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Secretariat and the various technical committees regarding enforcement and implementation
concems.441 On the basis of recommendations from the Secretariat, the Standing
Committee issues its own recommendations to the Parties in the form of Notifications to the
Parties.442 The process by which the pennanent committees and the Secretariat submit
recommendations to the Standing Committee, and by which the Standing Committee issues
its own recommendations to the Parties, is the strongest means by which compliance by the
Parties with the provisions of the Convention is enforced.443 Recently this positive
process has resulted in concerted action to remedy several recurrent implementation and
enforcement problems,444 as seen in the case of Taiwan's illegal trade in the products of
rhinoceroses and tiger products, which is presented later in this chapter.
Parties are obliged to provide to the Secretariat annual reports containing a summary
of all records of trade in specimens of species included in Appendices I, II and m.445 Data
from annual reports provide statistical information on the total volume of world trade in
CITES species, which is essential for assessing the conservation status of species in trade.
However, the quality of the data in the CITES database, in many cases, is incomplete and
inaccurate and may be of limited use for monitoring and enforcement purposes.446
Lastly, CITES requires each member to establish on a national level, one or more
Management Authorities and Scientific Authorities which are responsible for ensuring that
the conditions for granting a permit have been satisfied447 These Authorities are required
to meet at regularly scheduled meetings, in order to ensure communication with the
Secretariat and other members. Management Authorities in importing countries often have
to correspond with Management Authorities in exporting countries. In 1981, for example,
441 Ibid
442 Ibid.
443 (Nash. 1994), p. 10.
444 For more cases in which the Standing Committee has been involved and where the cases have proven
successful in tenns of CITES conservation, see Nash, "Making CITES Work", 1994. p. 11-12.
445 (993 UNfS 243), art. VIII, paragraph 7.
446 (Nash. 1994), p. 4.
447 (993 UNfS 243), supra note 2, art. IX.
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the u.K. seized a consignment of 45 royal pythons which arrived from Ghana without an
export permit and infonned the Ghanean Management Authority of the seizure.448 The
latter confinned that the shipment was illegal, and the pythons were subsequently returned
to Ghana and released into a national park.449
2. Exemptions- There are a number of circumstances where international trade in
specimens of species in the appendices do not require a CITES permit450 These
exemptions must be unde~tood when discussing the effectiveness of CITES. An
exemption of particular importance is the allowance of member countries to exempt
themselves from the appendices requirements for a particular species by taking a
reservation.451 A reservation must designate the species it cove~ and may be taken either
at the time the member country joins the convention or within 90 days of any amendment to
the appendices.452 Reservations may be withdrawn at any time. Reasons for taking
reservations need not be given, although they are nonnally taken by Parties objecting to
increased protection for species on which they have an established trnde. For example,
France and Italy took reservations on species of reptiles important to their luxury leather
trade, and Japan took reservations on whales, sea turtles and lizards, all of which are in
great demand in Japanese consumer markets.453 A party that takes a reservation is treated
as a non-party with respect to that species.454 CITES does not allow member parties to
trade with membe~who have a reservation to a species, or with non-membe~,with
respect to a listed species.455 This should mean that the effect of reservations in relation to
448 (Lyster. 1985), p. 271.
449 Ibid.
450 CITES lists a series of exceptions to the permit requirements for Appendices I, II. and m. such as
animals "bred in captivity" for commercial purposes and the "ranching" of speices. For further information
see (Lyster, 1985}.p. 256-264.
451 (993 UNTS 243), art XXIII
452 (CITES Fourth Conference Proceedings. supra note 54)
453 France and Italy have withdrawn theirreservatioos, and Japan bas withdrawn its reservations on sea
turtles and lizards. (Dane, U.S. Fish & Wildlife 1995), phone interview with author.
454 (993 UNTS 243), art. xxm(3).
455 Ibid.
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trade between reserving and non-reserving Parties is minimal because non-Parties must
produce documentation comparable to that required of Parties.456 In practice, however,
reservations can be very damaging. Not only can reserving Parties trade freely with non-
Parties, but reservations can encourage trade to continue with other Parties, even though
the trade is deemed illegal by CITES.457
A significant ramification of reservations is seen in the case of Japan's past
reservation to the hawksbill sea turtle, presently listed on Appendix I of CITES. Prior to
Japan's 1980 ratification of CITES, the country imported approximately forty tons of
hawksbill shell annually, making it by far the world's largest consumer of sea turtles and
sea turtle products.458 Japan's reservation on sea turtles allowed the country to import sea
turtle products banned by CITES. However, Resolution 4.25 requires that any import
from a CITES party that does not hold a reservation must be accompanied by a legal CITES
export pennit459 Since Japan had not implemented any verification procedures to check
permits from the exporting nation, many developing nations, party to CITES, such as
Indonesia, Panama, Cuba, Singapore, and the Philippines, continuously exported the sea
turtles to Japan.460 In this case, CITES could not adequately protect sea turtles because the
voracious market simply overwhelmed CITES' ability to regulate the trade.461 In addition,
Japan's reservation thwarted any efforts of other nations to protect the hawksbill
species.462 CITES effectiveness relies on both the importing and exporting countries to
actively enforce its provisions. When a consuming country, like Japan, fails to protect a
species, the demand invariably finds a supply.463 As will be further explained in the next
section, Japan was convinced in 1994 to remove its reservation to sea turtles.
456 (Lyster, 1985), p. 262-264.
457 Ibid.
458 (Hill, 1990), p. 265-269.
459 (Fourth Conference Proceedings, supra note 54), p. 81.
460 (Hill, 1990), p. 265-269.
461 Ibid
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid.
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Reservations are common in international agreements. Most likely, without the
reservation provisions, a number of nations would not become parties to regulatory treaties
such as CITES.464 At the same time, the reservation provisions can render the listing of a
species in Appendix lor II ineffective.465 Of some encouragement are the recent steps
taken by CITES to reduce the negative impact of reservations. One such step is the
requirement of stricter trade documentation for countries with reservations on Appendix I
and Appendix II species.466
3. National Legislation to Implement CITES - After a country accedes to CITES, it must
take appropriate measures, usually by passing legislation, to implement the convention.
The legislation must, at a minimum, commit the country to abide by all CITES mandates,
but, unlike ICCAT, it may also incorporate measures stricter than the convention itself.467
Venezuela and Brazil, for example, have CITES implementing laws which prohibit the
export of virtually all wildlife, even though many of their native species are given only
Appendix II protection by CITES.468
a. The United States' Role - The U.S. has one of the more sophisticated CITES
implementation programs and has implemented CITES among the longest of any of the 120
Parties.469 "Consequently, analysis of CITES enforcement in this country is likely to be a
good indicator of the effectiveness of administratively sophisticated CITES enforcement in
general. "470 The U.S.'s Management and Scientific Authorities were designated in 1976,
and final regulations were promulgated in 15177, although the program did not begin until
464 (Hill, 1990), p. 276.
465 Ibid.
466 (Fifth Conference Proceedings, supra note 144), p. 66. For further infonnation on CITES treatment d
the negative impacts of reservations, see Wijnstekers, 1992, p 75-89.
467 (fitzgerald. 1990), p. 332-334.
468 Ibid
469 (Kosloff, 1987), p. 10229. Note: For further case studies on U.S. enforcement of CITES, see
(Kosloff, 1987), p. 10229.
470 Ibid.
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four years after ratification.471 The United States was the first country to ratify CITES with
the enactment of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973.472 The ESA has been
characterized by the United States Supreme Court as "the most comprehensive legislation
for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation. "473 The ESA
attempts to preserve ecosystems by regulating domestic and international trade in threatened
species and by protecting important habitats.474 The Endangered Species Act works with
CITES by prohibiting the trade of any wildlife in contravention of CITES or the possession
of specimens obtained through unlawful trade.475 CITES also lists approximately fifty
percent of the species protected by the ESA.476 On the whole. the ESA is more restrictive
than CITES. since the ESA only allows the importation or exportation of protected species
for scientific research. enhancement of species propagation, and for certain types of
exhibitions.477
CITES also dovetails with the U.S.'s Lacey Act.478 which makes it a violation of
federal law for any person to import or export animals taken. transported. or sold in
violation of a treaty or the laws of a foreign country.479 The Lacey Act was originally
enacted in 1900 to merely prohibit interstate commerce in wildlife taken. possessed,
transported, or sold in violation of state law.480 However, Congress expanded the Act to
toughen the penalty provisions of the Lacey Act, making it the most effective enforcement
device for federal wildlife officials.481
471 (Kosloff. 1987). p. 10229.
472 (Shepard's Acts. See 16 U.S.Code sec. 1531-44. (1988».
473 (Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. 437 U.S. 153, 180, 1978).
474 (Hill. 1990), p. 235.
475 (16 U.S.Code sec. 1538).
476 (Hill, 1990), p. 235.
477 Ibid
478 (Shepards Acts, See 16 U.S. Code sec. 3371-78 (1900».
479 (Hill, 1990), p. 235.
480 (Shepards Acts, See 16 U.S. Code sec. 3371-78 (1900».
481 (Hill, 1990), p. 235.
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The Pelly Amendment,482 also known as section eight of the Fishermen's
Protective Act of 1967,483 also dovetails with CITES. The Pelly Amendment acts to
provide a means to ensure that the unsustainable fishing practices of foreign fishing Beets
do not jeopardize American fishery stocks or hann American fishing fleets.484 The Pelly
Amendment can work in conjunction with other U.S. laws, such as the MMPA and the
Magnuson Act, to enable the President of the United States to increase trade sanctions
against foreign fishing fleets that continually violate these laws.485 Under the Pelly
Amendment, the President has the discretionary authority to embargo all fish and wildlife
products imported from another nation upon notice from the Secretary of Commerce that
that nation has violated one or more of the aforementioned U.S. laws for a certain time
period.486
In 1994, the CITES Secretariat recommended that Parties impose sanctions against
Taiwan for its continued illegal trade in rhinoceros horns and tiger parts and products,
which are listed on Appendix I of CITES. The U.S. responded by implementing
sanctions, through the Pelly Amendment "In response to Taiwan's failure to undertake
sufficient actions to stop illegal trade in rhinoceros and tiger parts and products, the
President prohibits the bringing or importation into the United States of fish and wildlife
products of Taiwan, pursuant to section 8 (a)(4) of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967,
as Amended. "487 The sanctions effectively worked to pressure Taiwan into removing its
reservation and abiding by CITES trade mandates, thus giving the rhino and tiger
populations a chance to begin to rebuild.488
482 (Shepards Acts. See 22 U.S. Code sec. 1978 (1988».
483 (Shepards Acts, See 22 U.S. Code sec. 1971-1980 (1988».
484 (Housman. 1992). p.• 598.
485 Ibid.
486 (22 U.S. Code sec. 1978 (1988»
487 (Federal Register. April 28. 19(4). Vol. 59. No. 81, p. 22044.
488 (Dane. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 1995), phone interview by author.
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In addition, in 1994, the U.S. threatened to impose sanctions against Japan for its
CITES reservation to hawksbill turtles.489 As previously mentioned, these turtles are an
endangered species and fisted on Appendix I of CITES. Japan promptly responded to the
threat by removing its reservation and initiating measures to abide by CITES trade
regulations for hawksbill turtles.490 "It is clear [by evidencing collective reports] that
Japan's level of trade on hawksbill turtles has decreased since removing its reservation."491
4. Enforcement and Compliance of CITES - Article VIII of CITES requires member
countries to take appropriate measures to enforce the treaty, including provisions outlining
penalties and confiscation's.492 The individual parties decide on the specific methods of
enforcement, which may include penalties, jail sentences or monetary fines.493 Usually,
the fines and sentences that have been imposed have been light494 Confiscation of
contraband has been the most effective and commonly used enforcement device.495
However, since CITES is actually implemented at the customs control points of each
country, the Treaty's provisions and restrictions are effective only to the degree that
customs officials require compliance with the Treaty.496 As is the case with many
international agreements, enforcement is left up to the individual CITES Parties and
depends upon their integrity and goodwill.497 Ultimately, the success of CITES depends
upon the adequacy of domestic legislative enactment's and the extent of enforcement efforts
489 Also pursuant to the Pelly Amendment Ibid
490 Ibid Note: In 1987, Japan had entered fourteen reservations on Appendix I species alone, by far the
most of any CITES nation. (McFadden. 1987), p. 314. To date, Japan has withdrawn all but one (whale
species) of its reservations to CITES, evidencing Japans willingness to comply with OTES. (Dane, 1995),
phone interview by author.
491 (Daves, NMFS 1995), phone intemview by author.
492 (993 UNfS 243, supra note 2, art VID.)
493 (Hill, 1990), p. 234-236.
494 Ibid
495 (Lyster, 1985), p. 265.
496 (Favre, 1987), p. 247.
497 (Hill, 1990), p. 272-275.
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conducted by the individual party states.498 This condition underscores the need for
effective compliance and enforcement regimes by Party states.
There are two structural aspects to CITES which assist in its compliance. First.
through the biennial meetings. parties can respond to changing circumstances and directly
lobby each other on specific compliance problems.499 Second. the CITES Secretariat has
evolved into an independent monitoring organization.500 Although the Secretariat has no
direct enforcement power. it remains a remarkably independent entity which actively
monitors compliance with the terms of CITES.501 If there is an enforcement or compliance
problem with a listed species. the Secretariat is required to inform the appropriate member
nation. and may inform other concerned parties as well.502
a. U.S.'s Enforcement of CITES - To effectively enforce CITES, the United
States has designated nine cities as ports of entry for trade in wildlife and plants.503 At
these locations. agents and inspectors from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Division
of Law Enforcement take the lead in inspections and investigations. with assistance from
the Customs Service. Department of Justice. Department of State. and other agencies.504
In addition. customs officials interdict illegal shipments of wildlife at all ports other than
those designated as a port of entry. Those who violate CITES in the U.S.• whether for
personal or commercial reasons, may have their goods confiscated and receive penalties of
up to one year injail and as much as $50.000 in fines per violation.505
498 (liwa, 1991), p. 129.
499 (Hill, 1990), p. 1:72-1:75.
500 Ibid
501 Ibid.
502 (Fifth Conference Proceedings, supra note 114)
503 The ports of entry are New York, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Dallas-
Fort Worth, Seattle, and Honolulu. (Hill, 1990), p. 234-236.
504 Ibid.
505 (Fitzgerald. 1990), p. 332-334.
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While the U.S. has an array of legal tools to regulate trade in endangered species
"enforcement is hampered by a lack of personnel and administrative resources."506
Because of manpower shortages, the Fish and Wildlife Service is unable to inspect the
majority of psittacine shipments.507 As a consequence, the agency is compelled to rely
upon importer's paperwork which purportedly certifies that the shipments are in
compliance with CITES.508 Furthennore, United States Customs agents and Border Patrol
officers evidence a lack of sufficient education to identify species.509 U.S. agencies tend
to place a higher priority on the prevention of drug smuggling than on illegal trade
trafficking.510
The U.S., as well as many other CITES countries, are implementing measures to
improve enforcement of the Treaty's provisions.511 While detection of illegal transactions
can never be infallible, efficient enforcement procedures and issues are a dominant theme of
CITES meetings, and significant progress both in developed and developing nations is
being made.512 "Ultimately, in many cases, the enforcement techniques enabling CITES to
work effectively are use of sanctions, public pressure and higher profile legal action by
conservation groups."513
506 (Hill, 1990), p. 236.
507 Maupower shortages are even more aitical in member states with more limited economic resources.
(Heppes, 1987), p. 239.
508 Ibid.
509 (Hill, 1990), p. 236.
510 Ibid.
511 Such measures have taken the form of an increase in training seminars for enforcement officials, Creely
provided by NGO's to devdoping and devdoped cotmtries; increased funding to national enforcement
programs; and CITES meetings which increasingly focus OIl enforcement issues and seminars. (Gaski,
1995), phone interview by author.
512 Ibid.
513 (Dane, U.S. Fish & Wildlife 1995), phone interview by author.
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B. CITES APPLICATION TO MARINE SPECIES
The question arises as to whether bluefin tuna should be listed on CITES, in
addition to remaining under ICCAT's purview. In order to adequately address this
question. one must consider various deliberations as to CITES' viability as a tool for
advancing the protection of marine species, specifically the Atlantic bluefin tuna (which is
not yet recognized under the Treaty).
A primary consideration is whether or not the bluefin tuna falls within the
jurisdictional umbrella of CITES. In order to list a marine species under CITES, there
must first be a consensus on the state of the existing populatio~514which is quite difficult
to achieve considering the large body of member nations and the degree of conflict over
data collection and quality. Secondly, sufficient evidence of trade volume, showing that a
potential threat exists to the survival of the species, is required.515 Specifically, this means
that if trade pressure does not exist, CITES is not the correct instrument for conserving the
animal, despite political demands. For example, certain species of dolphin, which are
threatened only because of the incidence of bycateh. are not eligible for CITES. as they are
not threatened from trade.516 Presently. the high correlation between the decline of the
bluefin tuna population and its subsequent international trade (over three-quarters of the
western Atlantic bluefin is traded internationally) does indeed make the species eligible for a
CITES listing.517
Administratively, both the Atlantic bluefin tuna and southern bluefin tuna (the vast
majority of the latter are tIaded to Japan as well) meet the second requirement. showing
detrimentally large tIade volumes and are thus eligible for a CITES listing. However, to
determine whether or not CITES may benefit these species. other examples of marine
species (having similar characteristics to the bluefin) covered by CITES must be reviewed.
514 (Chopra, 1987), p. 225-232.
515 Ibid.
516 (Wells and Bamfo, 1991), p. 144.
517 Ibid.
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Few marine species are currently listed on the CITES Appendices and those species
are primarily higher vertebrates, such as the great whales, sea turtles, and the saltwater
crocodile. Presently, only five species of marine fish and six taxa of corals are listed under
CITES. The limited use of CITES for marine species may be due in part to mans'
perception of a difference in the conservation needs for marine species, as opposed to
terrestrial species, as relates to international trade regulations. There is also a very real
paucity of information on the distribution, life histories and population dynamics of many
marine species. Without adequate information, perceptions of the marine environment may
have resulted in overestimates of the abundance of marine wildlife. Marine species have
often been characterized as limitless due to their large ranges and apparent resilience to
over-exploitation. However, "fishes that are particularly vulnerable to commercial
extinction518 include those that congregate to spawn, those that migrate through many
jurisdictions and are thus vulnerable at many points, and estuarine species subject to habitat
degradation. "519 Species with low reproductive and growth rates, such as sharks and sea
turtles, and highly migratory species, such as the bluefin tuna, are especially vulnerable to
exploitation and extinction. Numerous international and regional fishery agreements exist
to regulate commercial fishing. However, for some of the vulnerable species, CITES may
provide a useful control mechanism.520
Whales - A CITES listing for whale species and populations, which migrate
through many jurisdictions, like bluefin tunas, was established despite the existence of the
International Whaling Commission (lWC). The IWC is concerned primarily with
controlling the numbers of great whales killed and with those species subject to intensive
518 Commercial extinction occurs when a population or species is reduced to the point where harvest is no
longer economically viable. Other types of extinction are biological extinction, which refers to the total
elimination of all individuals of a life fonn, and ecological extinction. which occurs when the species'
numbers are reduced to the point that they no longer serve their original or, perhaps, and meaningful
function in the ecosystem. (NOAA, 1992)
519 (Wells and Bando, 1991), p. 147-149.
520 Ibid.
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whaling operations, rather than with international trade.521 Therefore, listing those
species or populations of whales, whose catch is prohibited, on Appendix I, has supported
the IWC in its' decisions. A CITES listing has provided better trade monitoring and data
collection for these cetaceans, due mainly to resolutions in the Convention, mandating that
parties comply with import-export reports, and ensuring that parties consult with both the
IWC and CITES on a regular basis.522
Sturgeons - Three sturgeon species are listed under CITES due to major population
declines as a result of intense fishing pressure for caviar, even though regulations, such as
gear restrictions, minimum size limits, and closed areas and seasons, have been imposed
on the Atlantic sturgeon species. These species live primarily in the sea. although they
return to freshwater rivers to breed. They mature late and have low fecundity rates - factors
which may lead to a high probability of commercial extinction. Between 2000 and 9000
kg of meat of the Atlantic sturgeon, now listed in Appendix II, were exported from Canada
to the United States annually from 1984 to 1986, but only 5 kg in 1987523 (this was the
year the species were listed on Appendix I). CITES has clearly acted as an effective
monitoring mechanism for this species.
Sharks - A CITES listing for exploited shark species (the great white shark, the
basking shark, and the porbeagle) is presently being reviewed for implementation.524
These migratory sharks have long gestation periods, low fecundity, and are slow growers,
taking many years to reach maturity. They also congregate in certain areas for mating or
calving.525 Worldwide shark fishing has intensified in recent years, as a result of an
increase in demand for shark meat, fins, and oil. Lack of good population data is presently
521 Ibid
522 Ibid.
523 Ibid
524 (Daves. NMFS 1995), phone interview with author.
525 (Wells and Bando. 1991), p. 147-149.
121
a concem,526 however, a CITES listing of these species may enable member nations to
improve statistics for future use, as was the case for various whale populations.
CITES proves to be biologically beneficial for whale species and sturgeon species,
by improving data quality, trade monitoring, as well as reducing trade, especially for the
sturgeon. It is encouraging to note that the Convention is working towards implementing
shark species under its jurisdiction, with the conviction that they can benefit those species
included.
In the past, there have been occasions in which marine species already covered by
another agreement (i.e. whales under IWC) have been added to the Appendices of CITES,
and the question has been raised as to the nature of the relationship for states party to more
than one agreement. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties527
governs the application of successive treaties to the same subject matter. The Article states
that when a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered
incompatible With. an earlier or latter treaty, the provisions of that other treaty also prevail
for party states.528 In effect, since CITES governs only international trade, while most
fisheries agreements, such as ICCAT, focus on management and harvest controls, CITES
can still act to regulate trade over an area. Although it can be argued that it is an
unnecessary burden for CITES to have to monitor a species that is already subject to
management measures. the convention provides an invaluable check on numbers caught for
international trade.
Another important point to note is that Article XIV of CITES relieves member
countries to another agreement from CITES obligations with respect to trade in specimens
of marine species included in Appendix II, if such trade is in ~ordance with the
provisions of the other agreement, and if a certificate stipulating this condition is given by
526 Ibid.
527 (Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General. 31 Dec. 1984. Ch. xxrn Law of Treaties)
528 Ibid.
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the CITES Management Authority of the country of introduction.529 Therefore, since
management of the Atlantic bluefin tuna falls under the responsibility of parties to ICCAT,
and if an Appendix II listing is deemed necessary, then ICCAT member countries may be
exempted from CITES obligations relating to the bluefin species.530
Although CITES provides aid to various marine species, it also evidences
limitations in its ability to regulate international trade over animals and plants. Additions to
the appendices, particularly of higher taxa, must be carefully considered with respect to
further burdening and reducing the effectiveness of such a system.
C. CITES STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, with comparisons to ICCAT
There are similar problems evidenced in CITES to those seen in ICCAT's
management regime. Therefore, a thorough examination of CITES' strengths and
weaknesses, as compared to those of ICCAT must be made to determine CITES' viability
as an effective global regulatory agency capable of rebuilding the bluefin populations to a
sustainable level.
CITES PROBLEM AREAS
1. Data Analysis and Collection - As previously addressed, CITES parties are obliged to
submit yearly reports on all trade in CITES listed animals and plants that cross their
borders. These reports are expected to cover all incoming and outgoing trade, shipments,
and other statistics. In reality, only about half of all parties typically report on trade, and
529 (993 UNTS 243), art. XIV.
530 (Federal Register, 1994), p. 3835. Note: Since many b1uefm fishing countries are not members of
ICCAT but are parties to CITES, an Appendix II listing would make these countries accountable to CITES
obligations. In addition, at the lime of this writing. the ICCAT bluefm statistical document program has
not yet been fully implemented. Therefore, ICCAT member countries, at present, would be required to
follow the CITES' certificate of origin program. "Presently, ICCAT's statistical document has no basis in
the legal system and will not do much good in terms of enforcing countries to track trade and gather data.
Requiring countries to follow CITES certificate of origin program will evidence greater benefits when
compared to ICCAT's document" (Gaski, 1995), interview with author.
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their efforts are often incomplete.531 In addition, shipments reported by importing
countries seldom correlate with those reported by exporting countries (a problem also
evidenced in Japan's import data not correlating with [CCAT member country reports).
These discrepancies are often due to reporting errors, omissions, differences in methods
for measuring shipments, or illegal trade. Another major factor is the shortage of port
inspectors and data collectors needed to track the thousands of legal wildlife shipments that
cross national borders every day. CITES reports are, at best, characterized as gaugin.g the
minimwn, rather than the actual, number of specimens in trade.532 Although CITES
statistics are subject to shortcomings, most major trading countries do produce annual
reports, and the report of either the importing or exporting country alone is enough to
ensure that a shipment is recorded.533 The report data also shows general routes and
patterns that wildlife and wildlife products follow in international trade. Yet, application of
CITES is still poor in many countries, partially as a result of inadequate statistics and the
inability to effectively collect and control trade data.534
2. Lack of Compliance_- A report prepared for the CITES Secretariat by the World Trade
Monitoring Unit reveals that "at least 45 percent of all CITES transactions involving
animals and 79 percent of those involving plants go unreported even when the transactions
are between Parties which have submitted annual reports. "535 About one-third of CITES'
member States have wholly ignored the reporting requirements, established by Article VIII
of the Convention,536 and have never submitted an annual report. Further, CITES has
little enforcement power to combat the member's lack of compliance.537
531 (Fitzgerald. 1990), p. 323-325.
532 Ibid.
533 Ibid.
534 (Shumaker, Fish & Wildlife Service, 1995), phone interview by author.
535 (Chopra. 1987), p. 235-236.
536 (U.S. Department of the Interior, 1978), Art. VIII, p. 5.
537 Ibid.
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The text of both CITES and ICCAT, in effect. tolerates non-compliance by member
countries by allowing [or resetvations. As stated above, CITES members may resetve the
right to conduct commerce in any species included in the appendices. CITES places no
restrictions on a party's ability to exercise this right Once a member enters a resetvation, it
may conduct unlimited commercial trade in the resetved species or its derivatives, acts
which would otherwise be in contravention of CITES.538 As is the case with many
international agreements, when CITES was originally fonnulated, to minimize the potential
economic objections from potential signatories, reservations were allowed.539 The
perception is that the benefit of having numerous parties to the Convention outweighs the
potential abuse of its resetvation provision. However, reservations, especially on
Appendix I species, weaken CITES' ability to protect endangered wildlife.
A specific example of the lack of compliance by abuse of reservations is Japan's
relationship with CITES. This is of particular importance since Japan is the second largest
importer of wildlife prcx:iucts in the world540 Japan has made fourteen reservations to
CITES, the most of any nation that has ratified the Convention.541 There has been
widespread criticism of Japan's weak compliance with the CITES treaty, though this trend
has begun to change in recent years. Reproach from other countries has pressured the
Japanese into recently removing most of its reservations and complying with CITES
obligations.
As previously discussed, a disturbing lack of compliance is also evidenced in
member nation's response to ICCAT regulations over bluefin tuna, specifically in the
eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. This lack of compliance of regulations is one of many
factors preventing the bluefin's recovery.
538 [Liwo, 1991), p. 137-140.
539 Ibid.
540 (Chopra. 1987), p. 241.
541 Ibid.
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3. Conflict Among Contracting Parties - Like ICCAT, the primary members of CITES are
a high proportion of developing countries to developed countries (three-quarters of the
members are developing countries) and, as seen before, the same problems hold true for
both conventions. CITES presents atypical international forum where North' meets
'South'. Since it is generally known that the trade pattern for endangered species is from
the South to the North, enforcement is essential at both ends.542 But enforcement can be
costly and labor intensive. Developing countries are at an economic disadvantage, which
makes it not only difficult for them to carry out provisions of CITES, but also generates
non-compliance with the Convention due to the threat of loosing a vital income. These
countries are primarily concerned with present day survival issues, such as land, water,
and food; whereas, developed countries are focusing on future problems, such as
renewable resources and ozone depletion. These major differences in cultural perspectives
and fundamental human goals are perhaps the greatest obstacle to achieving the
environmental and conservation-oriented goals of both CITES and ICCAT.
4. Trade With Non-Parties - In recent years, it has been estimated that trade between
CITES parties and non-parties comprises approximately thirty percent of all wildlife
transactions.543 Under CITES, parties to the Treaty are perfunctorily authorized to trade
with non-party states. CITES allows such trade upon the issuance of "comparable
documentation" by the non-party state which "substantially conforms with the requirements
of the present Convention for permits and certificates. "544 However, the absence of
standards to govern trade between CITES parties and non-parties leaves members without
guidance if they choose to trade with non-members. In addition, the conditions placed
upon members who do trade with non-members are vague.545 As is a)so seen in ICCAT,
542 (Uwo, 1991), p. 143-145.
543 Ibid, p. 139-141.
544 (993 UNfS 243) supra note 1, art. 10.
545 (Uwo, 1991),p. 139-143.
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this absence of a policy to govern trade between the Convention parties and non-parties has
proven to be detrimental to the protection of endangered species, and in ICCAT's case,
bluefin tuna
5. Enforcement - The efficacy of CITES has been hampered by some member nation's
inadequacy in developing an infrastructure to enforce its provisions. Like ICCAT, under
CITES, enforcement is vested solely in national authorities.546 Each party to the
Convention is responsible for ensuring that any wildlife (alive or a product thereof)
transgressing its borders does not represent a violation of the treaty. 547 Thus, parties'
utilization of and adherence to CITES detennines the fate of the treaty. One of the most
severe problems in this context is an egregious shortage of personnel to conduct
inspections of wildlife and wildlife products during the importation or exportation process.
For example, a study by World Wildlife Fund on importation processes of birds such as
parrots, macaws, cockatoos and parakeets, revealed that over 60,000 of such birds, many
Hsted on Appendix I or II of CITES, may have entered the United States illegally in one
year.548 Fines and jail sentences in some countries are sometimes ridiculously low in
comparison with the value and status of the species involved.549 Recently, however,
countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are beginning to
impose stiffer penalties.550 The text of CITES, like ICCAT, theoretically provides an
effective framework for obtaining their designed purpose. However, both treaties can be
rendered moribund if national enforcement efforts prove to be ineffectual.
During the years that CITES has been in force, ,problem areas continue to persist
The staffs of some countries' Management and Scientific Authorities are often too small
and inadequately trained, and the quality and timeliness of annual reports are poor, which
546 (Wells and Barzdo, 1991), p. 136.
547 Ibid.
548 (Chopra. 1987), p. 235-236.
549 (Fitzgerald, 1990), p. 326.
550 (Dane, U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 1995), phone interview by author
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has led to data collection problems. In addition, the complexity of the appendices and the
Convention text makes enforcement even more difficult to implement, and allows for non-
compliance by member countries.
On the other hand, real progress has been made in CITES over the years. Most of
the major wildlife trading nations are now Parties and the level of enforcement in many
member countries is improving.551 With increasing public awareness of the function of
CITES and increasingly effective implementation, there are likely to be a greater amount of
moves to list more marine species, especially if other regulatory measures prove to be
insufficient552 Although non-compliance still occurs, international trade in Appendix II
species is more carefully regulated than it was two decades ago, and trade in Appendix I
species is by and large very sporadic.553 Much of these improvements are a credit to
CITES' strengths.
CITES STRENGTHS
1. Wide support - Perhaps one of the greatest strengths of CITES is the fact that 120 States
are now party to the Convention, demonstrating the widespread appeal and success of this
international treaty system. "CITES is considered one of the most successful global
conservation agreements, because of the member nation's willingness to accept its basic
principles and because the pennit system, through which it operates, ensures that it can be
more effectively enforced than many other treaties,"554 such as ICCAT.555
CITES' large membership can be attributed to the Convention's refonnation of the
fundamental problem of member nations unwilling to agree to a common goal.
551 [Wells and Barzdo, 1991), p. 151-152. and (Dane. u.s. Fish & Wildlife. 1995), phone interview by
author.
552 [Wells and Barzdo, 1991). p. 151-152.
553 Ibid.
554[Wells and Barzdo. 1991), p. 151, citing (Lyster. 1985).
555 (Wells and Barzdo, 1991).p.152.
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Specifically, the "producer" (or South) nations tend to support the Convention because they
see controls at the place of import as well as the place of export as essential weapons in
their fight to protect their valuable wildlife resources from poachers and illegal traders.556
The "consumer" (or North) nations support its aims of maintaining populations of species
at a level at which they can still be exploited for trade.
Most international fishery agreements (such as ICCAT, IATIC, and CCSBT) have
fewer Parties than CITES and no mechanism for controlling international trade. For
example, most of the 34 countries that fish for bluefin tuna in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean are CITES Parties, but only eleven are members of ICCAT (see Table 2,
page 92-93). ICCAT is not in a position to monitor or regulate the harvest or trade in
bluefin tuna caught by countries that are not ICCAT members, thus reducing the
effectiveness of any regulations put forth by the organization.
In addition, compared to ICCAT, CITES, with its large body of member nations, is
able to impose a greater amount of "peer pressure" on members violating or negating
CITES provisions. Peer pressure is one means by which international organizations can
enforce provisions. Peer pressure as a type of enforcement has come about mainly because
an effective institution for the application and enforcement of international law has yet to be
developed.557 Therefore, motivation for nations to consistently abide by the rules
imposed from international organizations, must come from outside international regimes
themselves. Peer pressure, which compels nations to abide by an international treaty,
consists of credibility in the eyes of other states, world opinion of the nation, and the desire
for social approval.558 Although some writers on international law have discounted these
factors,559 evidence suggests that increased public awareness has elevated the ability of
peer pressure in the international arena to become quite a powerful tool for enforcement560
556 Ibid.
557 (Von Glahn, 1992), p. 5-11.
558 Ibid.
559 Ibid
560 (Dane, U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 1995), phone interview with author.
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As previously shown. CITES has been able to effectively impose a great deal of pressure
on those countries not in confonnity with the Convention. through such methods as
protests and sanctions.56l ICCAT. with only 22 member countries, cannot impose nearly
as much pressure on its members. let alone non-members, which do not comply with its
regulations.
2. Administrative System - Of all the reasons for the ltrelative successlt562 of CITES. its
administrative system is one which stands oul563 The existence of a permanent Secretariat
and the numerous administrative obligations mandated for the Parties - to set up at least two
bodies to enforce the Convention, to communicate continually with other Parties and with
the Secretariat. and to meet regularly to review implementation of the Convention - are all
critical factors.564 In addition, CITES requires (whereas. ICCATs weakness is that it can
only recommend) that Parties enforce its provisions, penalize violations, and maintain
complete records of their trade in CITES species.565 These stringent administrative
requirements are lacking in the fishery authorities of ICCAT, IATIC. and CCSBT.
Many observers consider CITES' requirement that every member State establish a
Management Authority to implement the Convention as a success in itself.566 CITES is
unique in requiring national authorities and in establishing a global network of institutions
which cooperate directly with their counterparts in other States.567 By specifically
allocating such a responsibility, governmental attention is, presumably, more likely to
remain focused on implementing the policy. The establishment of Management Authorities
is particularly significant for two reasons. Firstly, the mere fact that each Party has two
permanent bodies responsible for implementing CITES goes a long way towards ensuring
561 (Von GIalm. 1992). p. 5-11.
562 (Nash. 1994). p.l.
563 Ibid.
564 (Lyster. 1985). p. 276-277.
565 (Kosloff & Trexler. 1987). p. 10225.
566 (Kosloff & Trexler. 1987), p. 10225.
567 (Lyster. 1985), p. 272.
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that each Party makes at least some effort to enforce the Convention.568 Some developing
countries never had any government body responsible for wildlife management prior to
CITES. "Even if implementation of CITES itself in these countries is abysmal, the very
fact that some agency has been designated as having that responsibility might be valuable in
furthering the long-term goals of conservation. 11569 Secondly, some Parties have given the
Management and Scientific Authorities additional responsibilities relating to wildlife
conservation.570 As a result, their establishment has not only helped regulate international
trade but has also contributed to an organized and rational approach to the overall
management of wildlife resources in those States.57 ! "CITES has formed a strong network
of communication and structure in the international community, which in itself renders
CITES effective."572
3. Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations - Non governmental organizations
(NGOs) are a crucial force in promoting strong implementation of CITES. NGOs,
particularly the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), were in fact
pivotal in the drafting of CITES.573 Since the Convention's inception, NGOs,
representing conservationists, various wildlife and industry interests, and the scientific
community, have been active participants in the biennial Conferences of the Parties
(although they are not allowed to vote). The Convention not only pennits NGOs to
participate at the meetings, but they also receive, as registered observers, all documentation
pertaining to the meetings.574 Even beyond formal participation at the Conferences and
various other meetings, NGOs have contributed vast amounts of time, effort, and financial
568 (Kosloff & Trexler, 1987), p. 10225.
569 Ibid.
570 Ibid.
571 Ibid.
572 (Daves, NMFS. 1995), phone interview by author.
573 (Kosloff & Trexler, 1987), p. 10225.
574 Ibid.
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resources to CITES for its enforcement and implementation. These groups have also paid
for travel expenses for conference delegates from developing countries, have contributed to
implementation of training seminars for enforcement officials, and have provided technical
support to trade officials.575 Probably one of the most important contributions NGOs
provide is in carrying out public awareness campaigns to end illegal wildlife trade and act
as a watchdog over CITES missions.576 For example, conservation groups alert
government officials to potential infractions, investigate illicit trade routes and operations,
and pressure authorities in importing and exporting countries alike to improve their laws
and enforcement efforts. liNGO oversight of Parties' implementing actions under CITES
has been a key variable in achieving whatever success CITES has achieved. In the absence
of NGO participation, CITES would very likely have followed the route of many other
international wildlife measures into obscurity."577
ICCAT has excluded NGO participation in its meetings. While ICCAT's charter
provides for participation by NGOs, approval is contingent upon unanimous agreement by
all member states.578 A single country can thus effectively veto participation by NGOs.
The failure of ICCAT to recognize NGOs has two strong consequences. First, ICCAT
cannot reap the benefits that NGOs provide, which can be quite imperative to the success of
a Convention, as seen by CITES. Since ICCAT has a poor track record as an effective
international organization. it could only benefit by any help offered. Second, the refusal of
a role for NGOs sends a signal to the world that the commission refuses to recognize the
voice of the public in the management of living marine resources. Presently, it seems that it
is no longer acceptable to the public that only the fishing industry has such a say in the fate
of marine resources.579
575 Ibid.
576 (Fitzgerald, 1990), p. 331-333.
577 Ibid.
578 (See ICCAT, 673 UNI'S 63), art IV.
579 (Fitzgerald, 1990), p. 331-333.
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D. PROPOSALS TO LIST BLUEFIN ON CITES
1. Sweden's Proposat- An attempt to list the Atlantic bluefin under CITES at the March
1992 conference failed.580 At this meeting Sweden proposed that the western Atlantic
population. the most severely depleted stock. be listed under Appendix I (a ban on trade)
and that the eastern Atlantic population be added to Appendix II (restricted trade). Japan.
the United States and Canada intensely opposed the proposal, emphasizing the role of
ICCAT in managing the species, and drafted a resolution objecting to Sweden IS
recommendation. This resolution offered a wider consexvation plan than ICCAT's plan at
the time, with its main feature being a 50 percent reduction for the western stock.581
Although the Swedish proposal to list bluefin under CITES was defeated, "some consider
it a victory because this issue has now been elevated to international attention and things are
never going to be the same." 582 Unfortunately, this action did not motivate ICCAT to
reduce the total allowable quotas for bluefin.
2. Kenya's Proposal - Prior to the CITES conference in November, 1994, Kenya,
prompted by NOOls, proposed that international trade of both the northern and southern
bluefin tuna be monitored under the auspices of CITES. However, pressure from Japan,
which provides a large somce of funds to Kenya (more than $100 million per year). forced
Kenya to drop the proposal a month before the CITES meeting. "Once again. the short-
term interests of the fishing industry have prevailed over concern for a declining fishery
resource. "583
580 (Sarma. 1993), p. 2 & 7.
581 Ibid.
582 (Weisman. 1992). p. AS.
583 (Sutton. WWF. 1994), personal interview by author.
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E. IS THERE A NEED FOR A CITES LISTING? - "When compared to ICCAT, CITES
is presendy a more effective Convention for potentially providing trade protection over
some marine species, and in providing a forum for international discussion."584 A listing
under CITES, either Appendix lor II, is both justified and rational in light of the status of
the Atlantic bluefin populations and the limitations under ICCATIS management. In short,
listing bluefin species under Appendix I would only allow trade of the tuna in exceptional
circumstances and subject the tuna to particularly strict regulations.585 Both party and non-
party countries would be required to track any trade of Atlantic bluefin tuna Even if Japan,
the largest importer of bluefin, were to take a reservation to this species, trade should
significantly decrease since Japan could only trade with non-parties to CITES or those
parties which also take a reservation to the species. If Japan did take a reservation, "it is
unlikely that any of the major exporters of bluefin [U.S., Australia, Canada, Spain, and
Taiwan] would also take a reservation to bluefin tuna if it was listed on either Appendix I or
11."586
Additionally, as was evidenced before in the case of the hawksbill turtle, "if Japan
[did take a reservation and] continued to conduct large amounts of illegal trade in the
bluefin species, the use of sanctions (or the threat ot) by the U.S. may persuade Japan to
remove its reservation and comply with CITES mandates."587 For an Appendix II listing
of Atlantic bluefin tuna, export pennits would be required, monitored, and limited when
deemed necessary by the Scientific and Management Authorities of CITES Parties.588 As
stated previously, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in tenns of
overlapping reporting requirements of ICCAT and CITES, ICCAT member countries
would comply with ICCAT's Statistical Documentation Program, (once its implemented)
versus the CITES pennit requirements. An Appendix II listing of bluefin could provide a
584 (Shumaker, U.S. Fish & Wildlife. 1995). phone interview by author.
585 (Wijostekers. 1992). p. 5.
586 (Dane. U.S. Fish & Wildlife. 1995). phone interview with author.
587 Ibid.
588 (Wijostekers, 1992). p. 6.
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significant benefit by mandating that non-ICCAT member countries, which are party to
CITES, be required to issue export permits with a finding that the export of the bluefin
would not be detrimental to the survival of the species.589
From the analyses above, it is reasonable to conclude that CITES provides a
solution to some of the fundamental problems inherent in fisheries management, which
ICCAT has been unable to reform. CITES benefits include the fact that CITES targets the
data gathering problem by providing access to an established framework for monitoring
international trade in bluefin tuna The CITES system would monitor trade from all
countries. In addition, the data gathered would identify the countries shipping bluefin, the
quantity, the catching country and the importing country - all of which is important in
assessing the level of mortality and the countries primarily responsible for the greatest
impact This data, in tum, would be available to ICCAT for decision making purposes.
Secondly, CITES' allowance of NGO participation has proven invaluable in terms
of providing technical and financial support, increasing public awareness over illegal acts,
and acting as a watchdog over CITES goals.
Thirdly, the CITES structure targets some of the conflicts between member
countries by allowing for flexibility and a forum for discussing aspects of the conflicting
philosophies. The realization by environmental interests that economic development is a
non-negotiable priority of developing countries; together with the acknowledgment by
economic interests that conservation ideals cannot be subverted or avoided, can help the
world's nations come closer to compromise as trade issues continue to confront
environmental concerns at the debating table. The CITES framework is currently the most
credible fonun to facilitate these and other international discussions.
Lastly, all fisheries organizations considered thus far have significantly fewer
parties than CITES and no mechanism for controlling international trade. The broad
membership of CITES helps to combat the exploitive fishing practices of those countries
589 (peel, 1994), p. 6.
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not presently party to less inclusive organizations, such as ICCAT. Both CITES and
ICCAT allow reservations from members. However, where ICCAT only recommends
regulations, CITES mandates its requirements to the appendices, holding Parties much
more accountable.
In examining the functions and strengths and weaknesses of CITES in comparison
to ICCAT, it becomes clear that by mandating trade restrictions for the over-exploited
Atlantic bluefin tuna, CITES would likely facilitate the species' recovery. This benefit
would accrue regardless of the applicability of other treaties and could actually stimulate the
implementation of other agreements, such as ICCAT. In fact, such action by CITES would
help further the stated objective of most international fisheries agreements to maintain fish
populations at levels which will permit a maximum sustainable yield.
Conclusion of Hypothesis Two and Three - Based on the analysis above, it may be
reasonably concluded that hypothesis two, which states that both ICCAT and CITES have
identifiable problems within areas such as data collection and analysis, lack of compliance
to the Convention, conflict between member countries and non-member countries, and
enforcement, is indeed valid.
We may also conclude that hypothesis three, which states that despite its
weaknesses, CITES is a viable tool for advancing the protection of bluefin tuna, is proven
true. Taken together, a CITES listing would strengthen ICCAT's existing management
regime by controlling the international trade of bluefin tuna
F. TOWARDS A GLOBAL FISHERY ORGANIZATION
Presently, CITES can be a valuable tool in managing the international trnde of
bluefin stocks effectively. Yet, to improve fisheries management for the future and to
overcome some of the inherent problems seen in fisheries organizations. it would be
reasonable to broaden and strengthen the scope of fishery organizations responsible for
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research and management of tuna and associated species. In fact, a global management
organization, evolving from CITES and the autonomous regional fisheries organizations
that presently exist, would be the most effective arrangement in terms of gathering
statistical information, coordinating regional management decision making, and
enforcement.590
None of the currently existing organizations for tuna research and management are
dealing effectively with all of the problems previously discussed.59l Because bluefin tuna
are highly migratory, vessels that harvest the tuna are mobile, and the international trade
market for this species continues to proliferate, tuna research and management could be
accomplished most efficiently on a global basis. The establishment of a global body is
complex mainly because of the complicated and sometimes volatile political state of the
world today. A realistic formation of a global organization is presented by Joseph in his
attempt at modeling international tuna management for the funrre. Joseph suggests:
"It might be more realistic to expect that a global organization could result from
the regional organizations that currently exist for the management of tuna and other
highly migratory species. Since none of the regional organizations seem to be fully
effective, a first logical step would be to strengthen them ... by modifying or
rewriting their conventions.
Once the regional bodies were empowered with the authority to carry out their
functions effectively they could coordinate their activities through a central
coordinating council composed, for example, of key members, of the regional
organizations. Although this council would not be a policy making body it could
serve in several important capacities, including the coordination of data collection,
vessel transfers, catch allocations and enforcement.
Once this system was operational, and if it were functioning effectively, the
advantages of global management would be evident and political will for such a
system attainable. The central council could then evolve into a governing rather
590 (Joseph & Greenough, 1979), p. 180-197.
591 (Burke & Christy, 1990), p.2.
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than a coordinating body. The autonomous regional organizations would be
grouped into divisions and staffing would be centralized.
In summary, if the highly migratory species are to be managed effectively and
their continued abundance insured for the benefit of future generations, a series of
compromises on the part of all nations is essential. These compromises will need to
be based not only on customary international law, but also on the law of nature." 592
Fonnation of a global fisheries management Ixxiy in the future should result from
the currently existing fisheries organizations, ICCAT, IATIC, CCSBT, FFA, and
IOFC/IPFC. In addition, if CITES has jurisdiction over international trade management
for the bluefin tuna, it would greatly aid in the ease and expediency or developing the
global organization, due to its effectiveness as an international organization.
The Law of the Sea Pertaining to High Seas Fishing - In addition to working towards a
CITES listing and a global fisheries organization for the future, other efforts have been,
and continue to be undertaken by coastal states, distant water fishing nations, and
international organizations to manage high seas fisheries, in particular "straddling"593 fish
stocks and highly migratory species.
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea - One approach towards initiating
fisheries management for the future, includes regulations by coastal states that apply to tuna
fishing within the EEZ as well as beyond, based upon provisions of the 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea (LOS).594 Article 116 of the 1982 Convention. which derives from
the 1958 Convention of Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, establishes that high seas fishing rights are subject to coastal state rights.595 This is
592 (Joseph. 1983). p. 149. For further information on slI'Ucturing a global organization. see (Joseph.
1983) and (Joseph & Greenough. 1979), p. 180-197.
593 According to the 1982 LOS. "straddling" fish stocks are dermed as those which occur both within areas
of national jurisdiction and in the high seas area beyond and adjacent to the exclusive economic zone.
(AiCONF.62/122. Art. 63)
594 (See U.N. Document AlCONF.621122 of Oct. 7, Nov. 23. & Nov. 26.1982)
595 (Burke & Christy, 1990). p. 20-21.
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an entirely new provision in the international law of the sea. This Article 116 might be
interpreted by coastal states as providing a basis for protecting its interests in tuna within its
zone of national jurisdiction. The protective measure would extend conservation and
allocation procedures to fishing activity on the high seas which impacts on tuna also caught
within the coastal states' EFZ.596 Although coastal states have not sought to fully rely on
article 116 to protect their tuna interests, this may be a possible approach taken in the
fUUlre, which could affect highly migratory fisheries management
Many of the LOS Convention provisions relating to the management and
conservation of living resources are now regarded by many as customary international
law.597 Nevertheless, as seen through this research, the inability of coastal and distant
water fishing nations and fishery organizations to cooperate in the management and
conservation of these living resources continues to lead to unsustainable fishing and the
collapse of many stocks. The problem of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks is
still a subject of debate and conflict598 As a result, the United Nations convened an
intemational Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.599
The Conference, held first in 1993, was intended to: a) identify and assess existing
problems related to the conservation and management of such stocks; b) consider means of
improving cooperation among states; and, c) formulate appropriate recommendations.600
Through the Conference sessions it became clear that there were many issues that needed to
be addressed and resolved to effect an adequate regime for the conservation and
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks concerned Many distant water
fishing nations (and NGOs) argued that the conference should consider conservation and
management measures for the fish stock as a biological unit over its entire range of
596 Ibid.
597 (Meltzer, 1994), p. 255-258.
598 Ibid.
599 «AJRES/471192) 22 Dec. 92)
600 Ibid.
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distribution, not divided along political boundaries.60 1 This view calls for cooperation of
management measures in EEZs and on the high seas, denying any special interests of
coastal states in ensuring that measures on the high seas are consistent with the
conservation and management measures within the adjacent EEZ.602 Yet many coastal
states argued that this view would compromise their sovereignty over the living resources
within the EEZ, as provided for under the 1982 LOS.603 Although considerable progress
was made in the Conference sessions, reconciliation of these divergent positions to achieve
effective and sustainable management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks was
not reached.604
While the 1982 LOS has become international treaty law for its 6O-plus ratifiers,605
the subject of straddling stocks and highly migratory species is still controversial because
high seas fishing nations cannot be sanctioned or forced to comply with the convention IS
conservation and management obligations.606 The lack of an enforceable international
mechanism for management and conservation of high seas living resources remains an
urgent environmental problem.
The implementation of a global fisheries organization and/or the strengthening of
the high seas provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention to adequately address conservation
of highly migratory species, such as the Atlantic bluefin tuna, will most likely happen far
into the future. Yet, the status of the Atlantic bluefin population demands a pro-active
response immediately. Thus, a listing under CITES is a rational proposal in beginning to
help rebuild the populations to a sustainable level.
601 (Meltzer. 1994). p.322-328.
602 Ibid.
603 Ibid.
604lbid For further information on the discussions and cooflicts over straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks. see Meltzer. 1994 and Vicuna, 1993.
605 Note: the 1982 LOS became international treaty law in November 1994. Ibid.
606 Ibid.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
The abundance of both northern and southern bluefin tuna has been drastically
reduced by commercial fishing for human consumption. Such factors as the declaration of
exclusive economic zones, and the increases in international trade, consumer demand, and
vessel range and fish-finding technology, have combined to restructure world tuna markets
into a sophisticated international environment where the demand for sashimi-grade tuna has
risen dramatically, causing fishing mortality on bluefin tuna to rise at alanning rates. These
factors have been especially damaging to the western Atlantic population, where the
number of adults has significantly declined since the early 1970's.
Over the past twenty years, many countries have entered the competition for the
bluefin species due to the lucrative monetary rewards, with the U.S. and Japan continuing
to be the major tuna consuming countries. Japan is now by far the most lucrative trade
destination for bluefin tuna, which is much in demand as fare at sushi bars. In addition,
Japan consumes approximately three quarters of the western Atlantic catch. The Japanese
demand for both fresh and frozen bluefin is still rising and the very high prices continue to
bring more effort into this over-harvested fishery. A disturbing consequence of the intense
fishing pressure is that those profiting from the remainder of the bluefin population have
little financial incentive to stop over-fishing, much less rebuild the population to a higher,
more productive level.
Tuna abundance has rested upon the effectiveness of international fishery regulatory
agencies, such as ICCAT, IATIC and CCSBT to reduce high fishing mortality levels and
keep stocks at sustainable levels, through the use of regulations and by restricting
international trade.607 There is a simple yet elusive truth which fishery organizations must
follow: healthy stocks, producing up to their potential, yield more fish and generate greater
607 (Beddington and Rettig, 1983), p. 31-33.
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economic perfonnance for commercial fishennen as a whole, the fishing public and the
consumer than do depleted stocks. Unfortunately, the history of international management
of large oceanic species has shown that regulations are usually promulgated only after
abundance is greatly reduced.608 Recovery of the overfished species is usually slow due
to the biological characteristics of these large fish, the degree to which they are reduced,
and the high quotas originally set to obtain international agreement on restrictions.609
An instance where an oceanic pelagic fish stock \yas driven to commercial
extinction or near extinction by fishing has not yet been documented.61o However, some
species, like bluefin tuna, have been greatly reduced by extensive exploitation and may
indeed be in jeopardy of commercial extinction. The challenge is to obtain maximum
sustainable harvests by effective management instead of allowing unregulated exploitation
to threaten the specie's long-term economic viability.611 Historical harvest levels highlight
the potential that can be realized by conserving immature as well as the "giant" bluefins at
this time.
ICCAT has been entrusted with the responsibility of managing Atlantic bluefin
tuna, yet the species has declined at an alanning rate over the past 20 years. Use of quotas,
minimum size limits, and closures to limit fishing were first implemented by ICCAT in
1982-83. However, these limitations have been insufficient to halt the decline of the
bluefin tuna population, especially in the western Atlantic adult stocks. ICCAT scientists
have stated their "serious concern over the status of Atlantic bluefin stocks, especially for
the west Atlantic. "612 The Commission's mismanagement is highlighted by the U.S.
National Marine Fisheries Service's recent analysis showing that if the Commission had
simply not raised the catch quota from 1,160 to 2,660 metric tons in 1983, the adult
population would by now have been approximately 3.4 times what is, and would have
608 (Sutinen, 1993), p. 1-3.
609 (Joseph. 1983), p. 123-126.
610 Ibid.
611 Ibid.
612 (ICCAT, 1992), p. 153-155.
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been steadily increasing, rather than declining.613 NMFS further states that "the objective
of stemming the decline in adult population size will not be achieved under the management
program now in effect. In order to stem further decline in the adult spawning stock... it is
necessary to reduce the allowable take by.50 percent or more."614
In addition to ICCAT's failure to properly manage the bluefin species, several other
fisheries bodies, such as CCSBT and IATIC, have yet to achieve maximum sustainable
yields for over harvested tuna species, namely the southern bluefin under CCSBT and the
yellowfin under IATIC. Although international protection rules have been adopted, they
do not prevent serious production losses and biological conservation. These organizations
have neither increased net benefits to their members nor achieved acceptable and stable
patterns of allocation. The history of international fishery bodies is marked by failure and
to continue to follow the models of the past is to continue along a fruitless path.
In addition, history shows us that ICCAT, as well as other fishery organizations,
continuously evidence major problems associated with the scientific study and management
of tuna: limitations in data collection and analysis, political pressure superseding the best
available scientific data, fundamental differences between member countries (causing
passage of ineffective regulations), lack of compliance to fishery organizations regulations~
the use of flags of convenience to avoid management regulations, and poor enforcement.
One of the most difficult of these problems to overcome is the conflict between fundamental
values between organizations' member countries, as well as non-member countries. Mike
Sutton from the World Wildlife Fund, captures the dilemma in the following question,
"Why should these [developing countries] payout money to ICCAT [in dues] in order to
catch less fish?"615 Sustainability of this common resource does not seem to be of
immediate concern to developing countries, thus it will be a challenge to persuade them to
613 (powers, 1992), p. 1-2
614 (NMFS, 1992), p. 56.
615 (Sutton, WWF, 1994), interview with author.
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preserve this species for future consumption, let alone take part in the international
management over bluefin tuna
Although ICCAT has taken only a superficial approach in addressing some of the
key problems which are crucial to the success of the management plan, future progress on
improving the Atlantic bluefin tuna data base can be made through ICCAT's recent
implementation of a statistical document program. In addition, the flags of convenience
issue is being targeted through the recent FAD agreement requiring all nations to register
flags of convenience vessels. These movements give rise to the hope that the
Commission's long quiescence may be changing. Considering the increased international
interest evidenced over the bluefin tuna case, there is hope for these conservative based
developments, as well as others, to become successful in assisting conservation efforts for
the species.
Yet, of immediate concern is the fact that the high price paid for export-grnde
bluefin tuna continues to deplete the bluefin tuna fishery and ICCAT's managing body is
not taking the action necessary to stop overfishing. Thus, it appears that additional efforts
to reverse the 20 year decline in the tuna population needs to come from outside the present
ICCAT system. Of major consideration is the prospect of listing the Atlantic bluefin tuna
under the CITES purview. One way to improve the condition of the western Atlantic over-
exploited stocks is to slow down the international trade in Atlantic populations under the
auspices of CITES. A CITES listing, as a supplement to ICCAT's management regime,
would monitor the worldwide trade in bluefin tuna and provide for a more comprehensive
global management regime for the future.
Presently, the momentum behind CITES remains strong. It now has 120 Parties,
more than any other conservation convention, and consists of most of the world's
significant wildlife-importing and wildlife-exporting nations. The effort dedicated to its
administration and enforcement throughout the world goes far beyond that which has been
dedicated to other international conservation instruments. Although CITES evidences
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similar problems as seen under ICCAT, unlike the present fishery organizations ICCAT,
IATIC, CCSBT, FFA, and IOFC/IPFC, CITES is one of the few conservation treaties
which provides for a sophisticated, permanent administrative infrastructure. Overall,
CITES is considered by many to be a success in a field which is predominantly
characterized by failures.
History shows us that fisheries statistics and monitoring of trade has proven to be
far from ideal. Undoubtedly, the data collected and compil~ by a single entity, such as
CITES, is the best basis for trade monitoring, since data is most likely to be compiled in a
standard and consistent way. It has been stated that data on distribution and population
sizes are much more difficult to obtain for marine species than for terrestrial species - a
classic example is the bluefin tuna Nevertheless, since there are genuine concerns that its
survival is jeopardized, a precautionary approach616 should be taken and the bluefin tuna
should be listed under Appendix I or II (pending further scientific results) of CITES.
Trade restrictions imposed under CITES would likely facilitate the species' recovery and
would help further the maximum sustainable yield objective of ICCAT.
An immediate agreement to list the bluefin populations under the auspices of CITES
is necessary in the short term to initiate rebuilding of the species populations. For the long
term, however, the effectiveness of future tuna regulations will rest upon a global approach
and the full support of member countries to the common goal of rebuilding and
conservatively managing bluefin tuna stocks for the future.
If conservation of highly migratory species is to fully succeed in the future,
management must deal with all of the problem areas effectively, and concerned nations will
have to exhibit a stronger political will than has yet been demonstrated. The unique
characteristics of the bluefin tuna and associated species, such as their extensive migrations
and their broad oceanic areas of harvest, necessitate that international management of the
616 The precautiooary principle asserts that there is a premium on a cautious and conservative approach to
human interventions in environmental sectors that are (a) unusually short on scientific understanding, and
(b) unusually susceptible to significant injury, especially irreversible injury. (Anonymous. 1993). p. 74.
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species is required for their survival. Yet history shows us that the existing arrangements
have failed to effectively manage bluefin populations. In addition to a CITES listing to
slow down international trade, it would be reasonable and efficient to broaden the scope of
organizations responsible for research and management of tuna. A single management
organization, evolving from the existing fishery organizations of ICCAT, IATIC, CCSBT,
FFA, and IOFC/IPFC, operating on a global level, would be the most effective
arrangement of all in tenns of gathering statistical infonnation and coordinating present
fisheries bodies' management decision making. This global body could strengthen
ICCAT, IATIC, and CCSBT by rewriting their conventions to establish a framework for
dealing effectively with the main problem areas. This global organization would coordinate
activities such as data collection and analysis, management decision making, enforcement,
as well as provide a forum for world-wide meetings of alr fishery organizations concerned.
A global body could also address the limitations of FFA and IOFCIIPFC, by providing
them with access to the worldwide data base and a forum to mesh management ideas with
the other fishery organizations. If the high rates of international trade for marine species
like the bluefin could be immediately and effectively controlled through CITES, fishery
agreements could improve their management structure and work towards a global forum for
the future. The most important issue for highly migratory marine species like the bluefin
tuna becomes the need to ensure that international resources are internationally managed.617
The commercial importance of marine species and their widespread overexploitation
has led to controversy as to how and to what extent the fishery should be managed. What
remains clear, however is the fact that current bluefin tuna management has failed to
sustain the species at a maximum yield. If no further measures are taken, the species will
continue its rapid decline to the point of possible commercial extinction. It is therefore
necessary to act now, within the framework of both short and long term goals. In initiating
these measures it would be most effective to receive immediate benefit from the existing
617 A point now widely recognized and codified in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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CITES trnde regulations, while at the same time working to develop a more comprehensive
global management regime for the future. Elements of this dual approach may well prove
worthy of modeling in attempting to manage other endangered or threatened species.
The Atlantic bluefin is but one of many species declining at an alarming rate.
Extinction is a natural feature of the evolution of life on earth, but in recent times humans
have been responsible for the loss of most of the animals and plants that have disappeared.
As human populations grow, so too does the need for vigorous and comprehensive
measures to ensure the preservation of endangered and threatened species. Chief Seathl
(Seattle) of the Suwamish tribe of the State of Washington, in a letter to the President of the
United States, 1855, wrote:
"If all the beasts were gone. men would die from great loneliness of spirit. for
whatever happens to the beasts also happens to the man. All things are connected.
Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth."618
618 (CITES, 1993), p. 3.
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